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Despite the founders of social enterprises being faced with a proliferation of 
structural forms to pursue their interests, social enterprise is often portrayed as 
a homogenous organisational category. This domain is increasingly rendered a 
governable terrain (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2016) through the development of 
Kitemarks, funder/investor requirements and government policy initiatives which 
shape and control what it means to be a ‘good’ social enterprise. Such 
mechanisms have been shown to strengthen institutional coherence and drive 
structural isomorphism (i.e. Similarity) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum, 
& Jonsson, 2017). As yet, however, scant attention has been given to the ways 
in which Kitemarks, standards and funding criteria serve to prioritise and 
marginalise particular forms of social enterprise by bestowing or denying access 
to material (e.g. financial) and symbolic (e.g. legitimacy) resources. Further, the 
implications of such disciplining affects and how individual entrepreneurs 
respond to them has likewise received little attention from scholars. 
 
This thesis seeks to explicate this issue, positioning Kitemarks, standards and 
funding criteria as political artefacts that serve to discipline the structure choices 
of social entrepreneurs through prescribing desirable characteristics, behaviours 
and structures for social enterprises. This prescription becomes problematic in 
situations when adherence to such prescriptions is at odds with social 
entrepreneur’s own constructions of legitimate organising principles, which are 
perceived by them to be as socially and materially efficacious but prevent 
access to physical and symbolic resources.  
  
The qualitative data set for this thesis comprises fifteen in-depth interviews with 
social entrepreneurs and their advisors regarding structure choice. The analysis 
presented offers new insights into the dynamics of structure choice by social 
entrepreneurs, including the potential nodes of conflict between exogenous 
prescriptions and social entrepreneur’s own orientation to certain aspects of 
organisation and what social entrepreneurs actually do in the face of such 
conflict. I find that conflict is particularly prevalent in respect of ownership and 
decision-making. In order to resolve the tensions that they experience, social 
4 
 
entrepreneurs often ‘decouple’ their governance and/or organising practices 
from those prescribed in external standards or begin to create new structures 
and ways of organising on the margins of the social enterprise domain through a 
process of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009).  
 
This thesis places such structures within an extended structural typology, 
extending the work of Bull (2015, 2018), and culminates in the development of a 
practice model for social enterprise structure selection. 











This thesis is dedicated to my parents and my very patient wife who have all 
lived through the highs and the lows of its writing up over the past three years. 
Further recognition must also go to Sheffield Business School in the person of 
Ann Norton for variously supporting me to the completion of this thesis and 
conspiring with me to divert from that path in equal measure. 
 
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisory team, Professor Rory Ridley-Duff 
and Professor Tracey Coule for their support, patience and encouragement as 
this thesis developed from an idea thrown around in a classroom to its 
completion. In further thanks to you both; Tracey, for your continual support as 
well as encouraging me to write and present my first academic conference 
paper and Rory for including me in some of your many projects, especially the 
UK Conference Committee for the 7th L’Emergence de l’Entreprise Sociale en 
Europe (EMES) International Research Conference in 2019. 
 
Secondly, I would also like to thank the many research participants in my study 
from whom I have learnt an immeasurable amount alongside taking great joy 
and encouragement from you all during the time we spent together. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Dr Murray Clark for many things; for his 
encouragement to join the doctoral programme in the first instance, for his good 
humoured belligerence, for his support for me as a new academic colleague 




Table of Contents 
 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................ 9 
List of Tables..................................................................................................... 11 
List of figures..................................................................................................... 12 
 
Chapter 1 -  Introduction ................................................................................... 13 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 13 
1.2 Research context. ....................................................................................... 13 
1.3 Background to social enterprise structure selection. ................................... 14 
1.4 Research purpose ....................................................................................... 16 
1.5 Research contributions. .............................................................................. 17 
1.6 Methodological overview.............................................................................. 18 
1.7 Structure of the thesis ................................................................................. 18 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature review ............................................................................ 20 
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 20 
2.1 The logic of social enterprise ...................................................................... 21 
2.2 The (social) entrepreneur ............................................................................ 40 
2.3 Implications for structure choice .................................................................. 49 
2.4 Chapter summary ....................................................................................... 52 
 
Chapter 3 - Methodology .................................................................................. 54 
3.1 An interpretative approach to understanding social enterprise structure 
selection. ........................................................................................................... 54 
3.2 The qualitative research methodology ........................................................ 55 
3.3 Research methodology ............................................................................... 57 
3.4 Research methods ...................................................................................... 57 
3.5 Data collection ............................................................................................ 59 
3.6 Sampling technique and sample selection .................................................. 60 
3.7 Data analysis .............................................................................................. 64 
3.8 Quality criteria ............................................................................................. 69 
3.9 Ethical issues .............................................................................................. 70 




Chapter 4: Findings ........................................................................................... 73 
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 73 
4.1 Entrepreneurial orientations towards organising - ownership and decision 
making. ............................................................................................................. 73 
4.1.1 Orientations towards ownership. .............................................................. 73 
4.1.2 Orientation towards decision making. ...................................................... 77 
4.2 Influences concerning access to finance: borrowing, investment & grants. 81 
4.3 The orientation of social entrepreneurs towards government policy. .......... 85 
4.4 Influences concerning the prioritisation and marginalisation of structures. . 86 
4.4.1 The construction and reconstruction of social enterprise; the influence of 
legitimacy and privilege through kites-marks and standards. ............................ 86 
4.4.2 The influence of structural pluralism, confusion and complexity. ............. 91 
4.4.3 The influence of funder's attitudes towards legal structures ..................... 93 
4.4.4 The influence of business, legal and governance advice. ........................ 95 
4.5 Social entrepreneurs responses to internal or external contradictions and 
tensions. ........................................................................................................... 99 
4.6 Chapter summary. .................................................................................... 102 
 
Chapter 5: Discussion. .................................................................................... 104 
5.1 The construction and categorisation of social enterprises. ....................... 107 
5.2 Tensions between the dominant social enterprise category and the 
organising orientations of social entrepreneurs............................................... 114 
5.3 How social entrepreneurs respond in the face of conflict with the institutional 
logics of the dominant social enterprise category. .......................................... 116 
5.4 Chapter summary. .................................................................................... 120 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions. .................................................................................. 122 
6.1 Contribution to practice ............................................................................. 122 
6.1.1 A practice model for social enteprise structure selection. ...................... 127 
6.2 Contribution to knowledge......................................................................... 131 
6.3 Limitations and further research. ............................................................... 134 
6.3.1 Limitations. ...................................................................................... 134 
6.3.2 Future research. ............................................................................. 135 





Appendices. .................................................................................................... 159 
Appendix 1. Interview invitation letter. ............................................................. 159 
Appendix 2. Participant interview questions .................................................... 161 





List of Abbreviations 
 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO) 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Community Benefit Society (CBS) 
Community Interest Company (CIC) 
Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG) 
Company Limited by Shares (CLS) 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
Emergence de l’Entreprise Sociale en Europe (EMES) 
Finnish Social Enterprise Mark (F-SEM) 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)  
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
Higher Education Institution (HEI) 
Industrial and Provident Society (IPS)  
International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR) 
Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) 
National Health Service (NHS) 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) 
Small, to Medium Enterprise (SME) 
Social Enterprise Limited Liability Partnership (SELLP) 
Social Enterprise Mark (SEM) 
10 
 
Social Enterprise UK (SEUK) 
Social Investment Tax Relief (SITR) 
Social Return on Investment (SROI) 
United Kingdom (UK) 




List of Tables 
 




List of figures 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Data reduction approach, adapted from Thomas (2006) 
Figure 3.2: Data structure and the formatting of the Findings chapter 
Figure 5.1: A Social enterprise structure selection model 
Figure 6.1: Social enterprise legal structure model, adapted from Bull (2018) 









The primary purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of how 
social entrepreneurs select the structure(s) for the enterprise(s) that they create. 
This thesis takes into account the current academic and practitioner literature 
and presents both an extension to Bull's (2015, 2018) structural typology of 
social enterprises alongside a new practice model for the selection of social 
enterprise structures. 
 
This chapter examines the importance of the research context, presents the 
background in which social entrepreneurs select structures for their enterprises, 
and explains the objectives and structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research context. 
 
Social enterprises are competitive and co-operative businesses, trading with a 
social purpose that can be said to have the following characteristics; "an 
enterprise orientation, so are involved in producing goods or providing services 
to a market and seek to be viable trading concerns. Social enterprises have 
explicit social or environmental aims and they are autonomous organisations 
with governance and ownership structures that are often based on participation 
by stakeholder groups where profits may be distributed as profit-sharing to 
stakeholders or used for the benefit of the community" (Social Enterprise 
London, 2001, p2).  
 
The origins of the social enterprise movement can be traced back to groups like 
the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers formed in 1844 to combat the 
unethical practices of mill owners in the UK (See Fairbairn, 1994; Van Opstal, 
2010). Beginning in the mid 1990's the social enterprise movement began to 
grow in importance with a number of different types of organisations, including 
trading charities, co-operatives, community enterprises, and other forms of 
social businesses coming together with a common aim of using enterprise as a 
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vehicle for social change (Leadbeater, 1997; Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 
2015; Pearce & Kay, 2003). This movement continues to grow in both economic 
and social importance with most recent data suggesting that there are an 
estimated 471,000 SME (small to medium enterprise) social enterprises in the 
UK. Furthermore, these social enterprises employ 1.44 million people (Gov.UK, 
2017a) with the sector as a whole contributing approximately £24 billion to the 
UK economy (Social Enterprise UK, 2017b). However, Ridley-Duff & Bull (2019) 
now estimate this figure to be £70.6 billion or £100 billion if co-operatives are 
included, with a broader social economy of £245 billion. 
 
Various governments have seen social enterprise as offering a unique 
combination of socially orientated, flexible and innovative solutions to the 
delivery of public services such as health care (Sepulveda, Lyon, & Vickers, 
2018). The growth of the prominence of social enterprises in the delivery of 
public services in recent times has in part been driven by challenges to the 
public finances (See also Pearce & Kay, 2003) but also by government 
legislation in the form of The Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 (Social 
Enterprise UK, 2012; Gov.UK, 2012a). The act requires commissioners of public 
services 'explicitly evaluate' as well as have 'due regard' for the creation of 
social value (Gov.UK, 2012a) therefore strengthening the position of social 
enterprises in this part of the economy. 
 
The growing prominence of social enterprise over the last thirty years in both the 
economic and social landscapes (Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2011, 2015; Social 
Enterprise UK, 2017b; Gov.UK, 2017a) would suggest that this is an important 
area of study and one in which further research may make a substantial 
contribution to academic understanding and the professional practice of social 
entrepreneurs (Dees, 1998; Defourny & Nyssens, 2010, 2017a, 2017b; Nicholls, 
2006). 
 
1.3 Background to social enterprise legal structures selection. 
 
The selection of appropriate structures for social enterprises has received 
relatively little attention from scholars save from a few that have sought to 
address structure selection either directly (Cox, 2006, 2012), or in relation to; 
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typology (Bull, 2015, 2018), governance (Spear, Cornforth, & Aiken, 2007, 2009) 
new forms of social enterprise (Ridley-Duff, 2015) or the role of standards 
(Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 2012). However, there has been much practitioner 
and government debate over the past ten to fifteen years (Bates, Wells, 
Braithwaite, Social Enterprise London, 2003; Cox, 2012; Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011; DLA Piper & UNLtd,  2014; Frail & 
Pedwell, 2003; Giotis, 2010; Guardian, 2011;  Morrison Foerster & Trust Law, 
2012; Social Enterprise UK, 2017a; Wrigleys Solicitors, 2014;) as social 
enterprises have sought to protect both their assets for social purpose whilst 
trading effectively in often highly competitive environments. This thesis argues 
that structure choice holds wide-ranging and profound implications for 
investment/funding options and trading opportunities as well as the protection of 
social purpose and/or assets (Spear et al., 2007, 2009; Giotis, 2010; Guardian, 
2011). Both of these factors are important in respect of the financial health and 
growth of social enterprises alongside the generation of social capital, therefore 
taken together represent a significant issue within the social enterprise 
discourse that is worthy of study.  
 
Doug Richards (chair of the Conservative Party, Small business taskforce), at the 
launch of 'Entrepreneurs manifesto and declaration of rights' in 2010, usefully 
summed up the dilemma that social entrepreneurs face with regard to structure 
selection; "social enterprises must make a Hobson’s choice early on and they live 
with the consequences of structures that do not accommodate growth or a 
change in approach to securing capital" (Giotis, 2010, page 1). Following this, the 
debate continued, in January 2011 with the Guardian Newspaper hosting a live 
debate on social enterprise legal structures (Guardian, 2011) during which it was 
suggested, whilst citing unpublished research for the Social Enterprise Coalition, 
that more than 50% of all social enterprises were dissatisfied with their current 
structure.  
The debate surrounding issues of legal structure developed further in 2014 with 
the Government's Autumn Statement in which it was announced that it was 
extending the social investment tax relief scheme (SITR) (Gov.UK, 2017b) with 
effect from 2015. This allowed investors making investments into 'social 
enterprises' to claim a 30% income tax relief. However, the definition of social 
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enterprise applied related directly to legal structure as the investee organisation 
had to be a Community Interest Company (CIC), a charity or a Community Benefit 
Society (CBS), therefore excluding social enterprises limited by shares and co-
operatives that are not for community benefit. The key issue surrounding the 
exclusion of these social enterprises centred on the absence of an “asset lock” in 
their legal structure. Small amendments were made to the scheme in 2018, but 
the exclusion of the aforementioned structures remains and serves to hinder the 
growth of non-asset locked social enterprises. 
 
1.4 Research purpose  
 
At the present time there remains no definition in law of a social enterprise in the 
UK excepting for the purposes a small number of government programmes 
(Morgan, 2013), therefore the social entrepreneur has a significant number of 
potential options in respect of structure. As social enterprises cannot be defined 
by their legal status they can only be characterised by the nature of what they do 
and how they do it, such that this is embedded in the forms of social ownership 
and governance that they adopt alongside the way they utilise the profits they 
generate through their trading activities (Bates, Wells, & Braithwaite, Social 
Enterprise London, 2003; Frail & Pedwell, 2003).  Therefore, choices regarding 
the structure of social enterprises are contingent upon a mix of factors including 
the enterprise's social purpose, the stakeholders involved, the scale on which it 
will operate and the way it will be financed as well as how it creates additional 
social value using its surplus (Bates, Wells, Braithwaite & Social Enterprise 
London, 2003; Cox, 2006).  
 
Social entrepreneurs are faced with a plethora of choices regarding the structure 
for their social enterprise(s) as an investigation of the currently available structure 
options, alongside the related literature and practitioner decision support material, 
uncovers a complex mix of seven different types of possible legal structure 
together with other variants of those types (Morgan, 2013; Cox, 2006). Further, 
the support organisation the School for Social Entrepreneurs (2018) suggests that 
there are twelve common structures available to social entrepreneurs.   
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Despite the founders of social enterprises being faced with a plurality of structural 
forms to pursue their interests, I argue that social enterprise is most often 
portrayed as a homogenous organisational category that I refer to as the 'social 
enterprise category' and that is increasingly being governed (Nickel & Eikenberry, 
2016) through the development of Kitemarks, funder/investor requirements and 
government policy initiatives that act to shape and control what it means to be a 
‘good’ social enterprise. Such mechanisms have been shown to strengthen 
institutional coherence and drive structural isomorphism (i.e. Similarity) (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). As yet, however, scant attention 
has been given to the ways in which these Kitemarks, standards and funding 
criteria serve to prioritise and marginalise particular forms of social enterprise by 
bestowing or denying access to material (e.g., financial) and symbolic (e.g., 
legitimacy) resources and the implications of such disciplinary affects or how 
individual social entrepreneurs respond.  
 
The research question selected for this thesis is, therefore, "What influences 
social entrepreneurs to adopt particular social enterprise structures and why?". 
 
1.5 Research contributions. 
 
I extend the current understanding of social enterprise structure selection in three 
ways. Firstly, by highlighting the disciplining effects of Kitemarks, standards and 
funding criteria on the structure choices of social entrepreneurs. In doing so, I 
explain how these serve to prioritise and marginalise particular forms of social 
enterprise by bestowing or denying access to material and symbolic resources. 
Secondly, by examining the implications of such disciplining affects and how 
individual entrepreneurs respond to them, I explain how new forms of social 
enterprise emerge. Finally by presenting a practice model for the selection of 
structures for social enterprises that departs from the current linear rational 
models and does not serve to promote a particular category of social enterprise or 
related structure over another. Here instead, I illuminate the important 
components that need to be developed in the selection of that structure alongside 
the ordering of those components. Further, it is hoped that this thesis may help to 
stimulate some degree of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, et al., 2009) in 
the development of new structures that more adequately address the tensions 
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between the organising orientations of social entrepreneurs and the structures 
that are currently prioritised or marginalised by external factors. 
 
1.6 Methodological overview 
 
In respect of the nascent theoretical understanding of the complex and nuanced 
nature of social enterprise structure selection, a qualitative approach and an 
inductive strategy have been adopted. This strategy follows the systematic 
procedure presented by Thomas's (2006) general inductive approach for 
analysing qualitative evaluation data. The data for this thesis was collected using 
a face to face interview instrument applied to the cases of fifteen social 
entrepreneurs and their advisers. The data collected was then subjected to a 
thematic analysis (Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009); Braun and Clarke, 
2006; Fugard and Potts, 2015) using the Nvivo software package in order to 
develop themes and clusters of themes from fragments of coded text.  The 
interplay between coded text, themes and clusters of themes in relation to the 
research question continued through several iterations of review and decision on 
what was more or less important in the data. From this iterative interplay, the 
theoretical building blocks for a new model for social enterprise structure selection 
were developed. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis includes six chapters.  Following this introductory chapter, chapter 
two presents a critical review of literature related to social enterprise structure 
selection, placing this in the context of institutional theory. The key concepts 
addressed relate to issues surrounding definitions of social enterprise, the 
nature of the social entrepreneur, the implications for organising, the institutional 
logics, kite-marks, legal structures, advice (business & governance) and funding 
for social enterprise activity. 
 
Chapter three is concerned with the research approach used and the research 
design. The qualitative research approach is discussed as are the method 
(interview technique), the data collection process and sampling technique and 
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the data analysis approach (General Analytic Induction). Alongside this, the 
ethical considerations and limitations related to my research are considered. 
 
Chapter four presents the findings of my research including the complex 
interplay between the internalised influences on structure selection and those 
influences originating within the external social enterprise context. In exploring 
these influences, the associated tensions faced by practitioners in selecting an 
appropriate structure are highlighted alongside the actions that are taken by 
social entrepreneurs in resolving those tensions. 
 
Chapter Five presents a discussion of three interrelated themes. First, the 
construction and categorisation of social enterprises. Second, the tensions 
between the social enterprise category and the organising orientations of social 
entrepreneurs. Third, how social entrepreneurs respond in the face of conflict 
with the institutional logics of the social enterprise category. 
 
Chapter six provides a comprehensive conclusion to the thesis. This chapter 
reviews the key findings, presents the contribution I make to knowledge and 
practice, including a practice model for the selection of social enterprise 
structure. In terms of the potential limitations of this research; the location of the 
participants in the North of England it could be argued, present a particular 
socially or politically located view of social enterprise activity. However, I argue 
that many of the participants had been engaged in social enterprise or advice 
activity in other parts of the United Kingdom and overseas so have provided a 
balanced account of social enterprise structure selection in the UK. The 
conclusion of this thesis suggests that there are a number of important issues 
concerning the availability, quality and nature of advice available to social 
entrepreneurs as they begin to develop appropriate business models and 





Chapter 2 - Literature review 
Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the literature surrounding the logics of social enterprise 
activity and the influences upon that activity. Leading from this review is an 
exploration of the gap represented by the dynamic intersection of these two 
types of influence in terms of the implications for the structure choices of social 
entrepreneurs in advance of reporting the empirical findings of this study in the 
later chapters of this thesis. 
The extant research to date has explored the macro-level issues concerning 
social enterprise activity such as; the relationship with government policy 
(Carter & Jones Evans, 2006; Henderson, Reilly, Moyes, & Whittam, 2018; 
Pearce & Kay, 2003;; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2015) the development of kite-marks 
(Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 2012), legal identities (Bull, 2015, 2018), the 
provision of advice (Spear et al., 2007; European Commission, 2015; British 
Council, 2016) alongside concerns for access to funding and grants (Macmillan, 
2007; Nicholls, 2010; European Commission, 2015; Cabinet Office, 2016;  
Davies, Haugh, & Chambers, 2017; Steiner & Teasdale, 2017).  
In contrast to this interest in macro-level issues a parallel part of the social 
enterprise discourse has focused upon examining the micro level influences 
upon social enterprise activity in relation to the nature of social entrepreneurs 
(Leadbeater, 1997; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Galle, 2010; Arribas, Hernández, 
Urbano, & Vila, 2012; Ernst, 2012; Smith, Bell, & Watts, 2014), and their 
orientations towards organising in relation to the institutional logics (Fitzgerald & 
Shepherd, 2018; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Sullivan Mort, Weerawardena, & 
Carnegie, 2003) that they adopt and that in turn shape their decisions. 
However, little has been written about the dynamic intersection between these 
two types of influence and the purpose of this chapter is therefore to map the 
interplay between the macro-structures or logics that shape and condition social 
enterprise activity and the micro-level orientations of social entrepreneurs in 
advance of reporting the empirical findings of this study. 
21 
 
2.1 The logics of social enterprise 
 
Categories (Glynn & Navis, 2013) can be regarded as useful social 
constructions that provide a flexible conceptual framework that can be modelled 
and remodelled in relation to the changing economic and social realities that are 
encountered by organisations (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). In addition to being 
shaped by economic and social realities, categories are shaped by the purpose 
being pursued (Zuckerman, 1999), as in this case by the social and economic 
activity of social enterprises. Underlying these categories are a number of 
competing organising logics or  shared systems of meaning and understanding 
that underpin the category and also act to confer legitimacy upon particular 
logics that manifest as social or economic goals and operating practices 
(Ocasio, Thornton, & Lounsbury, 2017). Institutional logics relate to the 
institutionalised organising principles that underpin how organisations work 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) and that are in themselves organisational reflections 
of the logics of the social systems that those organisations inhabit. Institutional 
logics provide a useful vehicle with which to view the organising principles of 
organisations and how they work (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011) as these logics help to 
illuminate organisational characteristics such as structure, ownership, and 
identity that in turn often influence the organisational decisions and responses 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) of social entrepreneurs.  
 
In relation to the categorisation of social enterprise activity the academic 
discourse and government policy documents make significant reference to a 
location or classification in the 'third sector' or 'system' of the economy 
concerned with the 'social economy' (Cabinet Office, 2018). In classifying social 
enterprise activity in this way Pearce & Kay (2003) usefully present us with 
three systems of the economy; the first system characterised by private, 
market-driven, profit orientation, the second system characterised by public 
service, planned provision, non-trading orientation and the third system 
characterised by self-help, mutual organisation and social purpose orientation. 
The logical location of social enterprise activity between the first system 
(mainstream economic entrepreneurship) and the third system or social 
economy alongside voluntary organisations and charities but close to the first 
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system (Pearce & Kay, 2003) would support the notion that both market 
(economic value) and social (social value) logics (Fitzgerald, & Shepherd, 2018) 
are important.  
 
In relation to social logics, Harding (2006) writing for the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) UK Social Enterprise Report provides a 
composite definition of social enterprise activity building on the writings of Dees 
(1998) and Boschee & McClurg, (2003) that reflects the part that social 
entrepreneurs play as change agents in addressing pressing societal problems 
(see also Leadbeater, 1997), that they innovate to create social value and are 
accountable to the constituencies that they serve. At the same time, however, 
and in relation to market logics Harding (2007) provides a later, wide ranging 
and comprehensive definition that encompasses the use of profits; “social 
entrepreneurship is any attempt at new social enterprise activity or new 
enterprise creation, such as self-employment, a new enterprise, or the 
expansion of an existing social enterprise by an individual, team of individuals 
or established social enterprise, with social or community goals as its base and 
where the profit is invested in the activity or venture itself rather than returned to 
investors” (Harding, 2007, p. 74). Bringing together both market and social 
logics the European Commission locates social enterprise activity at the centre 
of social (explicit and primary social aim) and market (continuous economic 
activity) logics (European Commission, 2015). The positioning of market and 
social logics in this way clearly foreshadows the hybrid nature of social 
enterprises and points to a blurring and potential tension between the two logics 
 
In examining the multiple logics of social enterprise activity the entrepreneurship 
discourse continues to primarily distinguish mainstream entrepreneurship from 
social entrepreneurship by the intended outcome or financial goals over and 
above any social or environmental motivation.  This is variously described as 
the 'for profit' or 'not for profit' debate. Taking this financial goals approach and 
the notion of profit or not for profit we are presented with a spectrum upon which 
we can place social entrepreneurship (Dees & Elias, 1998; Carter & Jones 
Evans, 2006). Carter and Jones Evans (2006) provide the following illustration 
of the social end of our entrepreneurship spectrum with 'voluntary activism' 
associated with social logics at the purely social end of the scale and 'corporate 
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social innovation' associated with market logics at the economic end of the 
scale. 
 
The Carter & Jones Evans social enterprise spectrum 
   



















Carter and Jones Evans (2006) 
 
Firstly considering not for profit activity where the social mission that is 
embodied by a social logic is most explicit as 'mission-related impact' is 
presented as the central and driving force (Dees, 2007).  Meanwhile at the other 
end of the Carter and Jones Evans (2006) spectrum is placed what is described 
as mainstream entrepreneurial activity characterised, mainly, if not solely by 
market logics. Between these two poles, we have a somewhat more central 
position that attempts to balance social and market logics with the wealth 
creating activities of the enterprise being used to reinvest in the desired social 
outcomes. 
 
Following and developing this line, Neck, Brush, & Allen (2009) provide us with 
a typology in which the differentiating factor is the intended mission and provide 
the following illustration in order to place social entrepreneurship within a more 
complex spectrum of entrepreneurial activity with the 'Hybrid' enterprise at its 
centre. The spectrum of logics is expressed as four quadrants; social purpose 
(social problem solving, for profit, economic impact); traditional (economic 
mission and economic impact, with measurement being primarily economic); 
social consequence (similar to traditional enterprises but with social outcomes, 
however, these are expressed as an outcome of doing business, and not as the 
primary purpose); enterprising non-profits (earned income whilst applying the 
general principles of entrepreneurship).  




The Neck, Brush, & Allen social enterprise typology. 
 
 Venture mission  




























Neck et al. (2009). 
 
This rather neat two by two matrix provides a useful typology and positioning 
tool, however it is argued that social entrepreneurs and their enterprises do not 
fit neatly into groups one to four and often times actually tend to occupy the 
middle ground with ‘Hybrids', exhibiting characteristics (logics) of more than one 
domain (Neck et al., 2009). Citing the social enterprise findings from Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor Survey of the US, Timmons & Spinelli (2009) argue 
that there are many, many more organisations found in this hybrid category of 
organising than that of social ventures and enterprising non-profits combined 
together. Further, it is argued that often times, social entrepreneurs do not 
recognise what they are doing as social enterprise activity and actually 
undertake multiple or mixed types of social, economic and hybrid 
entrepreneurial activity concurrently (Lepoutre, Justo, Terjesen, & Bosma, 
2013).  
 
The institutional logics associated with each of these types of social enterprise 
activity are recognisable “socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules” that shape organisational 
choices and responses including structure selection (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 
p. 804) both consciously and unconsciously (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
Institutional logics can shape the actions of social entrepreneurs in that they 
Hybrid 
Removed for reasons of copyright. 
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provide meanings for action (Vurro, Dacin, & Perrini, 2010) and therefore 
provide a source of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is important in 
terms of social enterprise activity as this not only concerns how audiences 
respond to the enterprise but also how they understand it; such that some forms 
of social enterprise structure may not only be seen "as more worthy, but also as 
more meaningful, more predictable, and more trustworthy (Suchman, 1995, 
page 575) by customers, advisers, funders and investors. In the case of social 
enterprise structure selection, legitimacy relates to both external structural 
legitimacy and an internal evaluation of legitimacy by social entrepreneurs. 
First, through the pursuit of a structure that might convey organisational 
legitimacy as the organising logics are conveyed at a macro-level (Suchman, 
1995) to the stakeholders of the enterprise. Second, as social entrepreneurs 
seek to project their own micro level evaluation of legitimacy to the macro-level 
through adoption of rhetorical legitimation strategies (Bitektine & Haack, 2015) 
in order to support their chosen organising logics. 
 
Institutional logics further influence the actions of social entrepreneurs through 
the content of dominant institutional logic or more formalised institutionalised 
template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) of social enterprise activity and 
the variety of different logics competing within that field (institutional coherence) 
both of which can be seen to be important in shaping the actions of social 
entrepreneurs and in constraining them (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Scholars have 
suggested that tension and conflict arises when groups either within or outside 
of the organisation support different logics and compete over which should be 
adopted (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013b). However, social 
entrepreneurs may accept different logics (market, social or hybrid) if they 
perceive that the need for the enterprise will be supported by key stakeholders 
(Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018) or depending on their level of association with 
the logics, they may potentially ignore, reject, comply, combine, or 
compartmentalise them (Pache & Santos, 2013a). In complying, social 
entrepreneurs may engage in tactical (Dey & Teasdale, 2016) or strategic 





Social and ethical values, beliefs, and practices typify the social logics of social 
enterprise activity and often include; strong stakeholder involvement, 
democratic governance, shared commitment to a social mission and acting 
ethically (Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 2015) so as to provide legitimacy. 
Equally, however, competitive market orientation and profit maximisation typify 
market logics where competitive positioning, therefore, becomes the primary 
source of legitimacy for an enterprise (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Authors 
(Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018) suggest that by trying to combine both social 
logics alongside market logics social entrepreneurs endeavour to achieve a 
delicate balance between for-profit (market logic) and not for profit (social logic) 
behaviours that often lead to conflict between competing demands (Pache & 
Santos, 2013a; Besharov & Smith, 2014). These tensions often reach a point of 
forced resolution in the selection of structure as dilemmas concerning the 
distribution of profits or their investment in the social mission become important 
alongside the sharing or retention of decision making (Pache & Santos, 2013b). 
This presents an interesting paradox insomuch that if social value is created by 
giving members the power to distribute profits, but they decide (democratically) 
to distribute them in ways which others deem to be 'private' (mutual) rather than 
'social' (philanthropic), there is a conflict between two different perspectives on 
value creation. 
 
A review of the legal literature reveals that for social enterprises unlike other 
types of enterprise, there are a far greater number of available structures 
alongside many variants that might be considered. The available choices of 
incorporated legal form currently include; the private company, the Community 
Interest Company (CIC), the Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO), Co-
operative Society, the Community Benefit Society (CBS) and the Limited 
Liability Partnership (LLP) (See also Bates, Wells & Braithwaite & Social 
Enterprise London, 2003; Morrison Foerster & Trust Law, 2012;  Social; Social 
Enterprise UK, 2017a).  However, despite social enterprises being faced with a 
plurality of structural forms to pursue their interests, social enterprise is most 
often portrayed in government policy documents as a homogenous 
organisational category such that this serves to strengthen institutional 
coherence and drive structural isomorphism (i.e. similarity) (DiMaggio & Powell, 
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1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017) disciplining what it means to be a ‘good’, 
legitimate social enterprise.  
 
In sum, there is considerable competition over which 'social' logics should 
inform questions of legitimacy including those (Bull, 2015, 2018; Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2014, 2017a; Ridley-Duff, 2015) that argue for a range of social logics 
to be recognised and legitimised so long as they fall within a broad 'for-purpose' 
logic of social enterprise of all types. 
 
The work of scholars associated with the EMES network in Europe (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2017a, 2017b) and the UK (Nicholls, 2006; Bull, 
2015, 2018; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018;) are most helpful in beginning to frame a 
discourse that goes beyond the dichotomy of 'social' vs 'market' logics. 
Defourny & Nyssens (2006, 2014, 2017a, 2017b) position four types of social 
enterprise based on core interests (general, mutual and capital interest) or 
social, mutual and market logic alongside positioning their sustainability in terms 
of a spectrum of non-market to market income, with social enterprises 
presented as; the Social Business model, the Social Cooperative model, the 
Entrepreneurial Non-Profit model and the Public Sector (social) Enterprise. This 
framing of social enterprise by EMES scholars presents an inclusive mix of both 
social and economic logics that include considerations for the nature of the 
social mission or social aims, the type of economic model and the governance 
structure as it is argued that they serve to inform the plurality of social 
enterprise structures. More importantly, the authors conclude that these three 
key dimensions are heavily interdependent insomuch that the type of social 
mission is likely to shape both the type of business model and organising 
arrangements adopted. Therefore, the economic model is likely to influence the 
way in which the social mission is pursued/developed and the primacy of the 
social mission may be better ensured by certain forms of organising (Defourny 
& Nyssens, 2017a).  
 
Examining the current theoretical frameworks, Bull (2015, 2018) identifies a 
patchwork of conceptual lenses through which social enterprise can be viewed 
and that share commonalities in their hybridity. However, he argues that these 
conceptualisations do not recognise the breadth of organisational types nor 
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engage with the inherent differences in the enterprises presented as social 
enterprises. In response, Bull (2018) presents a model in which an outer 
triangle represents what he argues to be the consensus of four general 
principles of social enterprise; trading in goods and services, primarily for social 
value, the creation and development of social/ethical capital and the pursuit of 
economic sustainability. In support of these principles, it is widely accepted that 
social enterprises engage in the trading of goods and services (Dees, 1998; 
European Commission, 2015; Harding, 2007; Nicholls, 2006). Secondly, as 
presented by EMES scholars and the European Commission, social enterprises 
are viable (Defourny & Nyssens, 2006, 2014, 2017a, 2017b) and engaged in 
continuous economic activity (European Commission, 2015) suggesting that 
they strive for ‘social and economic sustainability’. Thirdly, it is argued (Bull, 
2018) that despite the multiplicity of organising logics underpinning social 
enterprises (Fitzgerald, & Shepherd, 2018) the fundamental purpose of social 
enterprises is primarily for 'social value’ (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Pearce & 
Kay, 2003; Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 2015). Finally, it is argued that social 
enterprises are values led organisations that are driven to create social and 
ethical capital (Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2015).  
 
In meeting these four general principles, Bull (2018) argues that an organisation 
can be defined as a social enterprise. However, the author goes on to present 
three inner triangles that integrate their organisational antecedents; charitable, 
solidarity and entrepreneurial types of UK social enterprises with their 
associated legal identities; Charity Law, Company Law and Society Law. 
Associated with each of these legal identities are three groups of legal form; 
Charitable Incorporated Organisations (CIO)'s, Co-operative Society 
Organisations (CSO's) and Limited Liability Companies (LLC's). Charitable 
Incorporated Organisations (CIOs) are presented as 'trading charitable types' 
that are regulated by the Charity Commission, with philanthropic ideology 
(Dees, 1998), unitarism (Ridley-Duff, 2007) and stewardship organising 
arrangements (Low, 2006; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Co-
operative Society Organisations (CSOs) are presented as ‘solidarity type’ social 
enterprises adopting mutual principles of organising and democratic ownership 
(Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 2015). Underpinning the CSO is an identity that 
is based on wealth distribution and stakeholder democracy through multi-
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stakeholder organising arrangements (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Ridley-Duff, 
2007, 2015). Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) are presented as enterprises 
that are primarily for social purposes and are categorised as ‘social business’ 
types of social enterprise. Bull (2018) usefully gives the example of the 
Community Interest Company (CIC) as an LLC social enterprise where a single 
Director may retain control of the business, whilst the use of profit is capped 
and the social mission is protected by law and oversight by the CIC Regulator 
(Gov.UK, 2005; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2015). LLCs might adopt either stewardship 
or democratic organising arrangements (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997; Low, 2006) and can therefore take one of three forms; a Company 
Limited by Guarantee, a Company Limited by Shares or a Community Interest 
Company. 
 
Bull's (2018) three core types are presented in terms of prioritising their 
constitution in law, through their incorporation and regulation, rather than 
emphasising a non-profit or profit-plus viewpoint. In looking at the differences 
between those enterprises that are constituted by Company, Charity and 
Society Law, Bull (2018) highlights that they are different organisational forms 
with characteristics that cannot be simply rationalised as ‘trading’ (market logic) 
and ‘social purpose’ (social logic). However, the central space of Bull's Model is 
left blank as it is argued that the "conceptualisation of social enterprise in the 
UK has no ‘ideal’ type as there is no single legal identity" (Bull, 2018, p.589). 
 
Despite warnings in the literature that "we should be wary of attempting to rely 
on one hegemonically dominant model of social enterprise" (Bull, 2018, p.600; 
Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 2012) as yet scant attention has been given to the 
ways in which government policy documents, kite-marks, standards, privileged 
structures and funding criteria serve to prioritise and marginalise particular 
forms of social enterprise by bestowing or denying access to material and 
symbolic resources. Further, the implications of such disciplining effects and 
how individual entrepreneurs respond to them have also remained largely 
unexplored. 
 
Current government policy documents such as the recent Civil Society Strategy 
(Cabinet Office, 2018) locate social enterprises along with charities in a 
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homogenous group termed the 'social sector' alongside the 'public' and 'private' 
sectors. In this 'civil society' narrative, social enterprises are strongly identified 
with the primary purpose of "delivering social value, independent of state 
control" (Cabinet Office, 2018, p 26) suggesting the promotion of social logics 
as underpinning a social enterprise category of organisation. In further support 
of this argument, the government (Gov.UK, 2017a) further define the category 
boundaries of what is seen as social enterprise activity for their annual 'Social 
Enterprise Market Trends Report' as only those enterprises that meet certain 
criteria are included. To be included; social enterprises must generate a 
minimum 50% of their income from trading (selling products or services); must 
not pay more than 50 per cent of the profits to owners or shareholders and must 
have primarily social/environmental objectives, mainly reinvesting their profits 
for that purpose rather than them being paid to shareholders and owners. The 
adoption of these criteria by such a powerful actor implies the prescription of a 
set of organising logics or institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et 
al., 2009) and therefore a form of statecraft (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2016). 
 
The Community Interest Company (CIC) is one of the newest types of structure 
for social enterprise and was introduced in 2005 by the Companies Act 2004 
(Gov.UK, 2004) as amended by The Community Interest Company 
(Amendment) Regulations 2009 (GOV.UK, 2009) and regulated by the 
Regulator of Community Interest Companies. A CIC may be formed to limit its 
liability by shares or by guarantee but whilst a CIC limited by shares can issue 
shares and pay dividends it is subject to a dividend cap. The two most important 
features associated with the CIC are the asset lock, and the Community Interest 
Statement and Report. The asset lock seeks to ensure that profits and assets 
remain within the CIC and are used solely for community benefit, or transferred 
to another organisation which also has an asset lock. However, it may be 
possible to legitimately transfer assets if there is an accepted 'market value' for 
the asset which means that there is no loss in value (See Ridley-Duff & Bull, 
2015 and the case of Ealing Community Transport).  
Alongside the asset lock is a Community Interest Statement, signed by all the 
company's directors, declaring that the purpose of the enterprise is for 
community benefit (social logic) rather than private profit (market logic) whilst 
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describing the activities that it intends to engage in to pursue its mission. 
However, The CIC structure has been criticised for lack of clarity concerning 
how open and democratic its corporate governance model is in relation to the 
engagement of wider stakeholder interests (Boeger, 2018). 
 
Embodying the key elements of social and market logics articulated in the 
government policy documents (Gov.UK, 2017a; Cabinet Office, 2018) 
discussed earlier the CIC structure has also been promoted heavily by publicly 
funded organisations such as the CIC Regulator as well as by practitioner 
groups such as Social Enterprise UK (SEUK) in a way that serves to drive 
further the institutional coherence of the social enterprise category (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017) of social enterprise activity. 
In relation to kite-marks, the Social Enterprise Mark (SEM) is promoted by the 
Social Enterprise Mark Company as "the social enterprise accreditation 
authority" (Social Enterprise Mark Company, 2018) and applicants must 
demonstrate that they meet the SEM qualifying criteria in that they must; 
1. Have social and/or environmental objectives.  
2. Be an independent business. 
3. Earn 50% or more of its income from trading. 
4. Dedicate a principal proportion (51%+) of any annual profit to 
social/environmental purposes. 
5. On dissolution of the business, will distribute all remaining residual 
assets for social/environmental purposes. 
6. Be able to demonstrate that their social/ environmental objectives are 
being achieved. 
(Social Enterprise Mark Company, 2016) 
The SEM criteria detailed above bear a striking similarity to the criteria 
discussed earlier in relation to those used for inclusion as a social enterprise in 
the government's Social Enterprise: Market Trends 2017 report and further 
serves to reinforce the institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et al., 




Kitemarks and certification systems for social enterprises are not widely 
available or adopted across Europe, with such systems being available in only 
four European countries in the form of the Finnish Social Enterprise Mark (F-
SEM), the Polish [eS] certificate, the “Wirkt” stamp (It Works) in Germany and 
the Social Enterprise Mark (SEM) in the UK (European Commission, 2015). The 
Kite marks and certification systems noted have tended to struggle to gain 
widespread recognition and have generally seen limited adoption by social 
enterprises (European Commission, 2015). However, the SEM in the UK 
appears to be gaining some traction based upon support from government and 
practitioner groups. Further, the SEM describes itself as “the only internationally 
available accreditation scheme enabling credible social enterprises to prove that 
they are making a difference” and encourages consumers and business 
partners alike to "look out for businesses displaying the Social Enterprise Mark 
and buy with confidence, knowing that you are supporting genuine social 
enterprises to continue to make a real difference" Social Enterprise Mark 
Company (2018).  Such rhetoric alongside support from other powerful actors 
serves to further strengthen, embed and 'discipline' the social enterprise 
category.  
 
The emergence of the Social Enterprise Mark in the UK took place as Ridley-
Duff & Southcombe (2012) note, amidst a number of conceptual and practical 
difficulties surrounding the definition of what a social enterprise should be 
alongside the competing institutional logics that drive how they should operate. 
Further, the authors (Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 2012) argue that the espoused 
purpose of the SEM, according to its founding CEO, was actually to defend the 
social enterprise “brand” from government-funded bodies and voluntary sector 
organisations that were neither autonomous from the state, nor pursuing their 
social mission through trading (Finlay, 2011 as cited in Ridley-Duff & 
Southcombe, 2012; Finlay, 2017). A further argument advanced at this time was 
that the SEM was a potential vehicle to prevent private enterprises from 
presenting themselves as social enterprises on the basis of their commitment to 
a corporate social responsibility (CSR) agenda (Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 
2012) so continuing to reinforce the institutionalised templates for organising 




It is interesting to note that the SEM embeds many of the assumptions of the 
CIC model and therefore makes obtaining SEM accreditation by CICs relatively 
straightforward whilst acting to exclude social enterprises with mutual or multi-
stakeholder ownership (Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 2012). A review of the 
Social Enterprise Mark directory notes a little over 150 accredited United 
Kingdom (UK) social enterprises (Social Enterprise Mark Company, 2018) with 
five organisations outside the UK having been awarded the SEM by 2017 
(Regulator of Community Interests Companies, 2017). In further embedding the 
institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) of the SEM 
during 2016 the Social Enterprise Mark Company was commissioned by the 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) to promote the SEM in 
order to encourage Higher Education Institutions (HEI's) to apply for the SEM, 
as well as promoting this to potential university applicants with around five 
Universities and Colleges being SEM accredited at that time (Guild HE, 2018).  
 
Other accreditation systems for social enterprises have been promoted such as 
the Fairbusiness mark launched by Smarter World, a human development 'think 
tank', in 2013 as a competitor to the SEM. The Fairbusiness mark criteria 
included (Civil Society, 2013); 
 
1. compliance with UK legislation and community standards 
2. generation of at least 50 per cent of its income from trading and/or 
manufacturing 
3. a statement in the enterprise's governing documents that at least 50 per 
cent of any profit is to be used to pursue social and/or environmental 
objectives 
4. have a social and/or environmental mission and policy in place 
5. be independent 
6. not rely on volunteers 
7. account for the social and environmental costs it creates.  
 
Sharing some similarity with the institutionalised templates for organising 
(Battilana, et al., 2009) of the SEM, the Fairbusiness mark did not receive 
widespread support and was largely ignored by the government, funders and 




Despite other emergent accreditation schemes and measurement mechanisms 
the SEM is now a firm part of the UK social enterprise landscape and is 
recognised by government (DBiS), government supported institutions (The 
Regulator of Community Interest Companies; the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE), Guild HE (formerly the Higher Education 
Academy) and promoted by practitioner networks such as Social Enterprise UK 
so further strengthening the institutional coherence of the category and driving 
the structural isomorphism  (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2017) of social enterprise activity. 
 
Access to appropriate finance remains the biggest barrier for start-up and 
established social enterprises with 34% of those surveyed for the Social 
Enterprise State of the Nation Report 2017 (Social Enterprise, UK, 2017b) 
seeking finance in the previous twelve months, significantly ahead of their 
mainstream SME equivalents. Further, the inability to obtain investment and 
funding is the most significant reason cited for the closure of CICs (Regulator of 
Community Interest Companies, 2017). However, the primary reason for social 
enterprises seeking finance was to fund growth and the type of finance sought 
was most likely to be grant funding (Cabinet Office, 2016) suggesting evidence 
to support the assertion that many social enterprises are still grant dependant 
(Macmillan, 2007). 
 
The hybrid nature (Carter & Jones Evans, 2006; Neck, et al., 2009) of many 
social enterprises suggests that they derive their income from both market 
sources as well as non-market sources. Revenues are generally obtained from 
public contracts to deliver public services (quasi-markets); direct grants or 
subsidies provided by public authorities for specific project-based activities and 
employment subsidies; through the sale of goods either business to business or 
business to consumer; membership fees, donations and sponsorship; and other 
forms income from rents, endowed assets, and non-monetary forms such as in-
kind donations e.g. volunteer time, old IT equipment, surplus products, food or 
building material (European Commission, 2015). As Nicholls (2010) notes, the 
issues surrounding the financing of social enterprises, particularly that of social 
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investment are little researched by academics. Alongside this lack of academic 
attention, the issue is poorly understood by both social enterprises and lending 
organisations across Europe (European Commission, 2015).  
 
Social Enterprises tend to seek start-up capital from a wide range of public, 
charitable and private sources alongside earning income by delivering public 
service contracts or by competing in mainstream markets. Ongoing investment 
sources for established social enterprises typically include funds from 
shareholders or debt products (See BIG Issue Invest, 
https://bigissueinvest.com/) or individuals seeking ethical banking (see 
https://www.charitybank.org and https://www.triodos.co.uk). Unsecured debt in 
the form of loans with fixed or variable rates that do not require security is rarely 
available to social enterprises from mainstream banks. Social enterprises may, 
however, seek to raise finance from a number of individuals or institutions 
through an 'unlisted bond' and though this requires an asset(s) as security it can 
often be more flexible than loans from a bank, attracting lower interest rates and 
with investors usually being paid back over a five-year period. For charities 
seeking significant amounts (£10m - £50m) of unsecured debt a 'Listed Retail 
Charity Bond' (a bond listed on a stock exchange) that is specially developed 
for charities and generally has a lower rate than a bank with investors being 
able to buy and sell individual bonds that are typically paid back in a little over 
ten years. Other loan mechanisms that enable shared risk are available through 
quasi-equity investment where social enterprises pay a return / interest based 
on their business performance. Alternatively mixed or tiered arrangements are 
possible where two or more lenders work together to provide a mix of different 
types of debt and or equity investment (Brown, 2006), and where one lender 
accepts most of the risk.  
 
From 2015 certain forms of social enterprise (CICs, charities and BenComs) 
have benefited from investors being allowed to make investments into 'social 
enterprises' through the (SITR) scheme (Gov.UK, 2017b) and claim 30% 
income tax relief on their investment. However, as mentioned earlier, non-asset 
locked social enterprises remain excluded from this scheme. A further 
investment option is that of democratic finance where a social enterprise takes 
a grant, loan, equity or a mix of investments from a larger number of individual 
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investors or more usually the general public or a community of interest. The use 
of crowd funding platforms or public share issues have tended to be 
increasingly popular, especially for social enterprises maintaining community 
assets. The School for social entrepreneurs (2018) notes twenty-one different 
grant providers alongside fourteen social investment providers in the UK though 
access to certain sources are limited by the structure adopted. As observed by 
the European Commission, (2015) non-profit legal forms are typically able to 
attract philanthropic donations, grants and state tax reliefs but are mostly 
unable to access external investment so limiting their scalability. However, they 
may benefit from tax incentives whilst maintaining a related for-profit trading 
arm in order to maximise their ability to generate trading income though this can 
be complex and costly to establish in practice. Not for profit structures are 
generally unable to distribute profits (See also the Fair Shares Association Non-
Profit Association Model Rules) and can, therefore, find it hard to attract 
investment whilst share companies are typically able to attract investment, 
though this may be restricted as in the case of the CIC. Often however, the 
mechanisms to protect social purpose whilst generating profits to distribute are 
often weak (generally enshrined in the articles of association) and can be 
circumvented, even in asset locked structures such as CICs that have a legal 
mechanism for this purpose. 
 
Social enterprises tend to seek smaller amounts of finance with over half of 
social enterprises surveyed for the most recent State of Social Enterprise 
Survey (Social Enterprise UK, 2017b) seeking finance under £100,000, and 
over two-thirds seeking amounts below £250,000. Alongside seeking lower 
levels of finance, social enterprises have historically been largely focused upon 
the securing of grant support (Macmillan, 2007; Cabinet Office, 2016) with much 
scepticism surrounding equity investment (Sunley & Pinch, 2012). However, co-
operatives have historically been very successful on the basis of member 
contributions and mutual finance (See the Rochdale and Mondragon co-
operatives for examples). Many social enterprises have in the main remained 
cautious of debt and equity investment (associated with market logics) 
alongside the recognition that a great deal of time and effort is required to help 
social enterprises to become investment ready (Joy, De Las Casas, & Rickey, 
2011). During 2016/17, social enterprises sought finance mainly from grants 
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(73%) with 9% seeking a loan and only 4% an overdraft, with the remaining 3% 
being made up by lease/hire purchase agreements (Social Enterprise UK, 
2017b). However, it might be argued that this may be a product of definition 
rather than the nature of social enterprise itself. The cautious approach to 
financing social enterprises may perhaps be explained by their relatively small 
size (Cabinet Office, 2016; Social Enterprise UK, 2017b) and that they are also 
often highly resourceful and skilled at forms of bricolage (Barraket, Ling, 
Senyard, & Mason, 2013). ; Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010) which may, 
in turn, restrict their potential growth and expansion. Following that the financial 
survival of social enterprise is so deeply ingrained, then encouraging social 
enterprises to adopt new approaches and types of financing may require 
considerable help from intermediaries (Sunley & Pinch, 2012) as social 
enterprises try to balance market and social welfare logics. 
 
In mapping social enterprises and their ecosystem the European Commission 
(2015) suggests that most countries across Europe lack a comprehensive range 
of public support measures specifically targeted at social enterprises and that 
public support is generally fragmented and ad hoc. The types of support cited 
as lacking include; start-up, particularly business planning; investor readiness 
support in accessing investment finance and networks specifically tailored to the 
needs of social enterprises.  However, in the UK there are a significant number 
and variety advice and support schemes for social enterprises at a national, 
regional and local level. These schemes are mostly provided through 
partnership and networks of both specialist and generalist support providers, 
though recently the University sector has become increasingly involved in 
supporting social enterprises (See British Council, 2016). The support delivered 
varies from pre-start through start-up to consolidation and growth or all of these. 
Specialist support providers, such as UnLtd (www.unltd.org.uk/), and 
representative organisations such as  Social Firms England 
(www.socialfirmsengland.co.uk/), Cooperatives UK (www.uk.coop/) and Social 
Enterprise UK (www.socialenterprise.org.uk/) offer between them a wide range 
of free to access advice, guidance, tools and other information about social 
enterprise issues. Alongside the specialist networks, the mainstream National 
Enterprise Network provides business advice through its network of Enterprise 
Agencies. Dedicated training and development is available through the School 
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for Social Entrepreneurs and some Universities. In addition to the provision of 
advice by advisers, an internet search reveals a significant number of practice-
based advice documents available online from variety of organisations including 
law firms, funders, social enterprise support providers and networks alongside 
information papers on common structures for social enterprises from 
government departments (Bates, Wells,  & Braithwaite, 2018; Cox, 2012; 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011; DLA Piper & UNLtd, 
2014; Frail & Pedwell, 2003; Morrison Foerster & Trust Law, 2012; Social 
Enterprise UK, 2017a; Wrigleys Solicitors, 2014). A review of the practitioner 
support documents available to social entrepreneurs reveals that they vary 
greatly in the level of detail provided but do tend to follow a similar format of; a 
description of the features of the main social enterprise structures, their basic 
advantages and disadvantages followed by some form of decision tree or flow 
chart to guide structure selection choices.  
 
In relation to the specialist support available to social entrepreneurs in seeking 
to construct their governance model, this can be found from the established 
support organisations, peer networks or online from the Governance Hub 
(www.governancehub.org.uk/). Spear et al. (2007) undertaking research into the 
availability of governance support found that access to specialist governance 
support was at best patchy in terms of both its availability and quality, noting 
that;  
 
"Overall the picture of support available is one where standards are highly 
variable from locality to locality; and where low-cost, specialist governance 
advisors are thin on the ground, if not impossible to find" (Spear et al., 2007, p 
12). 
 
However, the issues noted by Spear et al., (2007) in relation to access to advice 
would appear to run counter to the findings of other research for the European 
Commission seeking to map the UK social enterprise eco-system (European 
Commission, 2015) that suggests that there are a large number of publicly 
funded support schemes alongside networks and mutual support schemes 
available for social entrepreneurs to access. This disparity may be explained in 
part due to the passage of time between the two studies, the geographic 
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coverage of support organisations or to the awareness of social entrepreneurs 
of that support. However, in order to access advice, social entrepreneurs may 
find that there is a support organisation (generic or specialist social enterprise) 
or practitioner network in their locality from which they can seek business 
advice and others may be reliant upon seeking an independent business 
adviser at commercial rates or upon their own social capital for support. If there 
is social enterprise network available locally or regionally, access to 
membership and therefore support may be restricted to enterprises that fit the 
template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) of the social enterprise category 
such as those of the SEM and CIC. For those able to access support from a 
mainstream enterprise support organisation there is a general recognition that 
most of the support needs of mainstream entrepreneurs and social 
entrepreneurs are the same and include; developing and testing business 
ideas, developing a business plan, finding customers and managing finance 
(Fox & Whiteley, 2015). However, where social enterprises differ is in the need 
for specialist support concerning aspects of organising founded upon social 
logics such as; structures, social finance, the use of volunteers and 
organisational development, alongside governance which are all often linked to 
legal structure and the use of volunteers (Fox & Whiteley, 2015). Despite the 
similarities in support needs, concerns remain with regard to the degree of 
specialist knowledge and understanding of both mainstream and specialist 
advisers in relation to social enterprise structures. In respect of the access to 
legal advice by social entrepreneurs, further implications arise from the degree 
of understanding by lawyers who are predominantly experienced with structures 
associated with economic models, and market logics and lack understanding of 
the social logic of social enterprise or how social enterprise activity works in 
practice. However, in response to this tension, in recent years some of the 
larger law firms have developed specialist charity and social enterprise teams 
so as to better advise clients from a position of understanding both 
social/mutual and market logics as they specialise in providing advice to social 
entrepreneurs and engage more fully with the sector through their CSR 





However, in relation to which social entrepreneurs seek advice and why they do 
so, there is little or no current academic writing concerning the provision of 
business advice in the UK and what little does exist is focused upon 
mainstream economic Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) rather than social 
enterprises. As the majority of social enterprises in the UK are SMEs then some 
insight can be drawn in relation to the type of support sought and from whom, in 
that accountants are the main source of support to SMEs and followed by 
consultants are the most important providers of business advice (Mole, North, & 
Baldock, 2017). SMEs more readily seek advice from accountants  as they are 
perceived to be a trusted and reliable source of assistance beyond their audit 
and compliance roles, often based on personal and long-standing relationships 
(Jarvis & Rigby, 2012).  
 
In the context of  market logic, the importance of the business planning process 
and the development of a business model as a sound basis for trading are well 
understood. Dees, Emerson & Economy, (2001, p. 273) note that business 
planning provides a range of necessary outcomes; by creating a “clarity of 
direction”, “knowledge of the market place”, “strong commitment from 
stakeholders” as well as helping to “attract investment”. However, as Bull and 
Crompton (2006, p 55) noted, some social enterprises, "suggested they could 
avoid structure, being a small business, choosing to rely on their core values 
rather than a business plan". Further, for social entrepreneurs seeking to 
develop a new enterprise, often for the first time, this business planning phase 
takes on an even greater significance (Burns, 2007; Rae, 2007) as both market 
and social logics become important. 
 
2.2 The (social) entrepreneur 
 
In seeking to understand why social entrepreneurs hold certain institutional 
orientations (Vurro, et al., 2010) and adopt particular institutionalised templates 
for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) it is firstly appropriate to examine the 
nature of the (social) entrepreneur and in doing so address questions 
surrounding; who are they, what motivates them and how they behave? 
However, given the complexity of the issues, some authors have argued that 
simply asking these questions is an endeavour that is likely to prove unfruitful 
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(Kilby, 1971; Chell, 2008) or they are the wrong questions to ask in the first 
place (Gartner, 1998).  
 
In exploring the entrepreneurial personality the basic assumptions have been 
that entrepreneurs are special people and have particular traits such as self-
confidence, the need for achievement, a strong locus of control, a propensity for 
risk-taking and a strong desire for independence (Meredith, Nelson, & Neck, 
1982). Timmons & Spinelli (2009) assert that entrepreneurs not only exhibit 
creative and innovative traits but also possess strong management skills, 
business know-how and sufficient contacts. The authors provide us with the 
following illustration that places the entrepreneur in context with the inventor, 
promoter and manager/administrator. 
 
              The entrepreneurial traits/skills matrix. 
 















Low       
General Management skills, 
business know-how and networks 
High 
Timmons & Spinelli (2009) 
 
This paints a rather idealised picture of entrepreneurs, exhibiting behaviours 
consistent with a high degree of creativity and innovation alongside highly 
developed business and management expertise that is perhaps not 
representative of entrepreneurs at large. In a search of an ideal mix, and being 
focused upon the individual, the authors perhaps miss the possibility that this 
ideal mix might be provided by a group or entrepreneurial team acting together 
(Kamm, Shuman, Seeger, & Nurick, 1990; Gartner, 1998; Harper, 2008) as 
often occurs in the formation of cooperatives and other social enterprises with 
shared ownership (See Ridley-Duff, 2015). Following this presentation, the 
major part of the entrepreneurship literature provides a view of entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurship that is wholly positive and desirable; however, some 
Removed for reasons of copy ight. 
42 
 
authors (Kets de Vries, 1977; Baumol, 1990; Gartner, 2005) have explored the 
less positive aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour.  
 
The work of Baumol (1990) discussed earlier, also hints at motivation, as he 
draws the distinction between "productive, unproductive and destructive" 
entrepreneurial activities as it provides us with a useful contrast of what might 
be positive traits alongside some rather less positive actions and outcomes of 
entrepreneurship that still resonate around current events such drug dealing, 
piracy, financial malpractice and rainforest destruction. Likewise, and in parallel 
to earlier discussion Kets de Vries (1977, 1985) identifies a number of possible 
negative traits and behaviours, describing certain entrepreneurs as “deviant”, 
“non-conformist, poorly organised and no stranger to self-destructive behaviour” 
(Kets de Vries, 1977, p 41) such that we cannot rule out such behaviours being 
associated with some social entrepreneurs despite an espoused social mission 
and adoption of social logics. 
 
A further part of the entrepreneurship literature that may be useful in seeking 
insights into the organising orientations of social entrepreneurs concerns 
whether entrepreneurs are born or created in order to explicate entrepreneurial 
personality and behaviours. Genetic research (Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkasc, & 
Spector, 2009) identifies common genetic factors for both opportunity 
recognition and the tendency to be an entrepreneur indicating that these two 
activities are fundamentally linked. Most recently in their article, the 'Big Five' 
Shane, Nicolaou, Cherkas, & Spector (2010) examine five key personality traits 
involved in influencing the pursuit of entrepreneurship; extraversion, openness 
to experience, disagreeableness, consciousness and emotional stability. In their 
study of over 4,500 twins in the UK and USA the authors' identified some 
correlation between accepted entrepreneurial traits and certain genetic factors, 
in this case, 'extraversion' and 'openness to experience'. However, and as the 
authors state, this correlation is a modest one and can only be said to be one of 
the many influences upon an individual’s propensity for entrepreneurship, social 
or otherwise.  
 
In looking to understand what makes people become entrepreneurs many 
authors (Bolton & Thompson, 2013; Shane, 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 
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2000; Timmons & Spinelli, 2009) assert that the entrepreneurial process is 
initiated because people actively choose to pursue opportunities they have 
spotted and that the opportunity is a key driver, be that social, economic or 
both. Further drivers can be said to relate to an individual entrepreneur’s belief 
in their own ability to gain the necessary skills, competencies and resources to 
reach their desired level of achievement for a chosen task or project (Bandura, 
1997) and perhaps connecting with the focus of many social entrepreneurs 
upon their social mission (social logics). Bandura (1995) also suggests that 
entrepreneurial behaviour stems from the individual’s feelings of control and 
enjoyment of the entrepreneurial process. It is argued that this feeling can be 
achieved through personal experience, the experience of others, by social 
persuasion and by reducing negative emotions towards their chosen venture.  
Baron (2004) argues that cognitive factors play a significant and important role 
in helping us to understand why individuals choose to become entrepreneurs, 
are able to spot opportunities and why some entrepreneurs are more successful 
than others. Baron (2004) concludes that successful entrepreneurs exhibit a 
reduced perception of risk, are natural prospectors, and have a greater 
susceptibility to the cognitive biases such as optimistic bias, affect infusion, 
allusion of control and planning fallacy. In a similar vein and as touched upon 
earlier Timmons & Spinelli (2009) present what might be considered a 
consensus, if idealised model for an entrepreneur centred around several 
dominant themes or core entrepreneurial attributes; commitment and 
determination, courage, leadership, opportunity obsession, tolerance to risk, 
ambiguity and uncertainty, creativity, self-reliance and adaptability and 
motivation to excel. These core attributes are, it is argued, supported by a 
number of desirable attributes; intelligence, creativity and innovativeness, 
energy, health and emotional stability, values and the capacity to inspire. 
However, in this presentation, the potentially negative aspects of 
entrepreneurial personality (Gartner, 2005; Kets de Vries, Spea1977, 1985) are 
termed non-entrepreneurial attributes and therefore a significant portion of what 
makes up the personality of certain entrepreneurs is simply dismissed. 
 
In addition to the cognitive factors previously discussed, the entrepreneurship 
literature identifies certain cultural and environmental factors that shape the 
genesis of the entrepreneur (McClelland, 1961; Bolton & Thompson, 2013; 
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Shane, 2003; Carter & Jones Evans, 2006; Timmons, 1985; Timmons & 
Spinelli, 2009). Bolton & Thompson (2013) identify family background, 
education, age and work experience as particularly important in shaping 
entrepreneurial behaviours. Similarly, Shane (2003) cites education and 
experience (career, general business, functional, industry and start-up) as being 
amongst the most important environmental factors. As with Timmons & 
Spinelli's (2009) identification of key entrepreneurship competencies and skills, 
these can be said to be largely the skills of modern management and leadership 
rather than being the preserve of the entrepreneur, particularly in respect of 
marketing, operations, team building, culture building, vision setting and team 
working. In addition to these factors, the pervasive influence of the socialisation 
practices that are shaped by our cultural values and attitudes, it is argued, help 
to either foster or hinder the emergence of entrepreneurial individuals 
(McClelland, 1961). Here, the disincentives perceived by Baumol (1990) might 
provide the very conditions that lead to the ‘social innovations’ and social 
entrepreneurship described by Leadbeater (1997). For example, the onerous 
legal requirements, lack of lucrative financial return and the inherent cost of 
investment in deep-rooted social issues that might act as disincentives to 
traditional economic entrepreneurs, might actually provide the social innovation 
stimulus that drives some social entrepreneurs (Leadbeater, 1997) as they are 
focused on social welfare logics. 
 
In respect of the differences between social and economic entrepreneurs and 
as touched upon earlier the current discourse continues to primarily distinguish 
the behaviours of social entrepreneurs from mainstream entrepreneurs by the 
balance of their intended outcome or financial goals against social or 
environmental motivations. Dees & Elias (1998) suggest an orientation towards 
hybrid forms of organising as they present a picture of the social entrepreneur 
as a special breed of leader, distinguished from purely economic entrepreneurs 
by their creation and sustenance of social value and their heightened sense of 
accountability to the constituencies served and for the outcomes created.  
 
The venture creation process of the social entrepreneur described earlier may 
also be viewed by more mainstream entrepreneurs as 'irrational' as the social 
enterprise process occurs despite and often because of an inhospitable 
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environment (Steinerowski, Jack, & Farmer, 2010) which would suggest the 
promotion of social over market logics by social entrepreneurs. Following this 
vein, Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman (2009) in their typology of social 
entrepreneurs describe them as visionary and charismatic leaders and this 
accords well with the goal of the social entrepreneur being focused upon social 
logics as they seek the resolution of social problems (Chell, Nicolopoulou, & 
Karatas-Ozkan, 2010).  
 
This theme of difference is pursued by Betsy Hubbard when she suggests that 
mainstream corporate leadership development has little to offer in supporting 
social entrepreneur leadership development as the former has evolved through 
research and experience from within the context of the market logics of the 
global corporate sector (Hubbard, 2005).  Hubbard (2005) follows on to argue 
for a collective leadership paradigm in seeking to solve some of social 
entrepreneurship's more complex, messy situations suggesting that traditional 
top-down approaches are unlikely to be successful. This emergence of 
‘collective leadership’ approaches from the 1990’s with its focus upon 
participation and shared ownership (mutual social logic) was, it is argued, born 
out of social entrepreneur's responses to the “demoralizing revelations of 
corruption, malfeasance, and sheer stupidity in the corporate world” (Kellerman, 
1999, p. 7) alongside rapid demographic and technological changes.  
 
In response to this situation a new collaborative approach was sought that 
involved “participants in planning, implementing, and evaluating their actions 
together, sharing leadership responsibilities and decision making, and building 
bridges to other communities and organizations” (Markus, 2001, p. 8). It is 
perhaps inevitable given the social logics adopted by social entrepreneurs that 
new forms of enterprise structures would be sought in response to more 
traditional, less democratic and ultimately more corruptible structures (Markus, 
2001; Hubbard, 2005; Kellerman, 1999, 2008; Ridley-duff & Bull, 2011; 
ashoka.org, 2011). 
 
There is a great deal that is consistent in the research and literature to suggest 
that the makeup and behaviour of both social and economic entrepreneurs are 
consistent in many respects but different in many others.  We can, however, 
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identify key defining factors in the way that social context, mission and 
measurement of success impact upon entrepreneurial behaviour and 
entrepreneurial processes. This position is supported by Neck, et al (2009) who 
cite the nature of the opportunity pursued, the nature of the stakeholders 
involved and related performance measurement as the significant and defining 
elements of social entrepreneurship action. However, we might strongly critique 
the notion that social entrepreneurship is defined by a single focus on social or 
environmental mission (social logic) and a lack of interest in wealth creation 
(market logic) (Chell, 2007) as this is not supported by practice or research 
(Bornstein, 2007; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2011) as social entrepreneurs often 
combine both logics. Further, we can recognise that social logics are 
themselves pluralistic in their mission to benefit others (philanthropic social 
logic) and the mission to include others in decision-making (mutual social logic). 
 
We can argue, however, that the defining factor in terms of social entrepreneur 
behaviour is the adoption of more democratic orientations towards organising 
(social or mutual logic) that in turn shape the structure and conduct of social 
enterprise activity. Support for this argument is found both throughout the social 
entrepreneurship literature (Hubbard, 2005; Kellerman, 1999, 2008; Markus, 
2001; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2011) and in professional practice as well as being 
cemented into the organising practices and structures of active social 
enterprises across the world. Further support can be found with regard to the 
entrepreneurial process from Austin, Stevenson & Wei-Skillern, 2006, p. 9) who 
cite “the interaction of the social venture’s mission and performance 
measurement” hence the presentation of a “social value proposition” (social 
logic) in which the nature of the people, capital and opportunity differ 
considerably from those in a purely economic value proposition (market logic). 
Drawing on Guclu, Dees & Battle Anderson (2002) and their presentation of a 
social enterprise creation process we can clearly identify mainstream 
entrepreneurial processes being redefined with a 'promising idea' being shaped 
by 'social needs' and 'social assets' (social logics) then being developed into an 
'enterprise plan' (market logic) measured by a 'social impact theory' resulting in 




In relation to personality traits and the comparison of social and traditional 
entrepreneurs relatively little has been written, but in their study of both types of 
entrepreneurs Smith et al (2014) found that the social entrepreneurs scored 
statistically significantly higher in three out of the five entrepreneurial personality 
dimensions that they measured; creativity, moderate/calculated risk-risk-
takingtaking and need for autonomy/independence. However, the authors 
perhaps unsurprisingly given the references in the literature to the importance of 
these traits to all entrepreneurs found no statistically significant difference 
between social and traditional entrepreneurs in respect of their 'drive & 
determination' (Meredith, et al., 1982) and their 'need for achievement' (Gartner, 
1998) which were found to be high in both groups.  
 
The discourse surrounding social and traditional entrepreneurs provides no 
consensus amongst academics as to the entrepreneurial personalities of social 
and traditional or economic entrepreneurs with some arguing that the two are 
incompatible (Arribas, Hernández, Urbano, & Vila, 2012) as traditional 
entrepreneurs are likely to demonstrate high levels of self-interest and low 
levels of social conscience with others arguing that they are not different at all 
but ‘one species within the genus ‘‘entrepreneur’’ (Dees, 1998, p3)  and with the 
only difference being in the values and perceptions driving their visions and 
ventures (Martin & Osberg, 2007). In further support of this view, Ernst (2012) 
argues that successful social entrepreneurs possess the same entrepreneurial 
personality traits as traditional entrepreneurs alongside aspirations to address a 
social issue that is suggestive of both market and social/mutual logics. 
 
It has been argued that all forms of entrepreneurship tend to be more innovative 
and creative (Timmons & Spinelli, 2009) but  that social entrepreneurs have to 
demonstrate a higher degree of creativity and innovation (Leadbeater, 1997) 
than traditional entrepreneurs as they are forced by necessity to leverage 
limited resources with more constraints on governance than traditional 
entrepreneurs. It is further argued that social entrepreneurs have to be more 
creative as they seek to balance the competing demands of market logics and 
the social logics as they try to combine them (Pache & Santos, 2013b; Sullivan 




The attitudes of entrepreneurs to risk is a common theme in the literature as it is 
argued that entrepreneurs of whatever type are natural prospectors and exhibit 
a reduced perception of risk Baron (2004) and that social entrepreneurs exhibit 
higher levels of risk-taking than their traditional counterparts (Smith, et al., 
2014). Further, and as (Galle, 2010) observes, social entrepreneurs are often 
seen to exchange their chances of economic prosperity for the achievement of 
their social mission such that market logics are supressed in favour of social 
logics or a mix of the two as they create blended value (Emerson, 2003).    
 
Interestingly, when the involvement of a greater number of stakeholders is 
concerned, as is the case with social enterprise activity (Low, 2006; Spear et 
al., 2007) it is argued (Smith, et al., 2014) that the inherent risk taking behaviour 
of the entrepreneur increases with the greater number of stakeholders 
dependent upon the enterprise. See also the notion of 'risky shift' and its 
relationship to ethics as discussed by Armstrong, Williams, & Barrett (2004). In 
exploring the trait of autonomy/independence, Smith et al (2014) found that the 
social entrepreneurs in their personality traits study exhibited a higher level of 
the 'need for Autonomy/independence' than did traditional entrepreneurs, and 
having also found social entrepreneurs to inherently take more risks, as they 
argue that taking risks is an attribute of an individual who is more prepared to 
take and be accountable for their individual entrepreneurial actions, when 
compared to traditional entrepreneurs. Critiquing the often held notion that 
social entrepreneurs are more likely to exhibit a prosocial personality (Ernst, 
2012) in that they would be more likely to seek collaboration and consensus in 
decision making the authors instead suggest a comparison to what Becker 
(1963, p 147) calls "moral entrepreneurs". This entrepreneur is characterised as 
crusading for the creation and enforcement of rules or social values (see also, 
Conrad, 1975) though the authors also add the knowledge, skills and drive to 
run an enterprising organisation (Smith, Bell, & Watts, 2014). 
 
In sum, the extant literature illuminates similarities and differences between 
social and economic entrepreneurs in different contexts in ways that contrast 
and conflict in equal measure. However, what is clear is that social 
entrepreneurs are presented as mixing both market and social logics in 
achieving a social mission. To what extent economic mission (market logic) or 
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social mission (social logic) prevails in terms of organising orientations varies 
between very different social entrepreneur micro contexts and between varied 
external environmental contexts. 
 
2.3 Implications for social enterprise structure choice 
 
In relation to the selection of structures by social entrepreneurs in the UK the 
literature remains a field that has received relatively little attention from 
scholars save from a few that have sought to address structure selection 
either directly (Cox, 2006, 2012), or in relation to typology (Bull, 2015, 2018), 
governance (Spear et al., 2009) or new forms of social enterprise (Ridley-Duff, 
2015). The extant literature surrounding the macro level logics of social 
enterprise activity and the micro-level (entrepreneurial) influences upon that 
activity have been discussed earlier, however, the points of tension between 
these two types of influence hold many implications for the structure choices of 
social entrepreneurs. 
   
Despite the lack of academic attention there has been much interest paid by 
government, practitioner groups, national networks and support organisations 
(See Frail & Pedwell, 2003; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2011; Morrison Foerster & Trust Law, 2012; Cox, 2012; DLA Piper & UNLtd,  
2014; Wrigleys Solicitors, 2014; Bates, Wells & Braithwaite, 2018; Social 
Enterprise UK, 2017a) alongside many more regional & local organisations 
(See Fraser, 2013; Queens University & Kingston Social Planning Council, 
2011)  who have largely provided linear rational decision tree type models 
alongside basic information to support social entrepreneurs as part of their 
business planning phase. 
 
A very particular intersection of tension surrounds the privileging through 
promotion by powerful actors such as government and practitioner groups of 
kite-mark standards such as the Social Enterprise Mark (SEM) and legal 
structures such as the Community Interest Company (CIC) that embody the 
category of social enterprise. This privileging holds implications for structure 
selection as those structures represent legitimacy to funders, government 
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agencies and practitioner groups who all, in return provide access to finance, 
business support and legitimacy.  
 
The tension that surrounds the construction of funding criteria concerns the 
exclusion of certain forms of social enterprise, particularly those that do not 
conform to the SEM, adopt the CIC structure or additionally seek charitable 
status. Yet further with regard to funding, in the Government’s 2014 Autumn 
Statement in it announced that it was extending the social investment tax relief 
scheme (SITR) (Gov.UK, 2017b) with effect from 2015 allowing investors 
making investments into 'social enterprises' to claim a 30% income tax relief. 
However, the definition of social enterprise applied related directly to legal 
structure as the investee organisation had to be a Community Interest 
Company (CIC), a charity or a Community Benefit Society (CBS), therefore 
excluding social enterprises limited by shares from the social enterprise 
category. The key issue surrounding the exclusion of some social enterprises 
centred on the absence of an “asset lock” in their legal structure. Small 
amendments were made to the scheme in 2018 but the exclusion of the 
aforementioned structures remains a key point of tension and serves to hinder 
the growth of non-asset locked social enterprises to the present time. This 
privileging of selected forms of social enterprise activity, in turn, serves to 
further define and strengthen the boundaries of the social enterprise category 
i.e. what is and what is not legitimately a social enterprise and therefore the 
collective identity of the category members (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). 
 
The social enterprise category constructed by such powerful actors is 
maintained by minimising the differences between the members in the 
category through the promotion of the SEM and the CIC as legitimate forms of 
social enterprise. As both of these institutionalised templates for organising 
(Battilana, et al., 2009) place restrictions on the distribution of profits and the 
ownership of assets (social logic) this manifests as a point of tension for social 
entrepreneurs with orientations towards retained ownership or shared 
ownership (market logic) excluding them from the social enterprise category 




Further, by maximising the differences between the social enterprise category 
and others through the promotional activity of the SEM and the CIC 
Association alongside other supporters of the category such as Guild HE 
serves to create clear boundaries or points of tension between the social 
enterprise category and other categories. This separation, in turn, serves to 
further facilitate the categorisation process as social entrepreneurs seek the 
associated categorical legitimacy (March & Olsen, 1989; Glynn & Navis, 2013) 
and recognition from stakeholders (Hsu & Hannan, 2005) such as practitioner 
networks, customer, suppliers and other more powerful actors. 
 
Further, this placing of organisations into categories acts as a disciplining 
function that can shape the allocation of attention among stakeholders 
(Zuckerman, 1999) as well as facilitating comparisons between the institutions 
within a category (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). The use of categories by 
government, funders, kite-marking organisations and practitioner networks in 
order to recognise, evaluate and select the members of the social enterprise 
category creates an 'organizational ‘imperative’ (Glynn & Navis, 2013) for 
social entrepreneurs to adopt the logic  of that category as a precursor to 
acquiring both social approval (acceptance as a social enterprise) and material 
resources (grants, investment  and business support) (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Glynn & Navis, 2013).  
 
Additionally, when social entrepreneurs strategically self-categorise in 
response to their audiences they may do so largely in pursuit of legitimacy and 
this can act as a prime driver for their structure selection. In addition to self-
categorisation, social enterprises are subject to forms of direct and indirect 
categorisation by expert legitimating agencies (Vergne & Wry, 2014) such as 
the SEM and funding bodies such as grant-giving organisations or investors 
and government departments. Direct categorisation can be seen in the direct 
requirements of funding bodies', social investors and grant givers concerning 
charitable status, ownership arrangements and the distribution of profits. 
Indirect social categorisation can be seen in the legitimating actions of kite-
mark awarding bodies such as the SEM or those promoting particular 
structures such as the CIC Association or CIC regulator as they act to make 
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the social enterprise category an increasingly governable domain (Nickel & 
Eikenberry, 2016). 
Additionally and when taken from a sociological perspective, legitimacy is 
predicated on an organisation conveying an identity that fits within an 
established category (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Glynn & Navis, 2013) of social 
enterprise activity. Wry, Lounsbury and Glynn (2011, p. 1) also suggest that 
this identity represents a "clear defining collective identity story" that identifies 
the group is engaged in social enterprise activity, "with a common orienting 
purpose and core practices" such as those of the SEM criteria and those 
embedded in the CIC structure. However, and again from a psychological 
perspective, organisations with common attributes will also see themselves as 
part of the same category and may, therefore, lead social entrepreneurs to 
self-categorise themselves accordingly (Glynn & Navis, 2013) whilst also 
excluding those that they do not see as part of the social enterprise category. 
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
 
In summary, this chapter reviewed the literature surrounding the macro level 
logics of social enterprise activity and the micro-level influences upon that 
activity followed by a review of the gap represented by the dynamic intersection 
of these two types of influence in terms of the implications for the structure 
choices of social entrepreneurs. 
 
The organising preferences of social entrepreneurs have been explored in 
relation to their traits and behaviours in order to explicate their potential 
orientations towards organising, particularly in relation to their selection of 
structure. Alongside this, the macro-level influences acting upon social 
enterprise activity concerning government policy documents, funder/investor 
criteria, kite-marks and promoted structures have likewise been considered in 
relation to structure selection. 
 
The largely overlooked, dynamic intersection of both micro level orientations of  
social entrepreneurs and the macro-level logics of social enterprise activities 
has also been discussed in order to illuminate the field of tension faced by 
social entrepreneurs in their selection of a structure. Further, the disciplining 
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effects of government policy documents, funder/investor criteria, kite-marks and 
promoted structures as artefacts of constraint upon the organising behaviours of 
social entrepreneurs is foreshadowed prior to the reporting of the empirical 




Chapter 3 - Methodology 
 
 
This chapter discusses the rationale for the research design and considers my 
underlying philosophical assumptions alongside their related methodological 
implications, the specific data collection and analysis methods used, the related 
ethical issues and the criteria appropriate for assessing the research (Crotty, 
1998; Cresswell, 2007; Thomas, 2006).  
 
3.1 An interpretative approach to understanding social enterprise 
structure selection. 
 
In selecting a research paradigm for this research I have considered three 
fundamental elements; ontology, epistemology and methodology. In respect of 
my ontological commitments; concerning “the nature of reality” (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985, p. 37) I believe the social world to be something that people are in the 
process of constructing (Bryman, 2008) such that concepts are constructed 
rather than discovered. In terms of ontological commitments, I maintain a realist 
stance in the belief that these constructed concepts correspond to something 
real in the world (Andrews, 2012). With regard to epistemological considerations 
related to the source of knowledge for this research or the ways of knowing that 
knowledge I have taken a subjective stance. The argument advanced for 
adopting this subjective approach relates to my commitment to the fundamental 
difference between the subject matters of the natural and the social sciences. I 
contest that natural scientists impose an external causal logic for explaining a 
behaviour that is inappropriate for understanding the complex and context-
specific human interaction involved in the structure selections of social 
entrepreneurs (Gill & Johnson, 2010). I have therefore chosen to adopt an 
inductive/interpretivist approach because of a strong commitment to a belief that 
the behaviour of social entrepreneurs and their advisers is based upon their 
interpretation of the phenomena of structure selection. Following this, it is my 
commitment that what we understand as the social reality is a projection of our 
own subjectivity and therefore truths concerning social enterprise structure 
selection are best arrived at through our engagement with and observation of 
social entrepreneurs (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). In seeking to understand the 
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selection of social enterprise structures I viewed my interpretation as being built 
by me from the jointly constructed understandings of structure selection as 
expressed by the research participants (Ratner, 2008). In this way, I was able to 
learn how social enterprise structure selections were constructed, sustained and 
changed over time as this construction was variously understood and 
simultaneously (re)constructed by practitioners who are actively concerned with 
the formation of social enterprises. Following Berger and Luckmann (1967), in 
the conduct of this research the social entrepreneurs and their advisers were the 
social actors that shared with me their constructions of social enterprise 
structure selection as I interviewed them (Alvesson & Ashcraft, 2012), enabling 
me to undertake my own process of interpretation of those structure selections 
for this thesis. I argue that in examining issues of social and political science 
and in order to understand the social world, it is necessary to engage with and 
participate in that world (Marsh & Furlong, 2002) and in approaching this thesis 
as interpretivist inductive research, I placed myself in a position to be able to 
engage closely with the social actors in understanding their perceptions about 
their experiences of structure selection.  
 
Further, in undertaking this research I have endeavoured to “see through the 
eyes” of the research participants (Bryman, 2008, p. 385) and capture their point 
of view (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) during the data collection such that I have been 
able to make an interpretation of social enterprise structure selection. In this way 
“the knower and the known are inseparable” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 37).  
 
In considering the third element of research paradigm, that of method, 
procedures for data collection, analysis and interpretation to be used, I have 
adopted a directional relationship between ontology, epistemology, 
methodology, methods and sources (Grix, 2010). In sum, my interpretivist 
approach to knowledge is underpinned by realist ontology and epistemology that 
is subjective in nature. 
 
3.2 The qualitative research methodology 
 
In considering the methodology for this research I have adopted a qualitative 
approach that emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and 
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analysis of data and involves an inductive approach to developing theoretical 
insights that embodies the view that social reality is an ever changing, emergent 
property of an individual’s creation (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Gray, 2016). By an 
inductive approach, I refer to an approach in which I have primarily used 
detailed readings of the raw data to derive theoretical insights (theoretical 
building blocks) and a model for social enterprise structure selection through 
interpretations that I made from that raw data (Thomas, 2006).  
 
The aim in selecting a qualitative approach was to provide an understanding of 
what was occurring or has occurred in the context of the practice of social 
enterprise structure selection so as to enable me to interpret the interpretations 
of the research participants (Geertz, 1973, as cited in Bryman, 2008) through a 
"process of attentive and empathetic understanding" (Miles, & Huberman, 1994, 
p. 6). In this qualitative, interpretivist approach I have focused on understanding 
social enterprise structure selection through my interpretation of its construction 
by social entrepreneurs and their advisers (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The key 
characteristics of my approach concerned intense contact with social enterprise 
structure selections constructed by social entrepreneurs and their advisers in 
their practice settings. Through this interaction with the research participants, I 
was able to understand the ways in which they act and account for their actions 
as well as exploring and reviewing emergent and divergent themes with them 
(Gray, 2016).  
 
A further consideration in adopting an inductive, qualitative approach concerned 
my wish to construct new theory from the theoretical insights gained rather than 
testing existing theories (Bryman, 2008). Following the inductive aspect of the 
research, it was important to me that the understanding generated was of real-
life application and that social entrepreneurs might adopt it into their 





3.3 Research methodology 
 
As discussed earlier, the qualitative research approach was adopted for this 
research activity. In relation to the research methodology adopted, a case-
based approach was followed in which the cases can be considered to be social 
entrepreneurs and their advisers bounded by the context of social enterprise 
structure selection (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Further to this, a storytelling 
approach was adopted as a form of meaning construction as it was my belief 
that individuals would make sense of their concerns regarding structure 
selection by telling stories (Collison & MacKenzie, 1999) such that I might 
interpret their constructions of structure selection. 
 
3.4 Research methods 
 
The face to face interview was selected as it is one the most widely used 
techniques in collecting qualitative data due to its inherent flexibility of use 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015) and the facilitation of the relationship with the research 
participants (King, Cassell, & Symon, 1994). The main method of data collection 
in this research was therefore from face to face interview discussions based on 
a set of semi-structured interview questions.  In order to access a broad range 
of experiences of social enterprise structure selections the study involved two 
distinct types of research participant: social entrepreneurs (in order to access 
their own experiences of their structure selections) and advisers to social 
entrepreneurs who were engaged in the provision or business, governance, 
legal and financial advice (in order to access their secondary experience of 
many, many structure selections and to understand how social entrepreneurs 
were advised on those selections). In respect of the two types of interview 
participants, two tailored sets of semi-structured interview questions were 
developed (Appendix 3). The interview questions where then undertaken in two 
phases; an initial pilot phase in which the questions were tested with one social 
entrepreneur and one adviser participant followed by a second phase involving 
a roll-out of the question sets to the remaining research participants. 
 
 
The outline structure provided by the questions sought to ensure a degree of 
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focus and standardisation across the research participants but at the same time 
afforded a degree of flexibility in pursuit of new and promising lines of enquiry 
(Kvale, 2008). For example, early on during the conduct of the research 
interviews, it emerged that some social entrepreneurs were seeking to adopt 
structures that appeared to possess a high degree of legitimacy but were, in 
turn, engaging in practices that ran contrary to the expected conduct associated 
with that structure. This promising line of enquiry was then explored with both 
social entrepreneurs and their advisers, which in turn suggested that this was far 
from an isolated case of this type of practice in structure selection. Further 
interesting lines of enquiry also presented when exploring the participant and/or 
client's current structure. Particularly, issues surrounding how this choice was 
made and whether this remained the most appropriate structure as the research 
participants expressed concerns about the emergence of kite-marking, 
particularly the Social Enterprise Mark (SEM) and the privileging of structures 
that met the criteria for the SEM.  
 
The types of data sought included the social entrepreneur participant’s accounts 
of the influences upon their selection of a structure, their enterprise’s current 
structure, how the selection of that structure was arrived at and in what context.  
Again, these interesting lines of enquiry were pursued in the interviews with all 
subsequent research participants. The general structure of the interview 
followed a story-telling type approach, engaging participants in a discussion 
about the formation of their social enterprise(s) to the present day including the 
choice of structure and its current effectiveness. It is perhaps important to note 
that in taking this approach that I viewed the historical truth of each account or 
story as being of lesser importance than the meaning that the research 
participant may have intended to present from the story (Riessman, 1993). In 
developing this story-telling approach with the participants, it was also possible 
to gain historical and in-depth data concerning the influences acting upon the 
selection of social enterprise structures and the related outcomes, both 
successful and unsuccessful as presented by the research participants. 
Additionally, I was able to encourage a degree of reflection on the part of 
participants in respect of how the decisions regarding their structure were 




I planned to record interview data using a ‘smart phone’ (Bryman, 2008) in the 
interests of accurately capturing the conversations that would take place 
(Patton, 2002a) and allow me to focus on the conversation, spotting and 
pursuing interesting lines of enquiry. Despite concerns over the intrusiveness of 
recording devices (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Bryman, 2008) and the possibility that 
the research participants would not be as candid if being recorded, it was hoped 
that the use of a familiar, everyday device such as a ‘smart-phone’ would go 
some way to address this concern. In practice, the research participants made 
no objection nor appeared to alter their manner in any way in response to my 
recording of the interviews with a standard recording device on the few 
occasions when the smart-phone failed to operate or ran low on battery power. 
It was the initial aim for the interview data obtained to be transcribed by me 
rather than being undertaken by others so as to allow me to get closer to the 
data, encourage the early identification of key themes and develop an 
awareness of the similarities and differences in the accounts of different 
research participants (Barnes, cited in Bryman, 2008). However, in practice, this 
was not possible for all interviews due to health reasons. 
 
3.5 Data collection 
 
In the first stage of fieldwork for this study, initial interviews were held with a social 
entrepreneur and a business adviser to enable piloting of the interview questions 
initially developed for each participant type alongside the data recording methods 
as well as to provide two useful practice sessions. I began my pilot exercise with a 
list of questions which were informed by an initial literature review and the 
research aims. At the beginning of each interview, I asked each participant to tell 
me a little bit about themselves and their social enterprise journey so as to 
provide useful background material on each participant in their own words. This 
early question served to break the ice and helped to build a degree of trust and 
rapport between myself and the interview participant. The pilot interviews lasted 
for approximately an hour. During this early phase, it became clear that the 
adviser participants were more likely to be not only advisers but also more 
experienced social entrepreneurs in their own right. In the light of this discovery, I 
decided to adopt an approach whereby the interview question set for the adviser 
participants would take the form of a mix of appropriate questions from the social 
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entrepreneur question set as judged appropriate by me during the interview 
alongside the adviser question set as previously envisaged. Initial findings from 
the two interviews conducted suggested that the issues of ownership, control, lack 
of understanding of structures, access to funding and the availability of legal 
advice where important issues related to the selection of a social enterprise 
structure. These aspects then became focus points that gave context to the 
existing question sets. 
 
3.6 Sampling technique and sample selection  
 
In seeking the information-rich experiences of social entrepreneurs and their 
advisers in relation to their structure selections that I could study in depth (Patton, 
2002a) and following Lincoln & Guba (1985) I adopted a purposeful, maximum 
variation sampling strategy. By purposeful I refer to the selection of information-
rich cases to study in depth Patton (1990) and by maximum variation, I refer to 
the selection of cases representing a heterogeneous range of characteristics and 
contexts related to the research question (Saunders, as cited in Symon & Cassell, 
2012). The intention in selecting this approach was to as far as possible, sample 
for heterogeneity of experiences and contexts of structure selection such as; 
organisation size, type, sector alongside entrepreneur experience, entrepreneurial 
orientations, and types of structure selected. I deemed this necessary in order to 
understand how social enterprise structure selection was seen and understood 
among different social entrepreneurs or their advisers in different settings and at 
different times.  In short, to search for variation in the perspectives of social 
entrepreneurs in their structure selection choice that ranged from the typical 
through to those that were more extreme in nature and with the aim of identifying 
common and divergent themes that were evident across the sample. The sample 
was selected from a pool of organisations drawn from local, regional and national 
networks of social entrepreneurs and the adviser (business, financial, governance 
and legal) community across England. The sample, whilst providing a cross-
section of variation in terms of size, structure, maturity, orientation of social 
purpose and trading environment such that it was envisaged that this might 





opportunity to engage with a wide range of potential influencing factors 
concerning social enterprise structure choice.  
 
The construction of the pool from which to draw the sample was undertaken by; 
contacting the chairs of local regional and national networks, writing to the 
organisations on their databases to ascertain their willingness to take part and 
then drawing up a sample from those willing to take part in the research. The 
potential participants selected were then contacted to confirm their participation 
and at which time they were sent a detailed participant briefing including 
confirmation of ethics committee approval (Appendix 1), a set of the semi-
structured interview questions (Appendix 2) alongside a standard proforma 
confirming their informed consent to take part in the study. The outcome from this 
process was the selection of two participants, one social entrepreneur and one 
adviser with whom to pilot the interview questions before commencing the study 
proper. At this time a further ten social entrepreneurs were selected to interview, 
and this was considered to be sufficient starting point.  Whilst it was not possible 
to identify any hard and fast rule as to how many participants would provide an 
ideal sample, following Kvale & Brinkman (2009) a range of 15 +/- 10 (5-25) was 
thought to be an appropriate start point for this research given the sample 
selection method was likely to provide for multiple practice experiences of each 
social entrepreneur and significantly more practice experiences from the adviser 
participants. Whilst this range was adopted it was accepted that it was not truly 
possible to establish in advance an appropriate sample size (Blaikie, 2000, 2007; 
Oppenheim, 1996). However, in practice this sample proved to be sufficient 
insomuch that by the completion of the final interview no new information or 
themes were emerging (Bryman and Bell, 2011, 2015; Cresswell, 2007; Symon & 
Cassell, 2012) from the sixteen hours of interview recordings made and five 









The following table (3.1) illustrates the final data collection sample including both 
adviser and social entrepreneur participants. Where participants had experience 
of both aspects of social entrepreneurship and provision of advice their various 
roles are noted. 
 
  Role(s)  in social enterprise 
Enterprise 








Officer of a social 
enterprise 
Social Business 25 
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a local 
authority spin social enterprise out engaged in 
the provision of alternative education to children 
excluded from secondary school. The 
participant has 25 years' experience in a social 
enterprise and was responsible for working with 
an advisory group to put in place the 
organisation's legal structure. The participant 
and their board are currently exploring a change 
of legal structure in pursuit of sustainability in 
connection with public funding. 
2 
Business adviser, 
funding adviser and 
a director of a social 
enterprise.  
Social Business 14 
A business adviser for a social investment 
organisation with 14 years of experience in 
providing business support to social enterprises 
and having supported over five hundred 
organisations in that time. The participant is also 
a founder member and former chair of a city-
based social enterprise network alongside being 
a director of a number of social enterprises. 
3 
Business adviser 




A former manager having worked in the charity 
sector for over 15 years as an employee and as 
a trustee. The participant has been a business 
adviser for the last five years providing business 
and legal structure advice to a range of social 
enterprises and is currently researching into 
entrepreneurship and crowdfunding for a degree 




and director or 
several social 
enterprises 
Social Business 13 
A CEO and founder of a social enterprise 
support organisation and a serial social 
entrepreneur with 15 years' experience. The 
participant's organisation has provided business 
support and legal structure advice to over 100 
social economy organisations in the last twelve 
months. In addition, the participant has been a 
board member of a regional development 
agency, a University social entrepreneur in 
residence and a charity trustee amongst other 
third sector national representative roles. 
5 
Social entrepreneur  
and director or 
several social 
enterprises 
Social Business 11 
A serial social entrepreneur who has created a 
number of social enterprises including a large 
community based business and entrepreneur 
support venue in a major city setting. The 
participant has 8 years' experience in the 










An experienced social enterprise Chief 
Executive Officer with 11 years' experience in 
creating and running social enterprises with a 
variety of legal structures. The participant has 
been very active in the area of trading charities 
as well as a number of other roles in the 
voluntary sector. In addition the participant has 
several years' experience as a business adviser 
to social enterprises alongside experience of 
turning around the governance and operations 
of failing social businesses. 
7 
Chief Executive 
Officer of a social 
enterprise 
Social Business 21 
The CEO of a local authority spin-out 
social enterprise providing employment 
and careers guidance to young people and 
adults. The participant has with 21 years' 
experience of social enterprise as both a 
Finance Director and CEO. The participant 
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is responsible for the oversight and 
continual development of governance 
arrangements including those concerning 
Teckal judgements as the enterprise 





and a director of a 
social enterprise.  
Social Business 22 
A business adviser for a social investment 
organisation with twenty two years of 
experience in the social economy sector 
as a Director, Trustee and adviser. The 
participant is experienced at working with 
policy makers, community organisations & 
social enterprises in designing investment 
readiness support programmes for 
financial products, based on successful 
practice in UK, Europe & USA and is 
currently an ambassador for a national 
social investment organisation. 





The Business Development Director of a 
large NHS spin out social enterprise 
specialising in delivering public health and 
social care contracts. Alongside its 
contracting activities the participant's 
social enterprise runs a number of social 
businesses including garden centres, 
community cafes and childcare day 
nurseries. The participant is particularly 
experienced in the raising of finance for 
social business alongside the issues of 
governance in a stakeholder owned social 




Officer of a social 
enterprise 
Social Business 20 
The CEO of a national, member owned 
business support organisation and is also an 
experienced business adviser with almost 
twenty five years' experience of working in a 
social enterprise at all levels. The participant is 
a well-known figure within the broader 
enterprise movement and wider government 
departments and is a regular media 
commentator, columnist and speaker on 
business start-up and small business issues. 
11 Social entrepreneur Social Business 14 
A social entrepreneur and former, regional 
social entrepreneur of the year who is an 
experienced business adviser to social 
enterprises specialising in the areas of access 
to finance, business planning, product/service 
development, marketing strategy and other 
areas connected with growth challenges. The 
participant is a proponent of and experienced in 
the implementation of multi-stakeholder, multi-
ownership legal structures for social enterprises. 
12 Legal structure expert Social Business 30 
A legal structures and governance expert with 
over 30 years' experience providing advice to a 
range of organisation's and social entrepreneurs 
across the UK. Having worked both as a 
practitioner and an adviser, the participant 
combines in-depth knowledge of company, 
charity and trust law with forty years of 
engagement with the values and principles that 








A social entrepreneur, academic and 
author with almost thirty years of 
experience in the social economy as a 
practitioner, academic, writer and activist. 
The participant has authored text books, 
academic journal articles and discussion 
papers on the topic social enterprise 
including the topic of legal structures. The 
participant is an expert, advocate and 






3.7 Data Analysis  
 
This section provides an explanation of the data analysis procedures and the six 
key themes developed through this process. The approach to qualitative data 
analysis was thematic analysis (Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009); Braun 
and Clarke, 2006; Fugard and Potts, 2015). Unlike other strategies or traditions 
associated with qualitative data analysis such as grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 2017; Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998), discourse analysis (Hepburn & 
Potter, 2006; Johnstone, 2018), narrative analysis (Riessman, 1993) and 
phenomenological analysis (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009) thematic analysis 
does not really have an identifiable heritage and can therefore be adapted to 
suit different philosophical traditions. The approach to the development of 
themes that I employed in this research can be found in many approaches to 
qualitative data analysis and can be considered to be a general inductive 
approach to the evaluation of qualitative data (Thomas, 2006). This general 
inductive approach (Figure 3.1) allowed me to make interpretations through the 
detailed reading and rereading of the data in order to develop new theories, 
concepts and models from that data. 
 
ownership legal structure models for social 
enterprises. 
14 Social entrepreneur, business adviser  Social Business 30 
One of the founders of the Social Enterprise 
movement in the UK and was the manager of 
England’s first Community Cooperative. The 
participant has pioneered work on legal 
structures, social auditing and licensing. The 
participant has introduced the concept of social 
enterprise to many countries in Europe, Asia 
and Africa alongside developing new practices 
in social enterprise governance and 
management. 
15 Legal adviser Private 3 
A practice lawyer working in the specialist 
charities and social economy team at a national 
firm of solicitors where the participant advises 
charities, their trading subsidiaries, and social 
enterprises on legal, financial and structural 






          Figure 3.1 Data reduction approach, adapted from Thomas (2006). 
 
The "intensive examination of a number of strategically selected cases" 
(Johnson, 2004, page 165) that I undertook involved "the systematic 
examination of similarities within and across cases" that allowed me to develop 
concepts, ideas and theories in relation to social enterprise structure selection 
Pascale (2011, p. 53).  
 
The enquiry began with an area of study (social enterprise structure selection) 
and as the study progressed I was able to make interpretations of the data in 
order to develop findings from it, further refine these findings to create themes 
and finally develop a model for social enterprise structure selection. A 
systematic approach to coding and classification was followed in order to draw 
clear linkages between the research objectives, the data and the research 
findings in a way that is both transparent and defensible. Audio interview files 
from the fifteen respondents across a range of social enterprises, social 
enterprise support organisations and those providing business and/or legal 
support to social enterprises/entrepreneurs were transcribed verbatim into 
Microsoft Word files and data analysis was begun simultaneously until 
saturation had occurred (Glaser & Strauss, 2017). I judged that saturation had 
occurred when further interviews were no longer increasing, or changing the 
range or depth of ideas related to the research objectives that had not already 
emerged (Jensen & Laurie, 2016) and took this to be an indication that data 
replication or redundancy had occurred (Bowen, 2008).   
 
The audio files recorded during the interviews were initially transcribed into word 
documents and then interview audio files were listened to several times, and 
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each edited against the transcribed text (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003). 
This process enabled me to be fully engaged with the data and ensure the 
accuracy of the transcript alongside the correct representation of the research 
participant's stories or the correct technical language of organisational structures 
within the narrative. This process was supported by the creation of research 
memos (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and diagrams before, during and after the 
interview sessions. These memos provided an opportunity to record interesting 
issues, ideas, stories, web sources, people, papers, reports etc. At this time, 
notes of developing ideas such as the notion of associated legitimacy in relation 
to certain structures, the decoupling of espoused practice from that associated 
with a particular social enteprise and the emergence of new multi-stakeholder 
structures such as the Social Enterprise Limited Liability Partnership (SELLP) 
were noted. These memos were transcribed, loaded into the NVivo software 
package and reviewed alongside the interview transcripts at different points 
during the analysis by way of reminder and as part of the analysis.  
 
In respect of data management and analysis, I considered two, a purely manual 
approach of "cutting and pasting" quotations onto sections of wallpaper or a 
computer-aided approach using specialist Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS). The pros and con's concerning the use of 
CAQDAS have previously been debated by researchers; with speed and ease of 
use been cited against loss of context and philosophical position (Atherton & 
Elsmore, 2007).  Having explored the benefits and drawbacks of CAQDAS I 
concluded that due to my earlier close contact with the data that the ease of use 
and speed advantages were the most compelling despite the additional 
consideration of having to learn to use a new software package (Basit, 2003; 
Baugh, Hallcom, & Harris, 2010) and elected to use the Nvivo software package 
to manage the research data. Helpfully this software was available free from the 
University alongside appropriate training and support.  
 
In following Thomas (2006) all of the research transcripts and memos were 
imported into the Nvivo software package simultaneously whilst the data 
collection was in progress. The interview data was collected from fifteen 
participants that represented two major groups, those who could be classified as 
social entrepreneurs and those who provided advice to social entrepreneurs. In 
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developing my data structure I had planned to split the data into two separate 
and discrete folders. However, in practice, many individuals expressed 
viewpoints from both perspectives as they had experience as both 
entrepreneurs and advisers so the initial decision to split these into two separate 
Nvivo folders was abandoned.  
 
Following step one the preparation of data, the next step (2) of identifying 
specific text segments of text related to the research question was begun.  In 
this search of the data, five hundred and eighteen pages of transcribed 
interviews were reviewed resulting in nine hundred and thirty five segments of 
text being identified as holding significance to the research question (Figure 
3.1). As presented by Thomas (2006) and mentioned earlier, the general 
inductive approach shares many features with other similar approaches, 
particularly grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2017; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
However, as the general inductive approach to coding suggests, I began to 
develop themes and categories that were most relevant to the research 
objectives and so the findings presented my interpretation of what I deemed to 
be the important themes from the data. 
 
In following Thomas's (2006) second and third steps, I created a number of a 
priori categories drawn from readings of the data alongside the research 
objectives and then began to label sentences, phrases and paragraphs based 
on my interpretation of the raw data to the initial a priori categories whilst 
simultaneously creating new categories as needed.  The a priori categories 
generated at this time included; definitions of social enterprise, access to advice 
& support and governance related issues. In the creation of these second-order 
themes from the nine hundred and thirty five segments of text as I began to 
further develop my emerging understanding of social enterprise structure 
selection. At this point, there were some overlapping and redundant categories, 
so in following (Thomas, 2006) I began the next stage (Step 4) in beginning to 
reduce the overlap and redundancy amongst categories. Where some of the 
categories demonstrated a link or relationship to other categories these were 
merged i.e. 'funder recognition' and 'market recognition were merged into 'the 
category of 'social enterprise as a badge of legitimacy' in the hierarchical 




This coding process sought to identify patterns in the data that captured the 
qualitative richness of social enterprise structure selection (Boyatzis, 1998) 
bringing out issues such as the decoupling of practice from that expected for a 
given structure as social entrepreneurs sought workaround solutions to enable 
them to control decision making or access profits.  Once this initial coding 
process was complete a further stage of corroborative review (Crabtree & Miller, 
1999) was undertaken in that all of the previous stages were reviewed and 
scrutinised alongside the memo created for each interview to ensure that the 
themes that emerged were representative of the earlier data analysis and code 
assignments. This corroborative phase aimed to avoid the unconscious 'seeing' 
of data that I expected to find (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The interplay 
between coded text, themes and clusters of themes and the research question 
continued through several iterations of review and decision on what was more or 
less important in the data and in relation to addressing the research question. 
Once this corroborative phase was completed the analysis moved on to a model 
developing phase (5) incorporating the most important categories (Thomas, 
2006). From this final stage, I arrived at six theoretical building blocks from the 
most important second-order themes from which I was able to build a model for 
social enterprise structure selection.  
 
At this point the size of the data was still considerable and some of the 
categories that were not assigned to the main themes such as political & world 
views, regulators and drivers of social enterprise creation were put aside for 
further research at a future time as they did not contribute significantly to the 
answering the research question. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the data structure 








Figure 3.2 Data structure and formatting of the Findings Chapter 
Figure 3.2 also shows how the categories, themes and model building blocks 
were developed and then sequenced into a logical structure for presentation in 
the Findings Chapter. 
 
3.8 Quality criteria 
 
In addressing the appropriate quality criteria for this study, I have considered it 
important that this work is designed to hold relevance and utility for the 
professional practice of social entrepreneurs and their advisers. I have therefore 
considered two key factors in respect of quality; my "theoretical sensitivity" as an 
experienced practitioner in the field of social enterprise and a regional policy 
maker (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p 42) alongside stakeholder triangulation of 
findings with practitioners and other researchers active in the field (Thomas, 
2006).  
 
Theoretical sensitivity refers to the personal qualities of the researcher and 
relates to an awareness of the subtleties of the meaning to be found in data. 
This awareness involves the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to 
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understand, and capability to separate that which is pertinent from that which is 
not. I have seen theoretical sensitivity as important as the credibility of the study 
relies in part on the confidence that readers have in my ability to be sensitive to 
the data and to make appropriate decisions in my research activity (Eisner, 
1991; Patton, 2002a). Following Strauss & Corbin (1990) I argue that my 
theoretical sensitivity comes from a number of sources, including my 
professional and personal experiences as an experienced practitioner in the 
field of social enterprise and a regional policymaker and from which I lay claim 
to a certain degree of theoretical sensitivity. However, I make a limited claim on 
quality through the demonstration of skills in qualitative research (Patton, 
2002b). As suggested by Lincoln & Guba (1985) I have also sought a degree of 
quality assurance in the research design through conducting stakeholder checks 
in order to seek a degree of triangulation from the research participants in the 
collection of the data alongside a degree of testing of my interpretation of the 
views and experiences that they conveyed during the data collection (Thomas, 
2006). 
 
3.9 Ethical issues 
 
In conducting the research, I sought through the actions discussed below to 
"preserve and protect the privacy, dignity, wellbeing, and freedom of research 
participants" (Academy of Management, 2006, p3). Furthermore, in considering 
these actions I have sought to maintain my own strong ethical stance, in the 
belief “that ethical precepts should never be broken” and that “Infractions of 
ethical principles are damaging to social research” more broadly (Bryman, 2016, 
p. 123). Whilst taking this stance I also accept that a degree of judgement or 
principled relativism (Fletcher, 1966 as cited in Bryman & Bell, 2011) may need 
to be exercised in achieving open and honest discussion with research 
participants; for example, Gans (1962, as cited in Punch, 2004) suggests that if 
researchers are completely honest with participants they may try to hide 
attitudes that they consider undesirable, and so may be dishonest. Accepting 
this view, the British Academy of Management Code of Ethics (The Academy of 
Management, 2006) followed and which required an honest approach that 
ensured that informed consent was secured. The actions that I have taken in 
this research concerning ethical issues were primarily concerned with the 
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protection of data, the obtaining informed consent, the accuracy and 
interpretation of transcripts and the reporting of interviews. In terms of the 
handling and protection of either personally or corporately sensitive information, 
all of the electronic data collected (interview recordings and transcribed 
documents) were stored on password protected flash drives and hard copies 
locked in a secure filing cabinet. As was expected, several of the social 
entrepreneurs interviewed asked for and were provided with verbal confirmation 
of confidentiality in addition to the statements provided in the briefing documents 
sent to them prior to the interview commencing. Obtaining ‘informed consent’ 
was a key activity undertaken before the interviews took place with the selected 
participants. In relation to informed consent, I sought to establish that the 
participants had understood and agreed to take part in the study having 
considered the aims of the research and the methods to be used. Alongside 
this, I ensured that the participants had been made aware of any likely conflicts 
of interest, any institutional affiliations on my part, the anticipated benefits, 
potential risks and that they had a right to refuse to participate or withdraw 
consent without reprisal (Harriss & Atkinson, 2009). All of the participants taking 
part were provided with a written and oral briefing such that they are able to 
understand the nature and likely consequences of taking part in the research in 
consideration of both themselves personally and their enterprises. In relation to 
the accuracy and interpretation of transcripts; for which I was ultimately 
responsible, I sought to confirm both the accurate transcription of conversations 
and consequent interpretation by sharing the results of the research with the 
participants. In terms of privacy and confidentiality; I adopted an approach to the 
reporting of interviews in which only aggregated and anonymised data was 
shared. 
3.10 Chapter summary 
 
A case-based research methodology has been advanced alongside an interview 
based data collection strategy in which participants were selected in order to 
provide information-rich cases to study in depth (Patton, 1990) and that 
represented a heterogeneous range of characteristics and contexts related to 




A thematic approach to data analysis (Langdridge & Hagger-Johnson, 2009); 
Braun and Clarke, 2006; Fugard and Potts, 2015) has been presented and 
explained alongside the adoption of the five- step, general inductive approach to 
the evaluation of qualitative data posited by Thomas (2006). How this process 
was applied in order to reduce five hundred and eighteen pages of research 
interview transcript down to nine hundred and thirty five segments of text in 
order to develop thirty one first-order categories, seventeen second-order 
categories and six theoretical building blocks has been presented in detail. 
Following my aim for the study to hold relevance and utility for the professional 
practice of social entrepreneurs and their advisers the quality criteria deemed to 
be appropriate for this study have been presented in relation to both my 
theoretical sensitivity (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and through my triangulation with 
research participants in the collection of the data alongside testing my 
interpretation of the views and experiences that they conveyed during the data 
collection (Thomas, 2006).  
 
Ethical issues have been considered in order to "preserve and protect the 
privacy, dignity, wellbeing, and freedom of research participants" (Academy of 
Management, 2006, p3). Procedures followed, ensured that participants 
received sufficient information and briefing for them to give their informed 










This research focuses on understanding the influences acting upon the selection 
of structures for social enterprises as well as the resultant implications of those 
influences. The aim of the research is to develop a model with which to assist 
social entrepreneurs and their advisers in that selection. 
 
In addressing the research question; "What influences social entrepreneurs to 
adopt particular social enterprise structures and why?" this chapter will present 
the findings the research within the context of the six themes elaborated in 
Chapter 3 by examining the complex interplay between the internalised 
influences on structure selection and those influences originating within the 
external social enterprise context. In exploring these influences the associated 
tensions faced by practitioners in selecting an appropriate structure will be 
examined alongside the actions that are taken by social entrepreneurs in 
resolving those tensions. 
  
4.1 Entrepreneurial orientations towards organising - ownership and 
decision making. 
 
4.1.1 Orientations towards ownership. 
 
The issue of ownership is a fundamental consideration for the research 
participants as it concerns who in law would actually own the enterprise, 
particularly any profits or other material assets such as, intellectual property, 
stock, buildings and equipment. Alongside the orientation of social 
entrepreneurs towards ownership their related orientation towards decision 
making is presented by research participants as very significant influence acting 
upon structure selection. This decision making influence relates equally to both 
social entrepreneurs who expressed a willingness to share ownership and/or 
decision making and those that wished to retain it. 
Ownership of the social enterprise influences structure and this was consistently 
identified as an important consideration by all research participants for their own 
enterprise(s) and/or those for whom they had provided advice.  The two 
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positions expressed by research participants concern the ownership of the 
social enterprise either by an individual or small group of founder social 
entrepreneurs or by a broader mixed community of stakeholders. The influence 
of shared ownership upon structure selection is illustrated by the views of a 
social entrepreneur who sought a shared ownership structure in the form of a 
Community Benefit Society (CBS) that was formed to preserve a local public 
building of significant historical importance: 
"….there was also quite a feeling that it had to be in community ownership 
and that was an important element of the whole project, the community 
ownership side of it". Business adviser. 
Additionally, a director of a social enterprise formed by NHS Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) staff under the Right to Request Programme1 and adopting a CBS 
structure expressed a strong orientation toward shared ownership in order to 
facilitate accountability to stakeholders by involving them directly in the delivery 
of public services: 
"I would argue that in our case we’re much more directly accountable to our 
service users. We’ve got about 1,000 members at the moment. ……..  
if they don’t like the way the management of [organisation] are running these 
services here we could be voted out by the majority. That kind of 
accountability via the structure of the organisation does not exist in public 
services". CBS Director. 
However, the influence of ownership is equally expressed by research 
participants as the wish for singular or limited ownership by social 
entrepreneurs. Here, in the quotations below, two legal advisers explain the 
viewpoint generally expressed by their clients with regard to the influence of 
ownership: 
…..a growing need to retain ownership or a willingness to share ownership? 
"No, an unwillingness".  Legal adviser. 
Top three issues for clients….."One, control and not relinquishing control". 
Practice lawyer. 
                                            
1 The Right to Request was established under the Transforming Community Services 
programme, which required Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to transfer their direct services 




There was a higher degree of influence towards shared ownership exhibited by 
social entrepreneurs who were involved in social enterprise activity concerning: 
delivery of public funded services direct to service users; a community or 
publicly owned asset and; where funding was sought from the public. Here a 
Director of a CBS formed to preserve a local building of architectural and historic 
interest explains: 
"it [the social enterprise] should be, grounded in community interest and the 
protection of that community asset by the community owning it". IPS Director. 
"We’re a BenCom, a community benefit society, and …. they [CEO and the 
founder directors] chose that structure instead of the standard, which would 
be a CIC, community interest company, because of what they wanted to do 
with membership: it’s for involvement, engagement of service users and staff 
and accountability". CBS Director. 
A higher degree of orientation towards individual ownership and control was 
exhibited by what adviser participants expressed as their more "entrepreneurial 
clients" as they privilege profit over social good. The social entrepreneurs 
demonstrating this orientation were seen as more likely to adopt governance 
arrangements that promote the maximisation of wealth creation for the owners 
of the enterprise over purely social good. The quotation below from a business 
adviser participant expresses the common viewpoint of their clients: 
"Control and ownership comes back time and time again and I would say in 
the main the sort of people we’re working with are quite entrepreneurial, or 
have aspirations to be entrepreneurial".  Social entrepreneur & business 
adviser. 
The orientation towards control appeared to be greater in the case of those 
research participants who expressed views concerning their enterprise that 
suggest they wished to be personally rewarded by their venture or who were 
more tightly focused on business logics in order to deliver social good. Here two 
social entrepreneurs explain their orientation: 
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"….so we were limited by shares right off the bat because it was – we wanted 
it to feel as entrepreneurial as possible so we knew that we were picking a 
limited by shares company". Social Entrepreneur. 
"CIC structure allowed us to still run it as an entrepreneurial type business 
whereas many of the other structures, charitable structures and what not you 
put on it really don’t lend themselves to running it like a regular business. 
Social Entrepreneur. 
Additionally, the social entrepreneurs noted above also tended to exhibit classic 
entrepreneurial traits; particularly a central locus of control: 
[Researcher] "So…… the entrepreneur control aspect was really important to 
you". [Social Entrepreneur] "It was very, very key". 
Social entrepreneurs who expressed an orientation towards control through 
ownership also exhibited tension surrounding the doing of social good and 
whether this should be locked into the enterprise through the structure selected:  
“You can trade and be a business, and if you’ve made lots of money, of 
course you can give it away to whatever you want……Then you have the 
control. The question for you is: do you want to enshrine that in your very 
fibre and make it a legally binding aspect of what you do?” Social 
entrepreneur. 
However, some further tension was expressed by this type of social 
entrepreneur in relation to the need to deliver broader social outcomes and 
involve a broader group of stakeholders as they articulated an orientation 
towards a form of 'corporate philanthropy'. Here a practice lawyer sums up the 
views of many of his clients: 
"I want to benefit the community but that is, that shouldn’t be at the expense 
of me not being able to control either the risk to me or my ability to be able to 
take the investment that I put into this back out again. So I think you are still 
seeing those two competing interests of being able to want to provide a 
genuine social benefit as well as protecting the private reason and rationale 




4.1.2 Orientation towards decision making. 
 
Social entrepreneurs and their advisers were often preoccupied with decision 
making pressures and its connection to the degree of control that they might 
retain. The nature of the viewpoints expressed by the research participants 
varies from those viewing plurality of control as a very positive aspect by those 
adopting governance arrangements that emphasise sharing to a more singular 
viewpoint expressed by those adopting arrangements with more control or a mix 
of approaches through hybrid type arrangements. A strong orientation towards 
both shared ownership and shared decision making is expressed below by the 
Director of a CBS who explains that this is seen as a very positive, desirable 
aspect of their structure: 
"…sometimes some very difficult questions are asked at the AGM, and if they 
are not responded to then that management team could be voted out. So, 
there are some very positive aspects about that structure". CBS Director. 
In contrast, we have an expression of the equally strong influence in favour of 
singular or restricted decision making as expressed below in the comments 
made by a practice lawyer and the founder of a CIC limited by shares: 
"the statement that I would quote more often than not is that people see their 
enterprise as their baby and I completely – completely get that and so why 
would they therefore relinquish control of it to a genuinely independent board 
of directors? There’s still this sort of feeling of – of fear. Well if I – if I’m 
running this thing I feel nervous about allowing an entirely independent board 
to oversee my work". Practice Lawyer. 
"We were running a business. This isn’t a sort of pocket money that we’re 
trying to give away and we want people’s perspectives. We’re running a 
business; so I think the [CIC] structures were a hindrance because it was – 
you feel as if you’ve got to put these people in positions of power when what 
you actually need to do is to have conversations with people"  
"I mean that’s why we set up an Advisory Board because we didn’t want 
people being Directors of the company. But why would they be Directors of 
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the company anyway? I mean these are people who don’t know anything 
about business". Social entrepreneur. 
In the contrasting viewpoints above we can perhaps begin to see the connection 
between the investment of the social entrepreneurs own funds or sweat equity 
and their orientation towards controlling or retaining ownership and decision 
making that  are not found in the public sector spin-outs or public heritage social 
enterprises. 
For some social entrepreneurs choosing to adopt a structure with more 
democratic governance arrangements, ownership and decision-making 
processes, the desire for "a feeling of ownership" was still an important 
orientation for founder social entrepreneurs when financial ownership may not 
be the preeminent orientation. Here an experienced social enterprise adviser 
explains the influences on structure selection for a client seeking to balance 
ownership, control and a need for legitimacy through structure: 
"….so it was a CIC limited by shares that was the final conclusion essentially. 
They weren’t particularly interested in a big exit strategy but they wanted to 
have some feeling of ownership and they wanted the decision-making 
themselves but they wanted to be transparently a social enterprise". Business 
adviser. 
Stakeholder engagement is a key challenge for all social enterprises and 
therefore an influence upon the selection of all social enterprise structures but 
this may act as a greater influence on the selection of certain structures such as 
the 2Industrial Provident Society (IPS), Community Interest Company (CIC) and 
trading charity that involves a broader community of stakeholders in their 
decision making.  The challenge of stakeholder engagement is illustrated by the 
quotations below from the business adviser to a community benefit society 
funded by a community share issue and a director of a health service spin out: 
"you’ve got 500-odd shareholders owning the organisation and they all have 
a vote and they can vote people on to the Board and it’s been one of the 
                                            
2 The IPS legal form was replaced in the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 
2014 by the co-operative society and the community benefit society. The term IPS is used in 
this thesis as it was used by the research participants. 
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biggest AGMs I’ve been to, the first AGM. There were 100 people at the first 
AGM". IPS Director. 
"….involvement from the membership, active involvement. That’s actually a 
much more difficult sell because people want to know why they should be 
involved in helping to run a service that they maybe think should be there 
anyway". Business adviser. 
Many of the social entrepreneurs and leaders of trading charities expressed 
concerns for the effectiveness of their governance arrangements, particularly 
those with more democratic models. The key concerns expressed being related 
to the skills, attitudes and behaviours of their boards. The heart of the concerns 
expressed by research participants in this research broadly follow the 
enterprise's ability to balance business decision making with the creation of 
social impact and included issues related to attitude to risk, business skills, and 
understanding of the social mission: 
"The speed at which a Charity Board makes a business decision is dictated 
by their reluctance to make business decisions and that can cost 
considerably. It also has an effect on how they would be prepared to perhaps 
take an investment loan to start up a charitable business, social business 
activity."  Charity Chief Executive 
"…strangely enough the CVs on paper had very little to do with how effective 
they were at contributing at board level – almost the opposite: the people who 
looked great on paper were not necessarily great helping the board to make 
good decisions and do their job as a board." IPS Director 
"you’ve got people from the third sector, so charities. Charities tend to be 
very risk-averse. They have a board trust where again it’s like, “What have 
you done with this money?” and it’s almost accusatory. Where in reality if 
you’re going to find anything new, if you’re really going to innovate in services 
some of the things you try will fail"….. 
"….with people from the private sector they’re often a lot more understanding 
of how to properly assess risk and how to push projects forward, but they 
may not understand some of the constraints of the landscape that you work 
within, such as the way things are funded and how you have to operate. 
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Sometimes they appear to struggle with the balance of social impact versus 
making a surplus in our case because we’re not-for-profit". IPS Director. 
In a similar vein to that of the influence of decision-making above, and in 
seeking to relieve the tensions surrounding the role stakeholders and boards in 
decision-making some experienced social entrepreneurs are more likely to avoid 
structures that are associated with what they perceive to be onerous 
governance arrangements, hence influencing their selection of structure: 
"So what I would do differently though on a new venture, which I am doing 
with xxxxx is simply creating a business model, showing it to everyone that 
works for us and saying, “This is how the money gets distributed and this is 
how we’re going to do our reporting so you can see it gets distributed.” I’ve 
created a limited by shares company, at the moment only two of us hold the 
shares…". Social entrepreneur. 
The type of governance model associated with a particular structure is an 
influence over that structure's selection. Additionally, this governance model 
influence is particularly strong for some serial social entrepreneurs or chief 
executives of social enterprises; particularly those that have experienced 
difficulty in the past in assembling effective boards with an appropriate skills mix, 
balanced attitude risk and ability to support the management team in making 
decisions. The experience of a charity chief executive looking to an alternative 
structure after experiencing tensions with their board serves to illustrate this 
alongside the resolution to that tension through the pursuit of alternative 
structure choices: 
"I had a tension running a charity as Chief Exec with a Board that at one 
point, this was 2008, I had a – I actually had a venture philanthropist that had 
come along, really interfering, I have to say and didn’t get it at all….. and they 
put in an interim Finance Director who said, “You don’t really know what 
you’re doing.” I said, “Well I think we know what we’re doing, it just takes a 
little bit of time to produce management accounts.” “Oh no, we want this.” Put 
that in place and this was a Charity Finance Director who just didn’t 
understand what we were doing, told the Board we were insolvent and the 
Board went off it, closed me out, brought in a specialist to help us …." 
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"I can see why you’re a CIC because you don’t want to go down that path 
again….."  
"Yeah, and it’s some of that stuff that kind of lets you, you need to have a 
flexibility that just doesn’t exist in the structures at the moment". Social 
Entrepreneur 
In relation to decision making considerations, adviser participants noted the 
importance of the sequencing of decision making arrangements such that, as is 
suggested later in this thesis concerning the sequencing of business planning, 
that consideration of the ownership and decision making orientations of the 
social entrepreneurs should precede the selection of a structure as illustrated by 
a very experienced social entrepreneur and business adviser: 
"……decision-making is a process and it’s not a structure and a lot them think 
structure first and think that that’s how they deal with governance, that they 
look at a structure.  You don’t, you look at what decisions need to be made 
and the processes that you need and the people you need for different types 
of decisions, and so you’re looking at a much more flexible thing." Social 
entrepreneur & business adviser. 
4.2 Influences concerning access to finance: borrowing, investment and 
grants 
 
Access to finance for social enterprises, particularly at start-up, influences the 
selection of particular structures. The nature of the influence lies in the 
relationship between some structures and the potential barriers they pose to 
social enterprises in obtaining finance through borrowing, investment or grants 
as this is often a critical aspect at start-up or during business growth. Here the 
founder of a CIC limited by shares expresses the issues he experienced in 
relation to attracting investment into a CIC structure due to the asset lock and 
the limits on dividends payable to investors: 
 
"that asset lock for CICs is the main reason you cannot draw investment into 
CICs. I mean I got investment but it was from quasi funding places, it wasn’t 
like – and I got a loan because they were going to back the building but 
nobody was going to back the business because there was no – I couldn’t 
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even get the Ethical Property Company to invest and basically he told me 
straight out, the Chief Exec, he said, “You’ve got an asset lock, so I’ve got to 
bet on your business and there’s no way I can do that. I mean I need to have 
something to back it up.” Social entrepreneur. 
Further, a practice lawyer expresses the same concern with regard to 
investment into the CIC structure: 
"So we have seen circumstances where people have set up CICs, invested 
their cash but not realised actually getting that back out may be tricky 
depending on how they’ve actually invested it." Practice lawyer. 
The distribution of profits for the benefit of the founding social entrepreneur(s) is 
a major influence on structure selection and this is closely linked to the 
ownership issues discussed earlier. The nature of this influence concern the 
same restrictions on profit distribution as that for equity investors and this is 
expressed here by the  founder of a CIC limited by shares: 
"like the structure of who decides how much money the entrepreneurs get 
back from the project. Why should it only be 5%? I mean hell I’ve sweated 
blood in shit loads for this and I get 5%? I mean quite honestly it makes me 
want to say, 'fuck you', basically". Social entrepreneur. 
"I mean for me to get back my investment I have to sell the business to get 
my investment back and even then I’m not sure I’m going to get anywhere 
close to my investment back. Forget about profit on my investment or interest 
on my investment – I mean I’ve got half a million in, to get that out at 5% a 
year of profits, how long do you think it would take me? I’d be dead before I’d 
get all of that back". Social entrepreneur. 
As with the influences related to social entrepreneurs exhibiting strong 
entrepreneurial traits towards more singular or limited forms of ownership, what 
seems to emerge here in respect of the distribution of profits is a similar type of 
influence towards structures that enable this distribution of profits for the benefit 
of the social entrepreneur(s). A further influence, as expressed here by the 
founder of a CIC who is identified as having strong entrepreneurial traits 
questions the restrictions on profit distribution imposed within the CIC structure: 
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"This is not an entrepreneurial style of thing because why wouldn’t it be 
50:50. Basically, you have to be an entrepreneur and be a monk. It’s like 
actually, I’m going to give you 99% of everything I have and then it will go to 
the community; well that’s really insane. I mean that’s just totally insane. It’s 
totally insane to me". Social entrepreneur. 
The limits on dividends that can be paid by CIC's have now been amended from 
October 2014 when the 20% limit on dividends per share was removed easing 
this issue to a degree so it might be argued reducing this particular influence 
despite the maximum aggregate dividend limit being set below 35% (Office of 
the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, 2016).  
Further to the influence presented above, the asset lock within certain structures 
influences structure selection as funders are orientated towards the assurance 
this gives in relation to the protection of what are often public assets or funds 
that are provided for the social good. Here a participant who is a director of an 
NHS spin out IPS describes how the asset lock in their structure provided a 
mechanism for protection against acquisition during an approach by a potential 
private sector competitor.  Additionally, this quotation as well as explaining the 
influence of a legal asset lock on structure choice it is also perhaps indicative of 
a broader lack of understanding of social enterprise structures amongst the 
private sector more generally: 
"There’s an asset lock. There was a conversation a while ago where a large 
provider of health services came for a chat with us and they were very 
interested in what we were doing and they were going to buy us….. We said, 
“You can do, but whatever you want to pay your share is only worth £1”. 
((Laughter)) They really struggled. They obviously didn’t understand the 
structure or what we were. They’d never heard of social enterprise or 
certainly hadn’t googled it, so they weren’t quite getting that." IPS Director. 
In contrast, research participants suggested that legal asset locks can be 
circumvented or avoided and that voluntary asset locks can easily be amended 
or deleted with the strength of the enterprise's governance model being the key 
determinant factor. Here, the experiences of two serial social entrepreneurs 
suggest that experienced social entrepreneurs or their advisers might be less 
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influenced away from legally asset locked structures as they know that it is 
possible to avoid the restrictions placed on the use of assets in these structures: 
"I don’t think the asset lock works anyway. Any clever person could pull it 
apart" 
"Yes, there’s loads of ways around it, loads of ways around…… I mean I 
could sell – if I were minded to, you could sell that asset and if there was any 
profit left over, and at this point there wouldn’t be, but if I sell the asset and 
there was any profit left over then I could create a company that helps 
entrepreneurs in bad parts of Leeds and just pay myself to go round and 
advise these people everywhere". Social entrepreneur. 
"The asset lock in the community interest company, so the asset lock, you’re 
not allowed to dispose of money or assets at less than market value, and if 
the company is wound up, that can’t be distributed amongst members and it 
has to go to another asset lock body. Nearly all the CICs that I deal with have 
got a handful of directors who are on the payroll, so if the business is going 
down the hill, they simply carry on paying themselves until the bank account 
is empty". Social entrepreneur. 
 
Significant tensions exist for social entrepreneurs seeking to retain ownership of 
their social enterprise when this internal need for ownership meets the need for 
external grant funding, as those structures that support retention of ownership 
almost always preclude access to the grant funding needed. This tension is 
summed up in the quotations below from a legal adviser as they describe the 
social entrepreneur being caught between two opposing influences:  
"So the social entrepreneur comes back and he says, “Does that mean I’ve 
got to share ownership with some other people?” to which I say yes, and they 
say, “I don’t want it.” So I say, “You have to make a choice. Hang on to your 
sole ownership of this project, that’s fine, you have to get external funding 
and finance it yourself, or put up with the fact that you’re going to have to 
essentially give your baby away to an organisation in which you have a 
minority stake and qualify for funding.” Legal adviser. 
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As we have seen earlier, the orientation of the social entrepreneurs to 
ownership and decision-making may exclude them from grant funding. 
However, this exclusion also acts from the counter position with social 
entrepreneurs intentionally choosing structures that would restrict grant 
funding as their business model is designed to drive sustainability solely 
through trading activity: 
 
"we’re a CIC limited by shares and I did that very deliberately because I didn’t 
want to use grant funding, you know, we kind of live and die by winning 
contracts and finding income generating methods". Social entrepreneur. 
 
4.3 The orientation of social entrepreneurs towards government policy. 
 
The orientation of some social entrepreneurs to government policy may exert a 
significant influence on their structure selection. Social entrepreneurs are 
increasingly engaged in the commissioning of public service contracts in 
competition with the private sector as the government continues to drive its civil 
society agenda. In response to government tender requirements and 
competitive pressure from the private sector social entrepreneurs are beginning 
to seek innovative new ways to combine their structures in order to compete in a 
very competitive public service commissioning environment.  The motivation for 
this response is explained by a research participant from a health sector social 
enterprise spin out: 
"looking at solutions to the challenges to the sector from organisations like G4S 
Circle and Virgin Health, so billion pound organisations that come up, mop up 
contracts, operate at a loss, destroy the competition and then they have a virtual 
monopoly. And it doesn’t end up in the best interests of the people using the 
services". IPS Director  
 
Despite the significant role played by social enterprises in the delivery of public 
services the findings here, suggest that this was a significant issue for only one 
particular participant who was engaged in a health spin out social enterprise but 





4.4 Influences concerning the prioritisation and marginalisation of 
structures. 
 
The external influences identified in this research concern those of; legitimacy 
and privilege through definition, structural pluralism, confusion and complexity,  
external influences upon business planning, access to finance, the actions of 
funders, business & legal advice and government policy. 
 
4.4.1 The construction and reconstruction of social enterprise; the 
influence of legitimacy and privilege through kites-marks and standards. 
 
The perception by external stakeholders of the legitimacy of a particular social 
enteprise structures has a significant influence upon the selection of that 
structure by social entrepreneurs and further to this that those structures 
perceived as legitimate are more likely to be selected than those perceived as 
less legitimate by stakeholders. The legitimacy of a particular structures often 
emanates from the approval of that structure's related definition through a kite-
mark such as the social enterprise mark (SEM) or promotion of that structure as 
legitimate such as the CIC. Below, a social entrepreneur expresses his 
concerns with regard to the SEM despite having been recognised by the 
practitioner community as social entrepreneur of the year and his enterprise 
regional social enterprise of the year: 
"years down the line, after selecting this particular model, the Social 
Enterprise Mark came along and we were basically told, “You’re not a social 
enterprise, you’ll abide by the Mark…. the biggest minus side was the lack of 
recognition, so the regular business support community would treat us as a 
second-class citizen because we weren’t really a proper business and some 
of the social enterprise community would treat us as a second-class citizen 
because we weren’t a proper social enterprise". Social entrepreneur. 
Alongside the concerns for legitimacy and recognition of their structure in 
relation to the social enterprise mark participants also expressed concern for the 
potential practical impacts upon their ability to trade and remain sustainable, and 
so presenting a potentially significant influence upon their legal structure 
selection. Here a social entrepreneur usefully illustrates the issues surrounding 
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the potential influences upon structure selection as he explains both the 
strategic and practical implications of adopting a structure that did not conform 
to the SEM criteria: 
"what worried me about the Social Enterprise Mark. It’s the only time, since 
setting it up, going back to being an entrepreneur, that’s the only time that 
I’ve felt worried for the future, was when we went, “Oh right, we’d better get 
this Mark thing,” and they said, “No, you’re not.” And strategically, I’m thinking 
that’s a nightmare for us now, because if we can’t call ourselves a social 
enterprise, or we become unable to tender for things or not on databases, 
then it’s the beginning of the end ..". Social entrepreneur. 
Further, and in a similar vein certain structures and their related definition are 
acknowledged by the research participants (both social entrepreneurs and 
advisers) as being presented as the accepted brands of social enterprise. 
Research participants consistently identified the CIC structure as the 
recognisably legitimate social enterprise brand and mention this as an 
influencing factor in their structure selection. The influencing factors that led a 
number of social entrepreneurs to adopt the CIC structure are illustrated in the 
quotes below: 
"So we picked the CIC thing because it would – it reassured the Council that 
they were dealing with a legitimate social enterprise and that these private 
sector people weren’t trying to just pull one over on them". Social 
entrepreneur. 
" the title is Community Interest Company so it must be good guys". Social 
entrepreneur. 
"…we grabbed the CIC moniker because we did not – I don’t know if we 
didn’t have a track record so much as we needed something to reassure 
public bodies that we – that somehow we weren’t taking their money and 
running off." Social entrepreneur. 
The higher the profile of a particular structure is within the social enterprise 
community, their funders, their stakeholders and in broader understanding the 
practitioner community the greater the influence will be upon its selection. This 
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is illustrated by the quotation below from a social entrepreneur reflecting on their 
selection of the CIC structure: 
"…. given the way the social enterprise legal structures were lorded as like 
these are like the golden children of business now, I’m not sure we would 
have been able to avoid being a CIC". Social entrepreneur. 
Further to the earlier noted influence of the promotion and therefore legitimating 
of specific structures such that significant influence is exerted on the selection of 
those structures. Here the role of government policy is noted as a specific 
structure promoting influence: 
"Now the Community Interest Company got so much promotion that they 
negated social enterprise activity that’s been going on for so long"…. 
Business adviser. 
Again and in a similar vein, government policy also contributes significant 
influence in relation to the earlier findings concerning confusion and complexity. 
Here a legal adviser highlights the role of government in adding to structural 
pluralism and hence to confusion through complexity: 
"they ploughed in with community interest companies when we already had 
community benefit societies, and then we already have four forms of charity, 
unincorporated associations, simple trusts, a charitable company and an 
independent society, and then they introduced the CIO. They just keep 
adding and there’s a wealth of them and they never take any away! 
((laughingly))". Legal adviser. 
In relation to practitioner understanding of social enteprise structures a strong 
underlying tension exists in relation to practitioner orientation towards the 
rejection of what might be regarded as the externally, 'officiated' and promoted 
definitions of social enterprise alongside their associated structure choices. This 
political challenge is presented in a general sense by participants but was 
particularly strong in relation to the social enterprise mark in that research 
participants were expressly concerned with how the social enterprise mark 
definition had been arrived at and in turn challenged the democratic legitimacy 
of those seeking to control what is or is not a social enterprise. The quotations 
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below are illustrative of the sentiment expressed by many social entrepreneurs 
and their advisers taking part in this research: 
 "‘Social enterprise is a grass root movement, it’s continually changing, and 
we are not in control of that change."  Social entrepreneur & business 
adviser. 
" people will try and control it, which is one of the reasons why I had real 
difficulties with the Social Enterprise Mark, and with any sort of given 
definition". Social entrepreneur. 
"It only matters when people like S. UK. [Social Enterprise UK] start to try and 
position themselves, and say, ‘We are the voice of social enterprise in the 
UK.’  And you say, ‘Well, a) you’re not, and b) your definition is 
undemocratically arrived at and narrow, and who the hell are you?" Social 
entrepreneur. 
"I think it’s that sort of… it’s that feeling that – that what you are has been 
taken – the definition of what you are has been taken possession of by 
somebody else… doesn’t seem to me to be overly helpful." Practice lawyer. 
In addition to the general concerns expressed over kite-marked definitions a 
lawyer advising social enterprises on structure suggests that this may constitute 
an inappropriate influence on practice as social enterprises seek legitimacy and 
recognition through the selection of a social enterprise structure that does not fit 
their business or governance model, resulting in the distraction of the enterprise 
from its core mission: 
"I think this sort of badging everything as either being quality or missing, or 
being outside the box is causing the organisation to then make decisions 
about what they are, what they live and breathe and then try and reconfigure 
what they’re doing to fit within that definition, which inevitably takes them 
away from what they were trying to do in the first place." Practice lawyer. 
In response to the tensions for practitioners surrounding the prescribed 
definitions and their associated structures this research identifies that some of 
these tensions are being resolved, at least in part through the pursuit by 
practitioners of dialogue with regulators and through the selection of other more 
generic structures such as the company limited by guarantee or shares: 
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"…..there were rigidities created by the Social Enterprise Mark that the 
practice community have partially overcome by working with the community 
interest company regulator, and also overcome by reverting back to like 
CLGs or CLSs; they just bypassed the rigidities of the CIC". Academic, social 
entrepreneur and legal structures expert. 
In relation to the legitimacy of the widely accepted and promoted definitions of 
social enterprise, several social entrepreneurs and advisers expressed the view 
that rather than the influence of legitimacy by definition and kite-marked brand, 
what was much more important by way of influence was how social enterprises 
behaved in practice.  In articulating this behaviour in practice, participants 
expressed referred to the creation of social value alongside the demonstration of 
higher order social values as an expression of their 'organisational identity' often 
measured by social auditing:  
"I think the way in which our social audit works, for example, is that it works 
within the resources of the enterprise and it’s geared mainly to do that, to 
make sure that the social enterprise remains on track to its own -  not 
external – its values and its own principles, and that includes an annual 
review of the constitution, does it fit anymore? ". Social enterprise adviser. 
Following this counterpoint of social enterprise as defined through an expression 
of behaviours and values, social entrepreneurs expressed strong views on the 
legitimacy of some social enterprises that had adopted the CIC structure: 
"I’ve seen loads of people running under CIC or charities that run the most 
horrendous companies you can imagine. I mean everything from sexual 
abuse to just poor management to larceny – I mean all kinds of things going 
on in these companies all over the country, that I’ve seen, but because they 
have the moniker or whatever everyone thinks it must be a good company, 
it’s okay." 
" It’s look, I’m a CIC; forget that I sexually abuse my employees. You know, 
look I’m a CIC; oh, I don’t have any women in power positions in my 
company. Look, I’m a CIC but I’m the worst run – you know, I actually, I’m not 
stealing money but I waste so much money I might as well be stealing it, do 




4.4.2 The influence of structural pluralism, confusion and complexity. 
 
Many research participants who were often very experienced social 
entrepreneurs expressed concerns over confusion surrounding structure 
selection is as a direct result of the complexity of the structures available to 
social enterprises as perceived by the research participants and that this 
represents a significant influence acting upon structure selection. Research 
participants consistently identified complexity as an influence in their structure 
selection either for themselves, their clients or both and the quotations below 
serve to illustrate the feelings expressed by most participants as to the 
complexity of structures available to social enterprises:  
"they were essentially exploring their options and really it was struggling to 
understand all the complexities involved in it, and even then, when I came 
along and laid it out for them, it’s like, “Oh, it’s even more complex than we 
thought.” Business adviser. 
"One of the big issues was complexity. It’s really straightforward, if you want 
to set up a limited company you can go buy it for £15 off the shelf tomorrow, 
a readymade set of rules and off you go, you’re in business, whereas if you 
want to set up a community benefit society, you really do need to think about 
your rules!  If you want to set up a CIC, there are different versions of a CIC 
you can set up". Business adviser. 
"Yeah, I mean I think that’s what I’m saying is the whole thing about setting 
up these structures is just ridiculous in my – and I think we’ve 
overcomplicated things massively, massively". Social entrepreneur. 
Further to the influence of complexity identified by the research participants, this 
was matched by general confusion both in respect of the social entrepreneur(s) 
and the broader social enterprise community. The main areas of confusion 
identified concerned proliferation of structures available alongside the relative 
merits and drawbacks of each as expressed in the summary below by legal two 
advisers and a social finance expert: 
"Yeah, and in terms of that, what you could say, the system within which we 
design legal structure is absurd, there are nine or ten different options: we’ve got 
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company limited by guarantee, CIC limited by guarantee, CIC limited by shares, 
a charitable company, CIO, Bencom , a cooperative society." Legal adviser. 
"…..you’ve got to know the whole range pretty intimately and frankly, unless 
you’re a specialist, which I am, you’re not going to. ….  
there’s no way you could have that depth of understanding. It’s taken me 40 
years!" Legal adviser. 
"There are about ten, I don’t know ten, there are a lot of legal structures you 
can go from and I find that a little bit confusing". Social finance expert. 
"from the consumer’s point of view, it’s absolutely baffling and a lot of people 
get very anxious about whether they’re picking the right structure or not, and 
equally, a lot of people get anxious when they discover they’ve picked the 
wrong one!" Legal adviser. 
 
"people are actually confused about the options and the pros and cons of 
each, so I do a lot of handholding at that stage and explaining in plain English 
what the options are." Legal Adviser. 
 
The confusion noted above and particularly in respect of the less fashionable, 
less promoted structures presents some very practical barriers to their selection 
as we find that the confusion noted earlier extents to broader stakeholder 
groups and their understanding of social enterprise structures. Here one of the 
business adviser participants explains the practical difficulty in seeking local 
business rate relief on behalf of a social enterprise client (who's enterprise was 
not constituted as a CIC) and the confusion over definitions of social enterprise 
in the broader stakeholder community: 
 
"The conversation I had with somebody in a local authority about business 
rates, they give reduced business rates for charities and community interest 
companies. Okay, what about a company limited by shares where 51% or 
more of its shareholding is community, not interested? Not interested in the 
slightest, because they don’t understand the difference, and I think that’s 
where the problem is, where maybe the government has promoted certain 
models more than others, ..". Social entrepreneur. 
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Social entrepreneurs were often influenced in their structure selection by other 
social entrepreneurs, especially where those entrepreneurs were recognised as 
experienced or holding reputation within the broader social enterprise 
community. Respected members of that social enterprise community often 
shared incorrect, ill-informed views concerning structures and served to further 
compound the confusion surrounding legal structure selection as their views 
passed around networks of social entrepreneurs: 
"I’ve had people come to me who actually have illegal structures that have 
been recommended to them by people who have quite a standing in the 
sector." Legal Adviser. 
 
4.4.3 The influence of funder's attitudes towards social enterprise 
structures 
 
As with the findings earlier in respect of the orientation of social entrepreneurs to 
the funding of their social enterprise acting as a significant influence on structure 
selection; findings also suggest that the selection of structure is influenced by 
the attitudes of funders towards certain structures. This direct influence from 
funders is well illustrated by the two quotations below from a business adviser 
and a social entrepreneur where funder attitudes have much more directly 
influenced the selection of the enterprise's structure and have in the two noted 
examples caused the existing structure to be changed completely: 
 
"So we’re working with somebody who started off self-employed, then formed a 
CIC, then Comic Relief desperately wanted to fund them because they were 
doing such wonderful work, got to the point where they were nearly at signing 
and they said, “Oh by the way you are a Charity aren’t you?” So they ended up 
founding a charity and they are working between Scotland and England – so 
they now have the two directors both self-employed, they’ve got two CICs, one 
registered in England and one in Scotland. One charity at the moment 
registered in Scotland but they need another one in England because lottery 
want to fund them and they need that structure – how stupid". Business adviser. 
 
"Sometimes funder driven decisions – I mean the reason I set my first social 
enterprise up as a charity – I set it up as a company limited by guarantee 
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because I wasn’t interested in personal gain and the big funder came, Northern 
Rock Foundation came and said, “We want to give you three-quarters of a 
million pounds but we need you to be a charity,” so what would you do?" Social 
entrepreneur. 
The influence of funders on structure selection is also be expressed through the 
bidding criteria that funders such as the Big Lottery Fund and a number of 
Community Foundations put in place for their grant funds such that they exclude 
certain forms of structures (those that distribute profits) from bidding for them 
either directly or indirectly: 
"you see and big lottery are funny about CICs limited by shares, as are 
Community Foundations, they have particular views". Social entrepreneur. 
The potential influence of exclusion through grant application criteria is 
exampled below by the founder of a CIC limited by shares who reflects on not 
being able to access grant funding: 
"I would have quite liked to have bid for was the RBS [Royal Bank of Scotland] 
Skills and Opportunities Fund, which is a grant …….. And we can’t bid for that 
because our legal structure precludes us from bidding; so although it’s grant I 
wouldn’t have been using it in that grant sense if you know what I mean". Social 
entrepreneur. 
Following on from the above findings concerning the influence of funders over 
the selection of structures, funders also exert a more indirect influence on legal 
structure selection as they influence the governance structures of social 
enterprises such that this may consequently influence the selection of structure. 
A number of research participants have noted this influence by funders over the 
governance model of social enterprises as funders seek assurances concerning 
governance structure, board make-up, skills and experience in order to support 
their due diligence process for their lending or grant funding. Here a lawyer from 
a specialist social enterprise legal practice explains the issue: 
"So I can think of a number of – a number of charitable foundations that I work 
with whose due diligence focus up front will be to focus quite heavily on the 
governance of an organisation, understanding exactly who – what the make-up 
of that board is and also the skills within that board and understanding that that 
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is going to drive a more professional basis on which a particular social 
enterprise acts". Practice lawyer. 
The issue of governance and the importance of this to funders in making funding 
decisions is supported here by a social finance expert who suggests that the two 
most important issues for social investors, in this case by social investment 
organisations concerns, leadership and governance of the social enterprise: 
"I would say certainly leadership and governance. That’s very much looking at 
the trustees and the management and the skills capacity of that, the board of 
trustees and senior management team." Social finance expert. 
In a related sense, this issue of reputational risk in relation to investors also acts 
an influence on structure selection. In managing reputational risk investors seek 
to support particular governance models in order to mitigate the potential for 
reputational damage as they insist upon independent boards of directors, so 
influencing social entrepreneurs towards particular structures that promote this 
type of governance model: 
"investors are increasingly nervous of its reputational risk of investing in 
organisations where poor governance within that organisation actually can then 
reflect very badly on the investor and sort of raise all sorts of reputational 
queries about why the investor has made that investment in the first place.  It’s 
usually the fact that when you think about this from the large problems that have 
occurred with charities and social enterprises over the past ten years, it is 
usually a governance failure that has resulted in the fall or failing of that 
organisation – particularly around where individuals have been found to have 
made irregular payments to themselves from their social enterprise out of a 
governance failing that’s caused that". Practice Lawyer. 
In summary, the influence of funder's attitudes and behaviours acts to prioritise 
the selection of particular structures or to marginalise the selection of other legal 
structures by social entrepreneurs. 
 
4.4.4 The influence of business, legal and governance advice. 
 
The business planning process is an important influence on structure selection 
as this was identified by all of those research participants that had experience of 
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giving business advice and some of the social entrepreneurs interviewed. The 
importance of business planning is illustrated by the quotations below such that 
the importance of a viable business model is expressed and that this is, in turn, 
is a precursor to and so influence upon legal structure selection:  
"for the start-ups: it’s business planning, it’s defining products and services, 
it’s talking about marketing strategy. Legal structure might come up, but a lot 
of it is really about making it viable." Business adviser. 
"the approach is finding out ……. how they were going to trade, where they 
were going to generate income…...". Business adviser. 
Further to identifying the importance of business planning in the structure 
selection process the importance of the sequencing of business planning in 
advance of structure selection emerges from the experience of a number of 
social entrepreneurs and the practice of business advisers as an important 
influence on structure selection: 
“Forget legal structure for now, let’s work on this plan.”  Business adviser. 
“Forget legal structure for now and let’s just define what products and 
services.”…..And then if there is an occasion where it becomes important for 
them to make a decision one way or another, I then have a focus session on 
it with them, just one-to-one". Business adviser. 
"I guess what I’m saying is it’s things like the NewCo model [legal structure] 
are brilliant but they’re off the agenda because it’s not right for me to get that 
in at the point of business planning, it’s just too complicated to get your head 
round, and it solves problems that you don’t even know you have!". Social 
entrepreneur and business adviser. 
Both business and legal advice are significant external influences upon structure 
selection as the advice provided by advisers may directly or indirectly influence 
the structure selections made by social entrepreneurs during the advice giving 
process. In a broader and additional sense, the influence of advisers may also 
act to either mitigate or compound the influences of structural pluralism, 
confusion and complexity discussed earlier in relation to the often poor quality of 
advice provided. Research participants consistently expressed the view that 
access to good quality advice was an important influence upon their structure 
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selection process. This influence is expressed below by a social entrepreneur 
and a charity chief executive and is suggestive of influences that act to mitigate 
the earlier noted influence of structural pluralism, confusion and complexity: 
 
"So I think, as a social entrepreneur, that there would be two routes. One is you 
either strike lucky and you can come across someone like (legal structures 
advisor) who really sorts you out! ((laughingly)) Or you understand that this is 
going to be a bit of a journey and be prepared to keep changing your 
structure…". Social entrepreneur. 
 
"It’s so important for people to make the right choices, and I think what’s really 
important is having that business support allows people to get the right 
information to make choices". Charity chief executive. 
 
"there are a number of generalist special enterprise advisors who think they 
know more than they do and give dodgy advice". Social entrepreneur. 
"An absolutely classic. They’ve set the wrong sort of company up because 
they’ve listened to the wrong advice.." Legal structures adviser. 
 
In a similar vein, the issue of poor legal advice provided  by legal experts and 
lawyers was specifically identified as detrimental to structure selection both by 
the social entrepreneur and adviser participants alongside assertions that many 
social enterprises had adopted an inappropriate structure following the receipt of 
advice: 
"Yeah, and what does worry me is the quality and availability of legal advice." 
Social entrepreneur. 
"I do get people coming to me who have been advised to register as a charity 
and have realised that they’ve essentially given away their project and they 
didn’t realise they were doing that." Legal adviser. 
"We realised that a lot of the legal work done at the time was substandard, and 




"And then they will go to a legal advisor, who will effectively sell them whatever 
they want to sell them." Social entrepreneur. 
"…we unpick structures quite a lot;" Legal structures adviser. 
"They are better to go to a lawyer to say, “I want to set up a CIC limited by 
shares and I want your advice,” than going to them and saying, “What should I 
set up?” because we actually find the advice quite often quite poor". Social 
entrepreneur. 
As with the findings concerning business planning and the sequencing of this in 
advance of structure selection discussed earlier, it is also suggested by legal 
advisers that the taking of legal advice should follow on from business planning 
and the development of a governance model in arriving at an appropriate 
structure for the enterprise. In support of this, a specialist social enterprise 
lawyer alongside a legal structure expert explains the context for the provision of 
legal advice and the relationship to the operation of enterprise: 
"Legal advice has to be given in the context of a commercial issue." 
Specialist social enterprise practice lawyer. 
"the message is, “You decide what you want to do and then you will find the 
right vehicle to actually fulfil that for you and sometimes you’ll have a choice 
at the end of the day.” Legal structures adviser. 
However, whilst the sequencing suggested above by both business advisers 
and legal advisers may prove to appropriate, a legal practice lawyer suggests 
that if it is practical to do so that the giving of legal advice and business advice 
may be co-ordinated such that the professional advisers supporting the client 
might all share a common view of the often complex business, governance and 
legal context of the social enterprise before arriving at a structure selection.  
Here a legal practice lawyer explains the issue of sequencing and suggests a 
degree of integration of business and legal advice: 
"a number of times we will feel that possibly a social entrepreneur has come 
to us a kind of the wrong stage. And that might be because they need to 
develop their business plan further or potentially because they’ve taken their 
business plan so far that they – they’ve not counted for a particular legal 
nuance, which means that actually doing their… offering their business plan 
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the way it wants to is impossible. So I kind of think that these things need to 
be – need to be kind of going on at the same time. So it’s not necessarily the 
degree of sequencing, it’s as you are undertaking your business planning 
have you considered the legal ramifications of that?" 
"So I mean the ideal scenario would be – at the appropriate stage would be 
sitting down with a set of accountants and a set of lawyers at the same time 
to almost thrash out what the sort of the main five issues on either side of that 
debate are. And so the lawyers and accountants then understand what the – 
what the particular financial concerns are from a legal point of view and the 
other way around what the legal concerns are from an accountant’s point of 
view." Practice lawyer. 
 
4.5 Social entrepreneur's responses to internal or external contradictions 
and tensions. 
 
Some experienced social entrepreneurs seek to resolve their organising 
tensions through the flexible implementation of structures so softening the 
influence away from those structures with seemingly problematic organising 
arrangements as they look to work around the structural constraints. Here an 
experienced social entrepreneur, a legal adviser and a business adviser explain 
the approach: 
 
"The sole social entrepreneur who will not give up control and ownership of 
their baby but who is absolutely dependent on securing some sort of grant 
funding. That’s the one that frequently never gets resolved. Yeah, and most 
other things we can solve at some stage or another with a few tricks of the 
trade. There is actually a slightly devious way round that one, and I don’t 
entirely approve of it, even though I thought of it, so I only offer it to people 
who are really desperate! ((laughs)) Which is basically you form a community 
interest company limited by guarantee with one voting member, which you 
can do, which is a social entrepreneur. They then recruit a Board of Directors, 
so when they go to funders, say, “Look, we’ve got four directors, they’re 
unrelated,” and in fact, come the general meeting, there’s only one person 
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with a vote who can appoint directors, sack them, replace them. So I don’t 
particularly like that structure". Legal adviser. 
[Researcher] Does the CIC regulator go for that? 
"Yeah". Legal adviser. 
Here we can clearly see that experienced social entrepreneurs and their 
advisers are fully aware of the regulatory constraints that they are seeking to 
avoid in their approaches to organising as they reference the acceptance CIC 
regulator in relation to their practice: 
"I think anyone like me, who has managed a social enterprise, and been in 
the real thick of it, knows that it’s actually all about power.  It’s all about power 
and managers realise that. Now it’s up to them how they want to manage 
that, but there’s no legal structure that I think I, as a manager, couldn’t 
manipulate to suit the way that I work and manage, and I think most 
experienced managers know that, and so really legal structures, to some 
extent, reflect that." Social entrepreneur. 
"the other thing is people don’t realise how flexible these structures can be.  
A lot of business advisors don’t realise how much they can bend and twist 
these structures." Social entrepreneur. 
"I don’t know any social enterprise where I’ve spent a long time with, when 
you work out what they really want, where you haven’t had to improvise or be 
imaginative with their legal structure, and that’s built in to good social 
enterprises". Business adviser. 
Advisers clearly recognised and exploited what they perceived to be flexibilities 
within the current structures that allowed them to accommodate their own 
orientations towards organising: 
"Personally, I quite like the complexity because it means I can design 
structures with very subtle variations and pick and choose from different bits, 
so it gratifies me that a client can come to me with some really quite weird 
and wonderful requirements and I can manipulate these little bits and pieces 




In counter-argument to the decoupling practiced by some social entrepreneurs 
and in pursuit of structural legitimacy, some form of measurement and review in 
the form SROI or Social Audit is suggested by some participants as a more 
effective reflection of social enterprise than some of the widely promoted 
structures: 
 "…. a good social audit, one of the things it does is that annually it reviews 
the legal structure and it reviews it in the light of people’s experiences 
annually, and that’s a very dynamic thing. That doesn’t happen in social 
enterprises generally. And I reckon the reason why it doesn’t happen is 
because the people who are in power in that social enterprise are aware that 
what they’re doing doesn’t necessarily fit with the legal structure and if they 
start to review it, then that change in power will be exposed". Social 
Entrepreneur. 
Whilst some social entrepreneurs have sought to decouple their practice from 
that associated with their structure, others have taken the approach of creating 
new structures that relate more closely to their organising orientations: 
 
.".it was pre-CIC….. and effectively, I think it boiled down to a charity, which 
was totally irrelevant, or a company limited by guarantee, and I didn’t like 
either of those. And then we started talking about share capital companies, 
and to cut a very long story short, between xxxx and myself, we invented a 
new form of shared capital company, a multi-stakeholder shared capital 
company, which we dubbed the NewCo model, and where there were 
different classes of shareholder". Social Entrepreneur. 
Here, we clearly see social entrepreneurs responding to what they perceive to 
be the restrictions imposed by the current structures such as the CIC: 
"……so all of the early backers to this [the FairShares Model] were rooted in 
some critique of the CIC. The early critique was the loss [of a democratic 
element]; and so Co-ops UK responded initially to that by creating a Co-
operative CIC, so they restored the democratic elements that were lost from 
the CIC in its original creation by the setting of model rules. xxxxx created a 
stakeholder model. I created what I call the surplus sharing model. xxxxx 
created what he called the social wealth model. So, we were all finding a 
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legal response to what we saw as the shortcomings of the CIC". Social 
Entrepreneur. 
Not only do we see social entrepreneurs responding to the restrictions of the 
current structures we also see them reacting to their competitive environment 
and seeking ways to scale up their operations through new co-operative 
approaches to partnership organising: 
"So, looking at the way that service is across the board, the commissioning is 
going, we responded to the issues in that and decided to set up the I believe 
first health and wellbeing LLP". 
"I think it’s a great model to use. It can be mixed between private sector and 
public, they’ve got to have objectives aligned, because again they’re taxed at 
source, they all will take the same risk. It’s an investable platform, so if an 
investor wanted to have equity shares in the LLP they could do that. But you 
cannot do that in the individual organisations that make up the LLP because 
they have an asset lock. So, that’s always been a barrier to investment. It 
could be possible that a commission would put the money in to start a service 
that they wanted to test out, so it’s an interesting model for innovation. You 
can use it as a funding circle. We’ve really had to focus on what we want to 
do because it’s such a flexible model". CBS Director. 
 
4.6 Chapter summary. 
 
In summary,  this research has identified a number of significant influences 
acting upon the selection of the structure selection for social enterprises and 
these include the internal influences of; ownership, decision making, business 
planning, funding alongside external influences that are exerted by; funders, 
kite-marks, confusion and complexity. This research finds that the structure 
choices made by social entrepreneurs have significant implications for access to 
funding, particularly grants and investment alongside some very practical 
implications related to trading, stakeholder engagement and access to advice 
that are related to the legitimacy associated with their structure. This research 
also finds that experienced social entrepreneurs or those with experienced 
advisers are taking very pragmatic decisions concerning structures as they look 
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to select structures that are recognised as being legitimate and privileged social 
enterprise structures on the basis of their promotion, recognition and legitimacy 
of definition such as the Community Interest Company and through kite-marks 
such as the Social Enterprise Mark. The issue of the CIC structure was a central 
and recurring concern for a significant number of the participants in this 
research and consequently provides a particular focus for future discussion in 
this thesis. 
 
Further, having chosen these legitimated structures, social entrepreneurs are 
seeking 'work-around' solutions in order to facilitate their access to finance 
alongside their control of ownership, control of decision making and their use of 
profits. In addition to 'work-around' solutions, social enterprises faced with a 
significant competitive threat from large private sector organisations, particularly 
in the health sector have sought innovative new multi-stakeholder structures to 
enable them to compete whilst maintaining the status and structural integrity of 





Chapter 5: Discussion. 
 
The selection of appropriate structures for social enterprises has been the 
subject of much practitioner and government debate as social enterprises have 
become an even greater presence in the social, political and economic 
landscapes over the past fifteen years  (Bates, Wells & Braithwaite, 2018; Cox, 
2012; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011; DLA Piper & 
UNLtd,  2014; Frail & Pedwell, 2003; Giotis, 2010; Guardian, 2011; Morrison 
Foerster & Trust Law, 2012; Social Enterprise UK, 2017a; Wrigleys Solicitors, 
2014) whilst trading effectively in often highly competitive environments (Dees, 
1998;  Thompson, 2002; Pearce & Kay, 2003). This thesis argues that the 
structure choices of social entrepreneurs holds wide-ranging and profound 
implications for investment, funding options and trading opportunities as well as 
the protection of social purpose and/or assets. All of the aforementioned factors 
are important in respect to the financial health and growth of social enterprises 
alongside their generation of social capital so represent profound implications 
for the practice of social enterprise. 
The overall purpose of this research was to more fully understand the factors 
that influence social entrepreneurs in choosing the structures that they adopt for 
the organisations they create. As there is at the present time no definition in law 
of a 'social enterprise', excepting for the purposes a small number of 
government programmes, the social entrepreneur has up to twelve potential 
choices in respect of legal form (School for Social Entrepreneurs, 2018). 
Following this, social enterprises are not defined by their legal status but rather 
by the nature of ownership and decision making social entrepreneurs adopt, 
alongside the way they utilise the profits they generate through their trading 
activity.  
Previous studies have examined social enterprise structure selection from the 
perspective of governance arrangements (Spear et al., 2007), typology based 
on legal structure (Bull, 2015, 2018) and rules-based rubrics (Bates, Wells & 
Braithwaite, 2018; Cox, 2012; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2011; DLA Piper & UNLtd, 2014; Frail & Pedwell, 2003; Morrison Foerster & 
Trust Law, 2012; Social Enterprise UK, 2017a; Wrigleys Solicitors, 2014). 
However, this research departs from these very particular perspectives in 
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seeking a holistic view of the influencing factors on structure selection based on 
the experiences of social entrepreneurs and their advisers. In adding to what is 
currently written, the influencing factors on structure selection are examined at a 
micro level through the organising orientations of social entrepreneurs alongside 
the macro environmental influences acting upon them. The lens of institutional 
logics (Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018; Pache & Santos, 2013a; Sullivan Mort, et 
al., 2003) is used in order to argue that the disciplining effects of the 
institutionalised templates for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) that are 
presented to social entrepreneurs by powerful actors serves to create and 
control the social enterprise category. 
Despite the founders of social enterprises being faced with a proliferation of 
structural forms to pursue their interests, social enterprise is constructed by 
powerful actors as a homogenous organisational category that I refer to as the 
'social enterprise category'. This social enterprise category is increasingly 
rendered a governable terrain (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2016) through the 
development of Kitemarks, funder/investor requirements and government policy 
initiatives which shape and control what it means to be a ‘good’ social 
enterprise. Such mechanisms have been shown to strengthen institutional 
coherence and drive structural isomorphism (i.e. Similarity) (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017) and such is now the case with social 
enterprise.  
As yet, scant attention has been given to the ways in which Kitemarks, 
standards, government promotion and funding criteria serve to prioritise and 
marginalise particular forms of social enterprise by bestowing or denying access 
to material (e.g. financial) and symbolic (e.g. legitimacy) resources, the 
implications of such disciplining affects or how individual entrepreneurs respond 
to them. 
This chapter explicates this issue and adds to the current social enterprise 
discourse as the mechanisms that govern social enterprise are exposed. In 
doing this I position Kitemarks, standards and funding criteria as political 
artefacts that serve to discipline the structure choices of social entrepreneurs 
through prescribing desirable characteristics, behaviours and structures for 
social enterprises. This chapter also highlights situations where adherence to 
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such prescriptions often results in tension for social entrepreneurs when their 
structure choice is at odds with their own constructions of legitimate organising 
principles, which are perceived by them to be as socially and materially 
efficacious but prevent access to physical and symbolic resources.  
The analysis presented in this chapter offers new insights into the dynamics 
surrounding the structure choices made by social entrepreneurs, including the 
potential nodes of conflict between exogenous prescriptions and social 
entrepreneur’s own orientation to certain aspects of organising and what social 
entrepreneurs actually do in the face of such conflict. I find that conflict is 
particularly prevalent in respect of ownership (the control and use of profits) and 
governance arrangements (the control decision-making)  where the treatment of 
these aspects within the logic of the social enterprise category are at odds with 
the social entrepreneurs orientation to how these issues should be organised. In 
order to resolve the tensions that they experience, social entrepreneurs often 
‘decouple’ (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017) their governance and/or organising 
practices from those prescribed in external standards or begin to create new 
structures and ways of organising on the margins of the social enterprise 
category through processes of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, et al., 
2009).   
The dynamics of structure choices made by social entrepreneurs foreshadowed 
above are presented in the social enterprise structure selection model below 





Figure 5.1 A Social Enterprise structure selection model 
 
The following sections of this chapter seek to explicate the external pressures 
acting on social entrepreneurs’ own orientation to certain aspects of organising 
and what they actually do in the face of such pressures as presented in figure 
5.1 above. 
 
5.1 The construction and categorisation of social enterprises. 
  
As set out in Chapter 4, the way that social enterprise is currently constructed by 
government, funders and within quality standards/Kitemarks constitutes a 'social 
enterprise' category of organisation, which possess disciplining functions that 
act to prioritise and marginalise particular organisational forms, thus creating a 
categorical imperative for social entrepreneurs to conform to particular 
forms/structures of social enterprise from within the social enterprise category. 
The findings [section 4.4] suggest that kite-marks, promoted structures, funding 
criteria, and government policy discipline the choices of social entrepreneurs in 
that they influence the ownership and control of the enterprise, its access to 
funding, investment, and support. Alongside the implications of these 
disciplining factors the enterprise's legitimacy, recognition and trading 
relationships may also be affected. 
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In some cases [See Findings, section 4.3.3]  it was apparent that structure had 
been selected based upon a desire to comply with the preferences of funders  
(Dey & Teasdale, 2016), the requirements of kite-marks or because the 
promoted structures were seen to represent the epitome of legitimate social 
enterprise structure rather than upon organising principles surrounding 
ownership, decision making and use of profits that were perceived by social 
entrepreneurs to be as socially and materially efficacious but prevented access 
to physical (money or material assets) and symbolic (legitimacy and recognition) 
resources [See Findings, sections 4.4]. Others, having selected their structure 
based upon their own view of such legitimate organising principles reflected 
upon the adverse consequences of that selection in relation to their loss of 
legitimacy as an accepted social enterprise, their inability to access funding or 
investment, the restriction on their use of profits and their loss of control of 
decision making [See findings section 4.4].  
Categorisation is used here as a useful lens through which to view the structure 
selection process, as we can see that the social enterprise category is 
constructed and reconstructed in response to the influences and prescriptions of 
powerful actors and the macro-economic environment alongside the social and 
economic realities of practical social enterprise activity [See findings, sections 
4.3 & 4.4]. Categorisation plays a key role in imposing a structural coherence on 
social entrepreneurs by placing their ways of organising into a recognisable 
social enterprise category. The placing of ways of organising into a recognisable 
category, implies the membership of a particular category and therefore not of 
others, resulting in relational tensions between the social enterprise category 
and other forms of organising [See findings, sections 4.3 & 4.4]. The ways that 
the category of social enterprise is constructed by government, funders and kite-
marking organisations serves to minimise the differences between the members 
of the social enterprise category whilst maximising the differences between that 
category and others [See Findings 4.2 & 4.4]. This separation of the category of 
social enterprise serves to create clear boundaries between it and other 
categories that in turn serve to further facilitate the categorisation process. This 
can clearly be seen in the accounts of social entrepreneurs and their advisors 
experiencing this process as they either felt excluded from the social enterprise 
109 
 
category or compelled to comply with it [See findings, sections 4.3 and 4.4] in 
pursuit of legitimacy (See NewCo Model) or grant funding. 
The placing of organisations into categories acts as a disciplining function that 
can shape the allocation of attention or support from various organisations 
(Zuckerman, 1999) such as funders and policymakers as well as facilitating 
comparisons between the organisations within a category (Hsu & Hannan, 
2005). This use of categories creates an 'organizational ‘imperative’ (Glynn & 
Navis, 2013) for social entrepreneurs to fit their social enterprise activity into that 
category as a precursor to acquiring both social approval (acceptance as a 
social enterprise) and material resources (grants, investment and business 
support) (Zuckerman, 1999; Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2001; Glynn & Navis, 2013) 
[See findings, sections 4.3, 4.4 & 4.5]. 
Additionally, when social entrepreneurs strategically self-categorise in response 
to their audiences they do so largely in pursuit of legitimacy and this can act as 
a prime driver for their structure selection. We saw within the narratives of the 
social entrepreneurs, for example, a significant concern for their categorisation 
by regulators or funders from whom they were are seeking grants or investment, 
customers seeking products or services, and specialist social enterprise 
networks/business support organisations from whom they were seeking 
assistance. [See findings, sections 4.2 & 4.4].  
In addition to self-categorisation, social enterprises are subject to social 
categorisation by expert legitimating agencies (Vergne & Wry, 2014) such as 
kite-marking organisations, funding bodies and government. As we can see in 
the accounts of social entrepreneurs and their advisers this categorisation 
occurs both directly and indirectly. Direct social categorisation by funding bodies 
can be seen in the funding requirements of social investors, grant givers or local 
authorities as experienced by number social entrepreneurs in this research [See 
findings, sections 4.3 and 4.4] but not by some of the 'experts' who then 
engaged in institutional entrepreneurship. Indirect social categorisation can be 
seen in the legitimating actions of sector kite-mark awarding bodies such as the 
SEM Company or those promoting particular structures such as the CIC 
Association or CIC regulator. The findings highlighted for example that social 
entrepreneurs clearly identified structures that met the requirements of the SEM 
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and CIC as members of the category of social enterprise and recognised the 
structures associated with the social enterprise category as being accepted as 
legitimate social enterprises [See findings, section 4.4]. We can also clearly see 
this social categorisation in relation to the CIC structure in action through the 
practice of local government officers in their decision making concerning the 
transfer of social assets, the application business rate relief and the promotional 
activities of the CIC regulator [See findings, section 4.4]. In these examples the 
actions of the expert legitimising organisation serves to favour those structures 
that conform to the institutional logics that are codified in CIC's institutionalised 
template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) and penalise those that do not.  
Departing from the linear, rational decision tree type conceptualisations of 
structure selection that can be found in the current academic and practitioner 
literature. This research presents important evidence of the disciplining of the 
choices of social entrepreneurs. Further, that this disciplining of structure choice 
by powerful actors serves to make the social enterprise category an increasingly 
controlled and governable terrain (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2016). 
Additionally and when taken from a sociological perspective, legitimacy is 
predicated on a social enterprise conveying an identity that fits within the social 
enterprise category (Navis & Glynn, 2011; Glynn & Navis, 2013) in order to be 
categorised as such. Wry, Lounsbury & Glynn (2011, p. 1) also suggest that this 
social enterprise persona should represent a "clear defining collective identity 
story" that demonstrates the group is engaged in social enterprise activity, "with 
a common orienting purpose and core practices". I argue that this "identity story" 
is conveyed in the formalised institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, 
et al., 2009) that is laid out in the requirements for the SEM, the CIC or in the 
definitions of social enterprise promoted by government agencies. 
However, and again from a psychological perspective, organisations with 
common attributes will also see themselves as part of the same category and 
self-categorise accordingly (Glynn & Navis, 2013). Despite the many and often 
contested definitions of social enterprise, the core aspects of each (trading, 
shared ownership and control alongside restrictions on the use of profits) are 
predominantly based upon government, funder and practitioner group definitions 
that represent the defining identity story (Wry, Lounsbury & Glynn, 2011) of the 
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social enterprise category. The findings highlighted for example, that particularly 
experienced advisers and social entrepreneurs such as participants 5, 11, 12, 
13 and 14 often viewed these categorises as narrow and undemocratically 
arrived by those groups of powerful actors such as the CIC Association, SEM 
company and Social Enterprise UK (SEUK) that would seek to define and 
categorise social enterprise activity in this way [See findings, section 4.4]. This 
group of social entrepreneurs and advisers clearly articulated a rejection of the 
creation and control of the social enterprise category by powerful actors. 
The participants in this research clearly articulated concerns about their 
categorisation in terms of their structure that related to legitimacy, recognition, 
access to support, ownership, and control alongside the potential effect on 
trading related to their structure. In exploring these concerns, this research 
explicates these largely overlooked influences and advances our understanding 
of the dynamics of strategic categorisation upon the structure selection process 
of social entrepreneurs going beyond what is currently written.  
In interpreting the concerns of the research participants two very specific issues 
emerged with regard to the categorisation of social enterprise activity; firstly, the 
kite-marked category promoted as the social enterprise mark (SEM) and the 
category promoted as the CIC [See findings, sections 4.4]. The SEM is 
promoted as a form of social enterprise accreditation and brand that suggests 
that it "tells customers that a product or service comes from a social enterprise" 
(Social Enterprise Mark Company, 2016). The categorisation of social enterprise 
activity in this way serves to privilege a particular conceptualisation of what a 
social enterprise is (Dart, Clow, & Armstrong, 2010); Lyon, & Sepulveda, 2009) 
and thereby confers both structural (Suchman, 1995) and categorical (Vergne & 
Wry, 2014) legitimacy upon the particular structures that fit the category 
boundaries  set out by the kite-marking organisation.  
The systematic privileging of one category over others (Lakoff, 1987)   and the 
meaning systems embedded within the promoted category clearly disciplined 
the choices of social entrepreneurs this study. This privileging facilitates the 
stratification of category membership based on certain attributes (Rosch in 
Rosch and Lloyd, 1978) such as governance structures that promote shared 
ownership or those that restrict the use of profits/ownership of assets by social 
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entrepreneurs. The stratification of membership within categories of social 
enterprise activity and the privileging or conferring of legitimacy on one category 
over another holds implications for practice in terms of promoting the selection 
of structures of social enterprise that fit a particular category boundary whilst 
challenging the selection of others that do not. In recognising that structure 
selection is disciplined in this way we can challenge the current 
conceptualisations of structure selection as purely based upon the rational 
choices made by social entrepreneurs related to their own orientations toward 
organising in favour of a more complex and politically nuanced view that 
structure selections are often a product of the disciplining actions of powerful 
actors. 
In addition to the disciplining influences acting upon social entrepreneur 
behaviour there are further and much more far-reaching considerations as this 
influencing of social entrepreneur behaviour manifests as a form of state-craft 
(Scott, 1998) that can be seen to influence the discourses of public policy, 
politics and economics in a way that has not been explored by previous authors. 
The challenge to legitimacy discussed above is particularly evident for example 
in respect of those social enterprise structures that include employee ownership 
and distribution of profits (Ridley-Duff & Southcombe, 2012) as they do not 
easily conform to the SEM and therefore fall outside the category boundary. The 
SEM and the CIC both benefit from specific infrastructure support via the Social 
Enterprise Mark Company and the CIC Association alongside their associated 
online information channels (www.socialenterprisemark.org.uk & 
www.cicassociation.org.uk). The infrastructure support afforded to the SEM and 
CIC alongside the CIC Regulator's duty to raise awareness of and confidence in 
the CIC structure (CIC Regulator, 2017) serves to reinforce audience 
perceptions of the legitimacy of this formalised institutionalised template for 
organising (Battilana, et al., 2009)  that in turn acts to maintain and strengthen 
the category boundary.  
The systematic privileging and bestowing of legitimacy upon certain categories 
of social enterprise structure serves to drive the isomorphism of social 
enterprise institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017) 
as social entrepreneurs are driven to adopt structures not in response to macro 
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environmental and competitive pressures or their micro orientations towards 
organising but rather through a process of response(s) to a socially and 
politically constructed environment [See findings, sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5].  
I find that the isomorphism of social enterprise institutions is being driven by the 
three types of isomorphic pressure posited by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in 
the form of coercive, mimetic and normative processes. Coercive pressures are 
generally the result of politics and power relationships and in this case the 
demands of government, funders and other large actors such as commissioners 
of services to adopt specific structures or practices, or face sanctions for non-
compliance (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). This coercive pressure is clearly 
demonstrated in the social entrepreneur's accounts of funders directly dictating 
the structure of their social enterprise as a precondition to the provision of 
funding and support [See findings, section 4.4].  Social entrepreneurs are often 
coerced into the adoption of certain kite-marked, promoted and privileged 
structures for fear of being excluded from practitioner networks, commissioning 
processes, investment, grant funding, business support or other forms of 
support such as business rate relief [See findings, section 4.4].  
Mimetic pressures typically concern the response of organisations to uncertainty 
as they seek to imitate other organisations that are seen to be successful and 
this is to a degree true of the social enterprises in this research though a 
significant driver for the adoption of structures through imitation relates to the 
adoption of for example the CIC structure as the expression of successful social 
enterprise activity that brings with it both legitimacy and privilege [See findings, 
section 4.4].  
Normative pressure is exerted by social enterprise peer networks and support 
organisations that for example act to promote certain structures such as the CIC 
or those that meet the criteria for the SEM as the normative choices. This 
normative pressure can clearly be seen in the diffusion of case studies of 
successful organisations adopting those structures as well as the promotion of 
their benefits over other alternatives (See www.cicassociation.org.uk). Following 
Nickel & Eikenberry (2016) the isomorphic pressures on the selection of social 
enterprise structures can be expressed as a form of 'governing' as both state 
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and non-state actors encourage particular forms of social enterprise structure 
such that the activity of social enterprise becomes increasingly governable.  
 
In identifying and explicating how the isomorphism of social enterprise 
institutions is being driven in relation to the coercive, mimetic and normative 
processes acting on social enterprise structure choices this discussion 
contributes to our understanding of both the current institutional state of social 
enterprise and to our understanding of the disciplining effects of these drivers. 
 
5.2 Tensions between the dominant social enterprise category and the 
organising orientations of social entrepreneurs. 
 
The category that is social enterprise is built upon a hybrid mix of social and 
market logics with social logics manifesting in strong stakeholder involvement, 
democratic governance, shared commitment to a social mission, and acting 
ethically (Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 2015; Fitzgerald & Shepherd, 2018) and 
with competitive market orientation and profit maximisation typifying market 
logics (Zhao & Lounsbury, 2016). The various logics adopted by social 
enterprises are often adopted in the form of a hybrid of the two (Carter & Jones 
Evans, 2006; Neck, Brush, & Allen, 2009) that conveys the formalised 
institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009; Fitzgerald & 
Shepherd, 2018) and that in turn underpins the category. Following the social 
enterprise discourse concerning hybridity, I also argue that the combining of 
market and social logics results in tension (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & 
Santos, 2013a). I uniquely position this tension as one that exists between the 
institutional logics imposed by powerful actors in the form of institutionalised 
templates for organising (Battilana Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009) that fit within the 
boundary of the social enterprise category and the organising orientations of 
social entrepreneurs. I further argue that this tension is particularly pronounced 
in relation to social entrepreneurs' orientations towards ownership, decision-
making and the distribution of profits.  
We saw in the narratives of the social entrepreneurs that there were particular 
concerns for the current institutional orientation (Vurro, et al., 2010) or 
institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009) in 
relation to decision making and ownership [See findings sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.4 & 
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4.5]. The institutional logics of the social enterprise category as embodied in the 
SEM and the CIC structure act to promote (a mimetic norm perceived by the 
research participants rather than a legal requirement) the sharing of decision 
making and the involvement of the social beneficiaries of the enterprise in that 
decision making as an expression of the categorical legitimacy (March & Olsen, 
2006; Glynn & Navis, 2013) of social enterprise activity and this provided a 
particular focus to the tensions that social entrepreneurs' experienced [See 
findings sections 4.1 & 4.4]. The accounts of the social entrepreneur and adviser 
participants often contained reflections upon the tension that they experienced 
in relation to the control of decision making of the enterprise that they had 
created or having chosen a structure that conformed to the social enterprise 
category rather than their own orientations towards organising [See findings 
sections 4.1 & 4.4]. 
In addition to, and often further compounding the decision making tensions the 
dominant logics related to the ownership of the enterprise and its assets, but 
particularly those that concerned the distribution of profits amongst the social 
entrepreneurs or other shareholders/investors were a source of further tension 
apparent in the narratives of the social entrepreneurs [See findings sections 4.1, 
4.2 & 4.4].  The tension concerning ownership and control was found to be 
much amplified when small groups or single entrepreneurs were involved and 
they sought to retain ownership and control of what they saw as 'their' enterprise 
[See findings section 4.1]. Conversely where public assets or a community 
imperative brought social entrepreneurs together the tensions experienced 
where those concerned with the protection of that asset in public ownership or 
the sharing of decision making surrounding how best to deliver their social 
mission [See findings section  4.1]. 
In relation to market logic tensions, the narratives of the social entrepreneurs or 
their advisers (participants 4, 5, 7, 11, 12 and 13) often revealed the 
juxtaposition of entrepreneurial personality in terms of business orientation, 
central locus of control, need for reward from the venture (Meredith, et al., 1982; 
Timmons & Spinelli, 2009) [See findings section 4.1] and the current institutional 
orientation of the social enterprise category in respect of philanthropic shared 
ownership and decision making which amplified that tension [See findings 
section 4.1].  
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The categorical governing or control of the category of social enterprise serves 
not only to restrict the choice of social enterprise structure but also acts to inhibit 
the development of new more radical forms of social enterprise structures. 
Moreover, the transformation of what the research participants regarded as the 
'grass-roots movement' of social enterprise [See findings section 4.4] is a 
manifest form of statecraft as the complex reality of social enterprise becomes 
typified, legible (Scott, 1998) and rendered a governable domain (Nickel & 
Eikenberry, 2016). The findings also concern the political views of the social 
entrepreneurs in that they clearly highlight this form of control as a point of 
tension as they rejected the legitimacy of those government and practitioner 
groups that they saw as conspiring to discipline and govern what they saw as 
the social enterprise movement [See Findings pages 4.4]. 
 
5.3 How social entrepreneurs respond in the face of conflict with the 
institutional logics of the dominant social enterprise category. 
 
Where the organising orientations of social entrepreneurs is in conflict with the 
social enterprise category and therefore the logics that underpin it, this results in 
one of three responses by social entrepreneurs; conformance to the social 
enterprise category logics, symbolic adherence whilst decoupling from those 
logics or the creation of new logics or mixes of logics and therefore new 
categories of social enterprise activity.  
 
5.3.1 Conformance to the social enterprise category logics 
 
Not all of the social entrepreneurs and their advisers in this research 
experienced tensions between the social enterprise category logics and their 
own orientations towards organising. Those who did not experience such 
tensions appeared to be content with the social enterprise category logics and 
the structures that related to those logics [See Findings section 4.1 & 4.2]. 
  
5.3.2 Decoupling from the social enterprise category logics 
  
In relation to decoupling  from the social enterprise category logics we saw 
practical manifestations of this response in the accounts of social entrepreneurs 
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or their advisers [See findings section 4.2 & 4.5] as they sought ways to 
circumvent the asset lock or shared decision making in the governance 
arrangements associated with the CIC structure. The decoupling of practice 
from the current institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, Leca & 
Boxenbaum, 2009) whilst symbolically complying (Dey & Teasdale, 2016) in 
pursuit of categorical legitimacy was clearly articulated through the accounts of 
social entrepreneurs or their advisers as they sought to organise in ways that 
limited or obviated the constraints imposed over ownership and/or decision 
making by this dominant institutional template [See findings sections 4.4 & 4.5]. 
 
5.3.3 Transformation through the creation of new categorises of social 
enterprise. 
 
A very different response to the above tensions was sought by other social 
entrepreneurs (participants 9,11,13 and 14) also experiencing the same tension 
as they began to create new categories of social enterprise activity with new 
ways of organising and new structures on the margins of the emerging 
governable domain of social activity. The social entrepreneurs, in this case, 
sought to take 'situated institutional action' (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) 
through processes of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, et al., 2009) in 
order to modify or create new categories. The institutional change enacted by 
social entrepreneurs is exampled in this research through the accounts of three 
groups of social entrepreneurs [See findings section 4.5].  
 
Firstly social entrepreneurs responding to dominant institutional logics have 
sought to facilitate shared ownership, investment and profit distribution in the 
development of the FairShares model (Ridley-Duff, 2015) in which it is possible 
to distinguish between different types of assets by their origin and therefore their 
future use so as to enable shares to be held and realised by employees, social 
entrepreneurs, investors and customers for social purpose as well as personal 
gain (See www.fairshares.coop/what-is-fairshares/). The institutional work 
(Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2011) pursued by the social entrepreneurs in 
creating this new category  relate to defining the category and changing the 
normative associations of the current social enterprise category of organising 
through the employment of rhetorical strategies (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) 
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that define the category by drawing upon the history and values of co-operative 
social enterprise. In pursuit of identity construction and the development of 
normative associations the meta-narratives (Czarniawska, 1997) or 'master 
frames' (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002) employed are those of ethics and 
democracy alongside wealth and power-sharing placed against the 'mirror 
narratives' (Ruebottom, 2013) of the inequality, inequity and dominance of 
control inherent in the current social enterprise category of organising. 
Interestingly, these logics can be clearly observed in public service 
bureaucracies, private for profit companies, and non-member led charitable 
associations. Further institutional work by the social entrepreneurs can be seen 
in the development of a normative network (www.fairshares-association.com) 
through which the new practices associated with this category are being 
normatively sanctioned (Lawrence, 1999; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
Secondly, findings highlighted another of the participants in this research who 
sought to develop an alternative structural category, also in pursuit of shared 
ownership. However, this 'NewCo' model was at that time a bespoke structure 
for a single enterprise without the broader pursuit of legitimacy by seeking to 
influence the sense-making (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2005) of those groups of powerful actors then defining and 
categorising social enterprise activity. The 'NewCo' model experienced 
significant tensions in practice that concerned both recognition and acceptance 
which resulted in adverse impacts upon trading as the enterprise was 
recognised by stakeholders as neither a true social enterprise nor a true private 
business [See findings section 4.4]. However, it is interesting to note that the 
FairShares Association (www.fairshares.coop) was amongst the first to 
recognise the 'NewCo' model as a legitimate form of social enterprise.  
 
Thirdly, the findings highlight other social entrepreneurs who in pursuit of scale 
in order to compete with the private sector for contracts in health provision have 
begun to organise in innovative new ways. In response to the privileging of large 
private sector organisations by funder requirements, these social entrepreneurs 
are creating a new collective category of social enterprise by adopting a 
structure not typically associated with social enterprise activity in the form of the 
Social Enterprise Limited Liability Partnership (SELLP).. The social 
entrepreneurs, in this case, have sought to implement this novel structure for 
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collective benefit whilst acting to maintain the governance model, business 
model and social mission of the individual members (Health & Wellbeing 
Partnership, 2018). The use of the limited liability partnership (LLP) structure by 
social enterprises was first proposed by Stephen Lloyd in an article in the 
Barrister Magazine in 2006 (Lloyd, 2006) and there has been little previous 
evidence of its use by social enterprises but this now emerges as a potential 
new category of social enterprise [See findings section 4.5] with its own 
institutional logics that enable scale, whilst retaining the individual governance, 
profit distribution and tax advantages of its members. 
 
There remain, however, significant challenges to the adoption of this structure 
as first conceptualised by Lloyd as he argued that for it to be truly effective there 
would need to be some minor changes to the LLP law. Following the social 
logics standpoint, Lloyd's original conception suggested that the features of such 
a SELLP might include; its establishment for charitable purposes (as defined in 
Section 2 of the Charities Act 2006); it being transparent in terms of filing 
membership and accounts information with Companies House, it being 
regulated by and filing an Annual Return to the CIC Regulator. In terms of 
control of decision making, it was suggested that at least one Charity Member of 
the SELLP with a minimum of 30% of the LLP’s equity being owned by a charity 
or charities. Further stipulations were also suggested in that a charity member 
would be appointed and hold a golden share which would mean that there could 
be no change to the purposes of the SELLP or change to its partnership 
agreement without its consent (see Lloyd, 2006).  Despite Lloyd's early 
conceptualisation of the SELLP the early adopters of this structure cite as a 
major advantage the opportunity to include private equity partners alongside 
charities and other forms of social enterprises in such a way that each might 
maintain their own ownership, control, tax and profit distribution arrangements 
whilst being able to work together for mutual benefit. Interestingly, these benefits 
would not be possible given the early design of the SELLP based on the 
primacy of social logics. 
 
In explicating the responses of social entrepreneurs to the disciplining of their 
structure choices this chapter advances the understanding of both structure 
selection and structure creation through the institutional work (Lawrence, 
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Suddaby & Leca, 2011) of social entrepreneurs engaged in the practice of 
institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, et al., 2009). 
  
 
5.4 Chapter summary. 
 
In summary, this chapter has discussed the how social enterprise is portrayed 
as a homogenous organisational category that is increasingly rendered a 
governable terrain (Nickel & Eikenberry, 2016) through the development of 
Kitemarks, funder/investor requirements and government initiatives which shape 
and control what it means to be a ‘good’ social enterprise. The mechanisms that 
act to strengthen institutional coherence and drive the structural isomorphism 
(i.e. Similarity) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017) of 
social enterprise domain are explored. This chapter pays attention to the ways 
in which Kitemarks, standards and funding criteria in particular, serve to 
prioritise and marginalise particular forms of social enterprise by bestowing or 
denying access to material (e.g. financial) and symbolic (e.g. legitimacy) 
resources. Alongside this, the implications of such disciplining effects on social 
entrepreneur's actions are considered. 
 
This chapter explicates the disciplining effects on structure selection by, 
positioning Kitemarks, standards and funding criteria as political artefacts that 
serve to constrain the structure choices of social entrepreneurs through 
prescribing desirable characteristics, behaviours and structures for social 
enterprises. The circumstances were adherence to such prescriptions is at odds 
with social entrepreneur’s own constructions of legitimate organising principles, 
which are perceived by them to be as socially and materially efficacious but 
prevent access to physical and symbolic resources are discussed. When such 
conflict arises, the responses of social entrepreneurs in either complying with 
the category logics, ‘decoupling’ their governance and/or organising practices 
from those prescribed in external standards or beginning to create new 
structures and ways of organising on the margins of the social enterprise 
domain are explored through the lenses of both institutional work (Lawrence, 
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Suddaby, & Leca, 2011) and the processes of institutional entrepreneurship 




Chapter 6: Conclusions. 
 
 
Based on the empirical findings presented in the preceding chapter(s) I argue in 
this thesis that social enterprise cannot be understood as a homogenous 
organisational category as portrayed in government policy documents but as a 
set of organisations facing a proliferation of structural forms which are 
increasingly rendered a governable domain (Scott, 1998; Nickel & Eikenberry, 
2016) through the development of Kitemarks, funder / investor requirements 
and government policy initiatives. I also advance further argument that these 
developments act to prioritise and marginalise particular forms of social 
enterprises as they exert coercive, mimetic and normative pressures (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) that act to facilitate the categorising of social enterprises in a 
way that strengthens institutional coherence and serves to drive structural 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). I also 
argue that as the actions of powerful actors work to maintain (Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006; Mutch, 2007) the social enterprise category and can be 
contrasted with the embedded agency of social entrepreneurs who act to create 
and legitimate new structures (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum, 2009; Hardy & 
Maguire, 2017) that challenge that social enterprise category. 
 
6.1 Contribution to practice 
 
The research question that was set for this study, by its very nature, seeks a 
practical answer, such that developing a contribution to practice was my primary 
aim in conducting the research. In problematizing the current approaches to 
structure selection (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) the intention was that the 
benefits of the research would have utility (Corley & Gioia, 2011) in supporting 
social entrepreneurs and their advisers in the selection of an appropriate 
structure for their social enterprise(s). This thesis, therefore, advances a new 
model for the practice of structure selection that extends current understanding 
through the consideration of the tensions between the organising orientations of 
social entrepreneurs, external environmental influences and the structures 
currently available to them. Further, the model presented recognises the 
practices of social entrepreneurs in response to the governing of the current 
123 
 
structures available to them as they seek to adopt and develop new structures 
through processes of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca & 
Boxenbaum, 2009). In presenting a holistic view of the selection of structures 
for social enterprises the aim is not to reinforce the disciplining of social 
enterprise activity but rather to illuminate how the social enterprise category is 
being challenged by the agency of social entrepreneurs. 
 
Following the argument that social enterprises cannot be understood as a 
homogenous organisational category, the selection of a congruent structure 
cannot therefore be easily arrived at through the use of the current linear 
flowchart type models produced by practitioners, support organisations, funders 
and law firms that are widely used by many social enterprise advisers.   
It is argued here that a congruent structure may be more appropriately arrived at 
through the balanced consideration of both the institutional orientation (Vurro, et 
al., 2010) of the social enterprise category and the social entrepreneur(s) own 
orientations towards particular ways of organising when placed within the 
context of the sequenced development of the core organisational components of 
business model, governance model, and structure.  
In proposing a model to assist social entrepreneurs in their selection of a 
structure this thesis illuminates the important issues in that structure selection 
process and their sequencing in arriving at a congruent structure. Rather than 
simply regarding structure selection as a response to a number of simple 
questions pertaining to internal organising and external factors, this thesis 
frames structure selection as an open process of tension resolution through the 
examination of the important interrelated issues that lead to that structure 
selection. A further purpose for advancing such a model is to encourage the 
embedded agency of social entrepreneurs in considering new approaches and 
structures categorical legitimation (Vergne & Wry, 2014) rather than accepting 
the disciplining of their choices and therefore the available structures. 
The current practice models that are designed to assist social entrepreneurs in 
selecting a structure do not adequately position and sequence business, legal or 
governance advice in a way that supports social entrepreneurs in addressing 
the tensions that they may experience. Further, current models do not fully 
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recognise the issues surrounding the congruence of structure with the issues 
related to the operation of the business and governance models.  
The importance of the business planning process and the development of a 
business model as a sound basis for trading are well understood. As Dees, 
Emerson, & Economy, 2001, p. 273) note, business planning provides a range 
of necessary outcomes;  by creating a “clarity of direction”, “knowledge of the 
market place”, “strong commitment from stakeholders” as well as helping to 
“attract investment”. The argument advanced here is one that concerns not only 
the social entrepreneurs(s) understanding and articulation of their business 
through the vehicle of a business model but also a clear understanding, 
clarification and articulation of their own orientations towards organising through 
a governance model. The accounts of the business adviser participants in this 
research strongly support the notion that the development of a business model 
as the outcome of a business planning process is the necessary first step 
towards selecting a structure for the new enterprise [See findings section 4.4]. 
This position is further supported by Mills (cited as in Conway, 2008) who 
suggests; the 'normal' advice before selecting a legal entity is to develop the 
organisation’s mission and business plan prior to the selection of structure.  The 
sequencing logic being applied does not seek to imply the primacy of the 
enterprise mission (market logic) over the social mission (social logic) nor 
institutional ambiguity in the motivations of social entrepreneurs (See Townsend 
& Hart, 2008) but simply that without trading there is no sustainable social 
enterprise activity whatever the primary motivation. The argument being 
advanced is rather one of congruence of organisational components with a 
structure in which a business model developed through a business planning 
process is followed by the development of a governance model that reflects the 
social entrepreneur(s) orientations towards organising and also acts to enable 
the business model to operate effectively within the construct of the chosen 
structures. The development of a business model (Teece, 2010) by social 
enterprises through the business planning process is generally accepted to be 
problematic (Bull & Crompton, 2006; Bull, 2007; Chapman, Forbes, & Brown, 
2007) and that the business model developed should be a social enterprise 
business model (Pearce & Kay, 2003) that not only reflects the commercial 
aspects of the business operation but also the social aims and targets (hybrid 
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logic).  In further respect of the notion of social enterprise business and 
governance models, participants also expressed concern for the validation of 
their practice via the rhetorical strategy of adopting accepted measurement 
mechanisms such as Social Audit (Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 2015) [See 
findings section 4.4 & 4.5] or Social Return on Investment (SROI) (Nicholls, 
Lawlor, Neitzert, & Goodspeed, 2012) in order to generate categorical 
acceptance and legitimacy (Klemelä, 2016) especially when they perceived that 
their structure was on the margins of the dominant social enterprise category. 
As with the discussion earlier in respect of governance model(s), this thesis 
does not seek to prescribe any particular business planning process or business 
model (See Grassl, 2012) but rather, stresses the importance of the role played 
by the business model in the structure selection process. The current models 
that are designed to assist social entrepreneurs in selecting a structure do not 
adequately position and sequence business, legal or governance advice in a 
way that supports social entrepreneurs in addressing the tensions that they may 
experience. The importance and availability of high- quality business and legal 
advice has been discussed earlier in this thesis alongside suggestions as to the 
timing and integration of some of these interventions.  
The accounts of the business adviser participants [See findings section 4.4] 
suggest that initial support interventions should be driven by the business model 
design or review such that business advice should be the first form of advice 
sought by the social entrepreneur(s). Once the initial business model has been 
developed, the next logical step would be to develop a governance model with 
support from either a business adviser / management consultant with the 
appropriate skills and knowledge or to seek appropriate legal advice at this 
stage. The aim at this stage should be to arrive at a governance model that is 
congruent with the business model i.e. a set of ownership, decision making and 
strategic leadership arrangements that whilst satisfying the organising 
orientations of the social entrepreneurs will enable the business model to 
operate effectively. The findings highlighted that if the advice sought in 
developing the business and governance models is from different sources then 
it is helpful to co-ordinate the decision making process of the final selection of 
an initial or new structure [See findings section 4.4]. The aim of this co-
ordination of advice should be to ensure that all of those advising the social 
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entrepreneur(s) fully understand the implications of a structure selection that is 
congruent with the business, and governance model of the enterprise. It has so 
far been implied that advice is sought and received via face to face intervention 
with advisers but given the availability of advice (Spear, Cornforth, & Aiken, 
2009) this advice may by necessity need to be accessed from a variety of 
sources i.e. face to face, online or from guidance documents. Regardless of how 
the social entrepreneur(s) receive advice the accounts of the business and legal 
adviser participants [See findings section 4.4] support the notion that the 
development of a congruent business and governance model will better 
articulate the business and its governance arrangements thus enabling them to 
provide more appropriate advice concerning the selection of a structure for the 
enterprise. The current structure selection models do not fully recognise the 
issues surrounding the congruence of structure with the issues related to the 
operation of the business and governance models developed or that these 
components are important precursors to structure selection. The evidence 
advanced for this argument is found in the accounts of the social entrepreneurs 
in this research and the subsequent decoupling (Vurro, et al., 2010) by some of 
their business and/or governance practice from the institutional logics of the 
dominant social enterprise category [See findings section 4.2 & 4.5].  
The current practice models fail to recognise the tensions between the 
organising orientations of social entrepreneurs and the available structures 
within the social enterprise category, assuming instead that once a particular 
decision has been made on the decision tree or flow diagram then the tension 
no longer exists or is resolved by the social entrepreneur(s). The current 
models, in failing to recognise the tensions between the organising orientations 
of social entrepreneurs and the available structure within the social enterprise 
category provides no outlet for the resolution of this tension and serves to drive 
the categorical imperative for social entrepreneurs to select structures that 
conform to the current institutional orientation (Vurro, et al., 2010) or 
institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009). This thesis, in 
explicating the tensions faced by social entrepreneurs in selecting a structure for 
their enterprise seeks to contribute to practice and theory by advancing an 
argument for the development of new forms of structures for social enterprises 
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in the resolution of those tensions through processes of institutional 
entrepreneurship. 
 
6.1.1 A practice model for social enterprise structure selection. 
 
Having discussed the important issues highlighted by the social entrepreneurs 
and their advisers in this research concerning the selection of structures, a 
practice model (Figure 6.2) for the selection structures for social enterprises is 
now advanced.  
 
Figure 6.2. A practice model for social enterprise structure selection 
 
The aim in presenting such a model is not to promote a particular category of 
social enterprise or related structure but rather to illuminate the important 
components to be developed in the selection of a congruent structure. At the 
risk of further proliferation of the choices for social entrepreneurs it is hoped that 
this new model might stimulate some degree of institutional entrepreneurship 
(Battilana, et al., 2009) in the development of new approaches and structures. 
Further, that these new structures might more adequately address the tensions 
between the organising orientations of social entrepreneurs and structures that 
are prioritised or marginalised by external factors. 
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Current practice models present structure choices as a rational set of decisions 
based firstly upon the securing of investment from private investors or the 
general public. If investment is not required from these sources then the 
question raised relates to the number of people involved in the Social 
Enterprise. If this is more than one then an Industrial Provident Society (IPS) or 
un-incorporated Association is suggested. If there is only one person involved, 
then sole trader status is suggested.  However, if investment is required and this 
from public sources then the question asked pertains to whether the social 
enterprise has solely charitable purposes or not? If the purpose is charitable 
then a charity or private company is advised, otherwise, a form of ethical public 
offering is suggested. Should investment be required and this is to be from 
private investors then the question asked pertains to the need to return all of the 
profit made by the social enterprise to investors? If this is the case then a private 
company limited by shares (CLS) is advised. Otherwise, a Community Interest 
Company (CIC) is suggested (adapted from Morrison Foerster & Trust Law, 
2012). 
 
Departing slightly from this approach to structure choice, Cox (2006, p 27) 
proposes a formula of "organisational model + business model + legal/financial 
structure = organisational structure". Here an organisational model based on the 
philosophical antecedents to ownership is the first consideration. Four possible 
choices are suggested with regard to ownership: co-operative in which the 
enterprise is owned and controlled by all the people involved in it; private, in 
which the enterprise is controlled by one or a few of the people involved in it; 
charitable, in which the enterprise is owned and controlled by people with no 
financial interest in it; multi-stakeholder, in which the enterprise is owned and 
controlled by a number of stakeholder groups including staff. The legal/financial 
structures for each are, respectively: a guarantee company (or CIC), a share 
company (or CIC), a society (Co-op or Community) and a Limited Liability 
Partnership. Following on from this, organisational structures relating to each 
are suggested as the: cooperative limited liability partnership, charitable 
community benefit society, non-charitable but not for profit guarantee company 




The proposed practice model (Figure 6.2) however, seeks to present each of the 
components necessary for the selection or reselection of a congruent structure 
via a cycle of initial planning or annual review that encompasses both the 
business model (BM) and governance model (GM) for the social enterprise. A 
very intentional sequencing of events is suggested and one that is primarily 
driven by the business model of the enterprise followed by a governance model 
that incorporates the social entrepreneur's ownership and decision-making 
orientations. The sequencing presented in this model directly implies a primacy 
of the economic mission (market logic) as expressed in the views of the 
participants in this research [See Findings, page 87-88].  
 
This model suggests that advice is taken at each stage of development or 
review, with business (BA) and legal/governance advice (LA) overlapping in 
order to suggest a degree of integration that is absent from current singular 
approaches to social enterprise advice giving. It is recognised however, that this 
might only be practicable in some instances and not in all cases. In respect of 
governance advice, findings suggested that the research participants did not 
seek specific governance advice per se but rather regarded this as either legal 
advice or an extension of the business advice process. This is perhaps 
understandable given the issues surrounding the availability of advice generally 
and the paucity of governance advice particularly (Spear et al., 2009). Further, 
for established social enterprises it is anticipated that advice might be required 
but with a greater emphasis upon review as the organisation's skills, activities 
and resources grow. For some social enterprises it may not be feasible due to 
costs or local availability to obtain face to face advice and so an advice 
intervention point may need to be supported by online resources, paper-based 
tools or guidance documents. 
 
Following the development of a business model and associated governance 
model, it is suggested that an annual review process (ARP) such as Social Audit 
(Spreckley, 1981, 2000, 2011, 2015) [See findings section 4.4] is undertaken 
annually. Though some form of social audit is suggested I do not seek to specify 
how this is undertaken or which model (See Kay & McMullan, 2017) is used but 
only that the vehicle of social audit may provide social enterprises with a 
mechanism for review that supports the enterprise in maintaining congruence of 
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business model, governance model and structure. In accordance with the 
developing practices of social enterprises seeking to adopt multiple structures 
via collaborative arrangements (LLPs) or subsidiary trading arms, the process of 
institutional entrepreneurship is presented here as being within the same 
selection and review processes.  
 
Where the tensions surrounding adherence to the social enterprise category and 
the social entrepreneur's own orientations towards organising are resolved, then 
the social entrepreneur will select a structure (SC1) that complies with the 
institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009) of the social 
enterprise category. However, where these tensions remain in conflict then two 
outcomes are open to the social entrepreneur(s). Firstly, they may select a 
structure (SC1) that complies with the institutionalised template for organising 
(Battilana, et al., 2009) of the social enterprise category and then decouple their 
business and/or governance practices from that template (SC2) in order to 
resolve the conflict through symbolic compliance (Batory, 2016; Edelman, 1992; 
Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Secondly they may, through processes of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana, et al., 2009) seek to adapt or create a new 
institutionalised template for organising (Battilana, et al., 2009), a new structure 
or a new category (SC3) (See Ridley-Duff, 2015; Lloyd, 2006; Health & 
Wellbeing Partnership, 2018).  
 
Having presented a practice model for the selection of structures by social 
entrepreneurs it is important to note that it is not my intention to prescribe a 
formula or flow chart solution to structure selection in the style of the current 
practice models. Rather, the intention is to provide a basis for the development 
of the core business and governance models of the enterprise as precursors to 
the selection of a structure in a way that recognises both the institutional logics 
of the social enterprise category and also the social entrepreneur's own 
organising orientations, particularly in respect of ownership and decision 
making.  
 
Finally, in recognising the agency of social entrepreneurs in this model I seek to 
promote the processes of institutional entrepreneurship so as to encourage the 
development of new, innovative templates of organisation, structures or 
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categories of social enterprise rather than supporting acceptance of the social 
enterprise category and the governing of the structure choices of social 
entrepreneurs. 
 
6.2 Contribution to knowledge. 
 
The contribution to knowledge made by this thesis lies in challenging current 
theorisations as well as current knowledge and practice related to social 
enterprise structure selection. Additionally, a contribution is made in the practical 
utility of the insights developed (Corley & Gioia, 2011) into the understanding 
and interrelationship of the components of social enterprise structure selection 
processes that are grounded in the experiences of social entrepreneurs and 
their advisers.  
 
Departing from the current linear rational theorisations of social enterprise 
selection (Bates, Wells & Braithwaite, 2018; Cox, 2012; Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 201; DLA Piper & UNLtd,  2014; Frail & 
Pedwell, 2003; Morrison Foerster & Trust Law, 2012; Social Enterprise UK, 
2017a Wrigleys Solicitors, 2014) and building on the conceptualisation of the 
different  organisational identities of what is regarded to be a social enterprise 
(Bull, 2015), this thesis contributes to the extension of current theory by blending 
(Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011) social entrepreneurship and institutional 
theory in order to frame the social enterprise structure selection process as an 
ongoing field of tensions between the social enterprise category of organising 
governed by powerful actors and social entrepreneurs' own orientations of 
towards organising.  
 
The insights I present in this thesis extend the current social entrepreneurship 
discourse by providing scholars with a deeper understanding of how social 
enterprise structure selection is disciplined by powerful actors such as 
government, funders, and kite-marking bodies who seek to construct social 
enterprise activity into a category of organising. 
  
A further contribution to theory is made in explicating the responses of social 
entrepreneurs to this disciplining of social enterprise activity as they are driven 
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to create new structures rather than selecting a structure in a linear rational way 
from within the social enterprise category as is presented as current practice by 
support organisations, government and funders. Further, that once structure 
selection choice is made that social entrepreneurs then may either decouple 
their organising practice or create and seek legitimacy for new social enterprise 
structures such as the SELLP, NewCo and Fair-shares. Here, I contribute to 
knowledge through the provision of a multi-level understanding of structure 
selection that examines the interplay between macro-level environmental 
influences and the micro level organising orientations of social entrepreneurs 
where previous works have examined singular aspects or focused upon linear 
approaches to structure selection. Additionally, the responses of social 
entrepreneurs to such disciplining are also explicated. 
In a further contribution to knowledge, I locate the new SELLP and Fairshares 
structures currently being adopted into practice within an adaptation of the 
conceptual framework presented by Bull (2015, 2018). Bull (2018), in presenting 
a new theoretical model for defining social enterprise in the United Kingdom 
(UK) based upon three core types of social enterprise recognises their 
constitution in law as the primary lens and therefore views them in terms of their 
incorporation and regulation rather than emphasising a not for profit or profit-
plus perspective (Bull, 2018). Recognising that these different organisational 
forms have characteristics that cannot be simply reduced to ‘market’ and ‘social 
purpose’ logics serves to identify them more accurately than any previous 
singular definition might.  The three organising characteristics (or institutional 
logics) identified on each axis of Bull's (2018) model that are characterised by 
market, social welfare and hybrid logics are, it is argued, the focus for the 
tensions in satisfying these logics within each structure in terms of the 
generation of social value versus the need for trading income and the 




Figure 6.1 Social enterprise legal structure model (Adapted from Bull, 2015,2018) 
 
Within this framework, three core types of social enterprise are theorised as: 
‘Solidarity’, ‘Trading Charity’ and ‘Social Business’ in terms of their 
incorporation, rather than from a sector perspective. Bull (2015) highlights that 
social enterprises may straddle two types; such that of the Community Benefit 
Society (CBS) that is incorporated in both society and charity law, the Company 
Limited by Guarantee (CLG) Charity incorporated in both charity and company 
law and the Company limited by Shares (CLS) / CLG Co-operative incorporated 
in company law but operating as a CLS with democratic principles that are 
associated with solidarity types. In adapting the work of Bull (2015, 2018) I 
conceptualise these new structures at the centre of the Bull's model and the 
tensions between the three types of organising principles with the SELLP 
constituted as a hybrid form of business entity (neither a partnership nor a 
company but a form of LLP), and the FairShares Models under co-operative, 
partnership or association law (See Figure 6.1; adapted from Bull, 2015, 2018). 
 
In a later development of this work, Bull (2018) suggests that the central space 
of his practice model is left blank as there is no 'ideal type' of social enterprise in 
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the UK. However, I argue here that the SELLP could fill this space as it has the 
capability to accommodate the four principles of social enterprise in the outer of 
the model alongside concurrently accommodating the three social enterprise 
types conceptualised within, alongside the capability to resolve all three of the 
organising tensions posited by Bull (2015). It could be argued that this might be 
simply a Limited Liability Company (Bull, 2018), however, the SELLP is a hybrid 
form constituted under LLP law. Further, this would be to oversimply the 
importance and flexibility of this structure as currently being operationalised by 
the Health and Wellbeing Partnership (2018). I present this conceptualisation 
therefore as a form of 'complex' or 'dense' hybrid organisation that may provide 
the vehicle to resolve the tensions between market and social logics alongside 
the tensions that also exist between several competing social logics, within one 
collective structure. 
 




As with most research, this study has a number of limitations.  The participants 
in the research were primarily drawn from social entrepreneurs and advisers of 
social entrepreneurs based in the North of England, and it could be argued that 
they may have presented a particular socially or politically located view of social 
enterprise activity as a result. However, it can be said that many of the 
participants had been engaged in social enterprise or advice activity in other 
parts of the United Kingdom and overseas so may act to balance the above 
criticism. Due to the nature of the structures available to social enterprises being 
grounded in the national legal frameworks and traditions of individual countries 
the findings of this research can only be said to apply directly to the selection of 
social enterprise structures in England. This said, I argue that though structures 
may differ, the notion that tensions exist between institutional demands and 
individual orientations toward organising may well be present in many national 
contexts.  
 
Further limitations may be identified regarding the extensive use of the 
institutional logics view as an analytical lens with which to view the structure 
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selections of social entrepreneurs. However, institutional logics were adopted as 
useful summary devices to help to make sense of the norms and practices 
surrounding social enterprise structure selections. Despite the possible critique 
that the institutional logics approach does not generally acknowledge agency, 
this thesis does consider the dynamic intersection of both the micro level 
orientations of social entrepreneurs and the macro-level logics of social 
enterprise activities in explicating social enterprise selection of structures.  
 
By way of yet further limitations, some of the social entrepreneurs or their 
advisers in this research related their historic experience in their interviews., 
Therefore, some of their critique of the CIC structure may now be less 
meaningful as some of the investment difficulties that they related may have 
been alleviated in part by the increase in the cap on the payment of dividends to 
shareholders. 
6.3.2 Future research. 
 
There are a number of important issues raised in this thesis concerning the 
availability, quality and nature of advice available for social entrepreneurs in 
relation to developing appropriate business models and governance 
arrangements that would benefit from further in-depth research.  
The research participants clearly expressed concerns in respect of access to 
high-quality governance (Spear et al., 2009) and business advice (Bull & 
Crompton, 2006; Bull, 2007; Chapman et al., 2007) which they found to be 
problematic. This would appear to be juxtaposed with the arguments presented 
by research for the European Commission seeking to map the UK social 
enterprise eco-system (European Commission, 2014) that suggests that there 
are a large number of publicly funded support schemes alongside networks and 
mutual support schemes available for social entrepreneurs to access. The 
concerns expressed by the research participants may be in part due to the 
geographic coverage of support organisations or to lack of awareness of the 
support available. In either case, it is beyond the purview of this research activity 
to map the support currently available for social entrepreneurs and this must 
remain for further research.  
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In addition, future research may usefully explore the utility of the practice model 
advanced in this thesis alongside issues of practitioner response to its 
implementation so serve to further develop the practice of social entrepreneurs 
and their advisers in selecting structures. 
 
 
6.4 Personal reflection. 
 
My journey through the DBA programme began back in 2011 when I was invited 
alongside a group of sixteen other colleagues and external candidates to join 
the in-house Doctoral cohort at Sheffield Hallam University, all of whom it 
appeared to me to be far better qualified than I to complete such a programme 
of study and research.  Despite my early feelings of trepidation I found the 
taught element of the Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) programme to be 
a hugely energising and intellectually stimulating experience. The shared 
experience with the other students was a supportive and rewarding experience 
as we learnt together what it was to undertake a doctoral degree programme. 
We all wrestled both together and alone with philosophies of knowledge as we 
began to understand the implications and role of our own ontological and 
epistemological assumptions to our putative research projects.  
The taught element of the programme with its four assignments presented some 
great highs and a few lows. Firstly the highs associated with beginning to 
engage intellectually with my subject area of management at a very different 
level to my previous Masters studies. In this respect, I will always look back 
fondly on this time of energetically devouring book after book, journal article 
after journal article, even those concerning research methods and philosophy. 
Secondly the lows; spending many solitary hours away from my family working 
on draft after draft of various passages writing only to tear them up in frustration.  
During this period, the receipt and assimilation of feedback was a tremendously 
important aspect and one worthy of mention. At this time I was very early in my 
teaching journey and the giving of feedback was a developing skill, so for me 
the receipt of feedback provided an opportunity to reflect upon my own practice. 
One particular experience stays with me and this concerned the feedback that I 
received for my final assignment paper. The lesson comes from the following 
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words written on the cover page of my paper; "this is beautifully written", wow, 
great, followed by "though I am not sure, quite why you have written some of it", 
ah, I see what you mean…. be clear and concise in your argument. So my 
message as a student was "be as clear and concise as possible" and as a 
teacher, that feedback needs to have both meaning and utility for the student.  
The next big step was completing the taught element of the course and 
subsequently succeeding in passing my DB2 research proposal, which was 
itself a truly energising point in the journey as I could now really get to grips with 
the practical fieldwork. I have been involved in the practice of social enterprise 
for many years as a Director and as a professional responsible for the 
government's business support programme for mainstream and social 
enterprise start-ups in the Yorkshire region so was very enthusiastic about 
engaging in the research fieldwork. Not surprisingly I found the fieldwork to be a 
thoroughly enjoyable experience as I was privileged to engage with some very 
interesting, knowledgeable and experienced social enterprise practitioners who 
freely gave me their time and their thoughts, something for which I will be 
eternally grateful.  
The analysis of the data I had collected at first seemed insurmountable as I 
pondered the sheer volume of pages of transcripts but then the decision to get 
to grips with the Nvivo software package really paid off as I started to code. 
Patterns were developed from immersion in the data that were formed into 
themes and then further developed into new ideas. Having chosen an inductive 
approach grounded in my interpretation of the data I had worried hugely as to 
whether any new theoretical insights would be generated but as the analysis 
continued an extension to another academic's theoretical classification model 
emerged and this was followed by my own practice model. However, having 
completed the fieldwork and undertaken the analysis things got harder and 
harder as I struggled to articulate my findings. Here, days of progress were 
punctuated by days of frustration in pages of text written and then deleted. At 
this point, I began to reflect on the efficacy of the approach that I had taken in 
trying to condense my writing efforts into one semester. However, a huge vote in 
favour of very good supervision as my supervisory team stepped in and 
suggested that I construct a storyboard of my arguments in order to help to 
articulate my findings which was followed up with a quick review  of  what I'd 
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written so far. So some useful feedback, some confirmation of approach and 
some gentle encouragement and swift progress began once again.  
Once the findings had been articulated then began the 'intellectual heavy lifting' 
of constructing the Discussion Chapter as I started to conceptualise the 
outcomes of my research into an effective contribution to both theory and 
practice. During this phase I was encouraged to make a contribution to an 
International Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research 
(ISTR) based on my findings and early conceptual modelling. As I reflect on the 
writing of my paper for the ISTR conference; this acted to give me a renewed 
sense of encouragement and a greater degree of confidence in myself as a 
researcher who could make a contribution to theory and practice that held both 
interest and utility not only for practitioners but to the broader community of 
social enterprise researchers. At this time, my Director of Studies also 
approached me to discuss contributing a chapter to a future edition of the 
textbook 'Understanding Social Enterprise' (Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2015) and for the 
first time in my doctoral journey I began to truly see the completion of my DBA 
as the beginning of my journey as a researcher rather than the end of my 





Academy of Management. (2006). The Academy of Management’s Code of 





2y9c3.  [Accessed 30th May 2017] 
Alvesson, M., & Ashcraft, K. L. (2012). Interviews in Symon, G., & Cassell, C. 
(Eds.). (2012). Qualitative organizational research: core methods and current 
challenges. Sage. 
Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2011). Generating research questions through 
problematization. Academy of management review, 36(2), 247-271. 
Andrews, T. (2012). What is social constructionism. Grounded theory review, 
11(1), 39-46. 
Armstrong, R. W., Williams, R. J., & Barrett, J. D. (2004). The impact of 
banality, risky shift and escalating commitment on ethical decision making. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 53(4), 365-370. 
Arribas, I., Hernández, P., Urbano, A., & Vila, J. E. (2012). Are social and 
entrepreneurial attitudes compatible? A behavioral and self-perceptional 
analysis. Management Decision, 50(10), 1739-1757. 
Ashoka (2011). What is a Social Entrepreneur? [online] Available at: 
www.ashoka.org. [Accessed 10th September 2011]. 
Atherton, A., & Elsmore, P. (2007). Structuring qualitative enquiry in 
management and organization research: A dialogue on the merits of using 
software for qualitative data analysis. Qualitative research in organizations and 
management: An International Journal, 2(1), 62-77. 
Austin, A., Stevenson, H., & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). Social and Commercial 
Entrepreneurship. Same, Different or Both?, Entrepreneurship  Theory and 
Practice, January, 2006. 
Bandura, A. (1995) Comments on the crusade against casual efficacy of human 
though, Journal of Behavior Therapy & Experimental Psychiatry, 26(3), 179–
190. 
Bandura, A. (1997) Self-efficacy: the exercise of control. New York: W. H. 
Freeman & Co. 
140 
 
Baron, R. A. (2004). ‘The cognitive perspective: a valuable tool for answering 
entrepreneurship’s basic “why” questions’, Journal of Business Venturing, 19, 
221–39. 
Barraket, J., Ling, S., Senyard, J., & Mason, C. (2013). Beyond identification: 
Understanding the nature of bricolage amongst diverse social enterprises. The 
Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research Exchange (ACERE 2013), 
Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, 05-08 February 2013/Per Davidsson. 
Basit, T. (2003). Manual or electronic? The role of coding in qualitative data 
analysis. Educational research, 45(2), 143-154. 
Bates, Wells, Braithwaite, & Social Enterprise London, (2003). Keeping it legal, 
legal forms for social enterprises, Social Enterprise London. 
Bates, Wells & Braithwaite. (2018). Get legal, setting up a charity or social 
enterprise.  [online] Available at: https://getlegal.bwbllp.com/decision-tool.  
[Accessed 9th August 2018] 
Batory, A. (2016). Defying the Commission: Creative Compliance and Respect 
for the Rule of Law in the EU. Public Administration, 94(3), 685-699. 
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid organizations: 
The case of commercial microfinance organizations. Academy of management 
Journal, 53(6), 1419-1440. 
Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: 
towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. Academy of Management 
annals, 3(1), 65-107. 
Baugh, J. B., Hallcom, A. S., & Harris, M. E. (2010). Computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis software: a practical perspective for applied research. 
Revista Digital Del Instituto Internacional de Costos, (6), 69-81. 
Baumol, W. J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and 
Destructive. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 892-921. 
Becker, H. (1963). Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, Free Press, 
New York, NY. 
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). The social construction of reality. A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Penguin Books, London. 
Besharov, M. L., & Smith, W. K. (2014). Multiple institutional logics in 
organizations: Explaining their varied nature and implications. Academy of 
management review, 39(3), 364-381. 
Bitektine, A., & Haack, P. (2015). The “macro” and the “micro” of legitimacy: 
Toward a multilevel theory of the legitimacy process. Academy of Management 
Review, 40(1), 49-75. 
141 
 
Blaikie, N. (2000). Designing Social Research, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Blaikie, N. (2007). Approaches to social enquiry: Advancing knowledge. Polity. 
Boeger, N. (2018). The New Corporate Movement. Shaping the Corporate 
Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity', Hart 
Publishing. 
Bolton, W., & Thompson, J. (2013). Entrepreneurs: Talent, temperament and 
opportunity. Routledge. 
Bornstein, D. (2007). How to change the world: Social entrepreneurs and the 
power of new ideas. Oxford University Press. 
Boschee, J., & McClurg, J. (2003). Toward a better understanding of social 
entrepreneurship: Some important distinctions. Retrieved October, 9, 2008. 
Bowen, G. A. (2008). Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research 
note. Qualitative research, 8(1), 137-152. 
Boxenbaum, E., & Jonsson, S. (2017). Isomorphism, diffusion and decoupling: 
Concept evolution and theoretical challenges. The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism, 2, 79-104. 
Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis 
and code development. sage. 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. 
Qualitative research in psychology, 3(2), 77-101. 
British Council (2016). Social enterprise in a global context the role of Higher 
Education Institutions. 
Brown, J. (2006). Equity finance for social enterprises. Social Enterprise 
Journal, 2(1), 73-81. 
Bryman, A. (2008). Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A. (2016). Social research methods. Oxford university press. 
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2011). Business research methods. Oxford University 
Press, USA. 
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2015). Business research methods. Oxford University 
Press, USA. 
Bull, M. (2007). “Balance”: the development of a social enterprise business 
performance analysis tool. Social Enterprise Journal, 3(1), 49-66. 
142 
 
Bull, M. (2008). “Challenging tensions: Critical, theoretical and empirical 
perspectives on social enterprise” Guest Editorial. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research. Volume 14. Number 5. pp 268–275. 
Bull, M. (2015). Shape sorting: towards defining Social Enterprise in the UK. 
Bull, M. (2018). Reconceptualising social enterprise in the UK through an 
appreciation of legal identities. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior 
& Research, 24(3), 587-605. 
Bull, M., & Crompton, H. (2006). Business practices in social enterprises. Social 
Enterprise Journal, 2(1), 42-60. 
Bull, M., & Ridley-Duff, R. (2018). Towards an appreciation of ethics in social 
enterprise business models. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-16. 
Burns, P. (2007). Entrepreneurship and Small Business, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 
Cabinet Office. (2016). Social Enterprise Market Trends, based upon the BIS 
Small Business Survey 2014, London: UK Cabinet Office 
Cabinet Office. (2018). Civil Society Strategy: Building a future that works for 
everyone, London: UK Cabinet Office. 
Carter, S., & Jones Evans, D. (2006) Enterprise and Small Business, Principles, 
Practice and Policy, Harlow: Prentice Hall. 
Chapman, T., Forbes, D., & Brown, J. (2007). “They have God on their side”: 
the impact of public sector attitudes on the development of social enterprise. 
Social enterprise journal, 3(1), 78-89. 
Chell, E. (2007). Social enterprise and entrepreneurship: towards a convergent 
theory of the entrepreneurial process, International Small Business Journal, Vol. 
25 pp 5-26. 
Chell, E. (2008). The entrepreneurial personality. A Social Construction, 
Routledge. 
Chell, E., Nicolopoulou, K., & Karatas-Ozkan, M. (2010). Social 
entrepreneurship and enterprise: International and innovation perspectives, 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Vol. 22, No. 6, October 2010, 485–
493 
Civil Society. (2013). Think tank launches rival social enterprise accreditation 
scheme. [online] Available at: https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/think-tank-





Collison, C., & MacKenzie, A. (1999). The power of story in organisations. 
Journal of Workplace Learning 11 (1), 38-40 
Conrad, P. (1975). The discovery of hyperkinesis: Notes on the medicalization 
of deviant behavior. Social problems, 23(1), 12-21. 
Conway, C. (2008). “Business planning training for social enterprise”, Social 
Enterprise Journal, Vol. 4 No. 1, 57-73. 
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. 
Corley, K. G., & Gioia, D. A. (2011). Building theory about theory building: what 
constitutes a theoretical contribution?. Academy of management review, 36(1), 
12-32. 
Cox, G. (2006) Social enterprise organisational structures: towards a 
development methodology. Retrieved from 
http://www1.lsbu.ac.uk/bcim/cgcm/conferences/serc/2006/speakers/cox-serc-
006.pdf 
Cox, G. (2012) The extra elements, ELEMENT C, Developing the right 
organisational structure for a social firm. Retrieved from 
http://www.geofcox.info/publications 
Crabtree, B. F., & Miller, W. L. (Eds.). (1999). Doing qualitative research. sage 
publications. 
Creed, W. D., Scully, M. A., & Austin, J. R. (2002). Clothes make the person? 
The tailoring of legitimating accounts and the social construction of identity. 
Organization Science, 13(5), 475-496. 
Cresswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design Choosing 
Among Five Approaches, Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective 
in the research process. London: Sage 
Czarniawska, B. (1997) Narrating the organization: Dramas of institutional 
identity. University of Chicago Press. 
Daft, R. L., & Weick, K. E. (1984). Toward a model of organizations as 
interpretation systems. Academy of management review, 9(2), 284-295. 
Dart, R., Clow, E., & Armstrong, A. (2010). Meaningful difficulties in the 
mapping of social enterprises. Social Enterprise Journal, 6(3), 186-193. 
Davies, I. A., Haugh, H., & Chambers, L. (2017). Barriers to social enterprise 
growth. Journal of Small Business Management. 
144 
 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, D.L., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Towards a stewardship 
theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47. 
Dees, J. (1998). ‘The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship’. Retrieved from 
www.fuqua.duke.edu/centers/case/leaders/resources.htm. 
Dees, G. (2007). Taking Social Enterprise Seriously, Society, Vol 44(3), pp 24-
31. 
Dees, G., & Elias, J. (1998) The challenges of combining social  and 
commercial enterprise, Business Ethics quarterly, Volume 8, Issue 1, 165-168. 
Dees, J., Emerson, J., & Economy, P. (2001). Enterprising Nonprofits: A Toolkit 
for Social Entrepreneurs, New York: Wiley 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2006). Defining social enterprise. Social 
enterprise: At the crossroads of market, public policies and civil society, 7, 3-27. 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2010). Conceptions of social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship in Europe and the United States: Convergences and 
divergences. Journal of social entrepreneurship, 1(1), 32-53. 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2014). The EMES approach of social enterprise in 
a comparative perspective. In Social Enterprise and the Third Sector (pp. 58-
81). Routledge. 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2017a). Fundamentals for an international 
typology of social enterprise models. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 28(6), 2469-2497. 
Defourny, J., & Nyssens, M. (2017b). Mapping social enterprise models: some 
evidence from the “ICSEM” project. Social Enterprise Journal, 13(4), 318-32 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2011). The SAGE handbook of 
qualitative research. Sage. 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. (2011). A guide to legal forms 
for social enterprise.  [online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3
1677/11-1400-guide-legal-forms-for-social-enterprise.pdf. [Accessed 9th March 
2013] 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. (2015). Small Business Survey, 
2014. [data collection]. UK Data Service. SN: 7814, 
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7814-1. 
Department of Health (2009), Transforming Community Services: Enabling New 
Patterns of Provision. The Stationery Office, London. 
145 
 
Dey, P., & Teasdale, S. (2016). The tactical mimicry of social enterprise 
strategies: Acting ‘as if’in the everyday life of third sector organizations. 
Organization, 23(4), 485-504. 
 
Di Domenico, M., Haugh, H., & Tracey, P. (2010). Social bricolage: Theorizing 
social value creation in social enterprises. Entrepreneurship theory and 
practice, 34(4), 681-703. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Collective 
rationality and institutional isomorphism in organizational fields. American 
Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160. 
DLA Piper & UNLtd. (2014) Structures for Social Enterprises. DLA Piper 
Edelman, L. B. (1992). Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: Organizational 
mediation of civil rights law. American journal of Sociology, 97(6), 1531-1576. 
Eisner, E. W. (1991). The enlightened eye: Qualitative inquiry and the 
enhancement of educational practice. New York, NY: Macmillan  
Emerson, J. (2003). The blended value proposition: Integrating social and 
financial returns. California management review, 45(4), 35-51. 
Ernst, K. (2012). Social entrepreneurs and their personality. In Social 
entrepreneurship and social business (pp. 51-64). Gabler Verlag. 
European Commission (2014). A map of social enterprises and their eco-
systems in Europe, Country Report: United Kingdom. London: ICF Consulting 
Services. 
European Commission (2015). A map of social enterprises and their eco-
systems in Europe. London: ICF Consulting Services. 
Fairbairn, B. (1994). The meaning of Rochdale: The Rochdale pioneers and the 
co-operative principles (No. 31778). University of Saskatchewan, Centre for the 
Study of Co-operatives. 
Fereday, J., & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating rigor using thematic 
analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme 
development. International journal of qualitative methods, 5(1), 80-92. 
Finlay, L. (2017, September 8th). Social Enterprise Mark: Providing Credible 





Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2006). The symbolic management of strategic 
change: Sensegiving via framing and decoupling. Academy of Management 
Journal, 49(6), 1173-1193. 
Fitzgerald, T., & Shepherd, D. (2018). Emerging structures for social enterprises 
within nonprofits: An institutional logics perspective. Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, 47(3), 474-492. 
Fox, T., & Whiteley, D. (2015) How mainstream enterprise support 
organisations are supporting social entrepreneurs, London: UnLtd. 
Frail, C., & Pedwell, C. (2003). Keeping it legal. Forms for social enterprises. 
London: Social Enterprise London 
Fraser (2013). Social Enterprise Lamcashire, Social Enterprise Toolkit. [onlline] 
Availlable at: http://selnet-uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SUL-Social-
Enterprise-Toolkit.pdf. [Accessed: 8th Matrch 2017] 
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, 
practices and institutional contradictions. 
Fugard, A. J., & Potts, H. W. (2015). Supporting thinking on sample sizes for 
thematic analyses: a quantitative tool. International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 18(6), 669-684. 
Galle, B. (2010). Social Enterprise: Who Needs It. BCL Rev., 54, 2025. 
Gartner, W. (1998) “Who is an Entrepreneur?” Is the Wrong Question, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Summer 1989, 47-68. 
Gartner, J. (2005). America’s manic entrepreneurs. American Enterprise, 16(5), 
18-21. 
Gill, J., & Johnson, P. (2010). Research methods for managers. Sage. 
Giotis, C. (2010). Social Enterprise Mag. [online] Available at: 
https://senscot.net/social-enterprises-stifled-by-structures/ [Accessed 10th 
January 2018]. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (2017). Discovery of grounded theory: Strategies 
for qualitative research. Routledge. 
Glynn, M. A., & Navis, C. (2013). Categories, identities, and cultural 
classification: Moving beyond a model of categorical constraint. Journal of 
Management Studies, 50(6), 1124-1137. 
Gov.UK. (2004). Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) 
Act 2004. [online] Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/27/ 
pdfs/ukpga_20040027_en.pdf [Accessed 22 April. 2018]. 
147 
 
Gov.UK. (2005). The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005. [online] 
Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1788/pdfs/ 
uksi_20051788_en.pdf [Accessed 22 April. 2018]. 
Gov.UK. (2009). The Community Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations 
2009 [online] Available at: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2009/9780111481004/contents [Accessed 
26 March. 2019]. 
Gov.UK, (2011). A guide to legal forms for social enterprise. GOV.UK. [online] 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-forms-for-social-
enterprise-a-guide [Accessed 24 April. 2018]. 
Gov.UK. (2012a). The Social Value Act (2012). [Online] Availlable at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/3/enacted.  [Accessed 13th August 
2016]. 
Gov.UK. (2012). Health and Social Care Act 2012: fact sheets - Publications - 
Gov.UK. [online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/health-and-social-care-act-2012-
fact-sheets [Accessed 22 April. 2018]. 
Gov.UK. (2017a). Social Enterprise Market Trends 2017. [online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
44266/MarketTrends2017report_final_sept2017.pdf. [Accessed: 2nd June 
2017]. 
Gov.UK. (2017b). Venture capital schemes: apply to use social investment tax 
relief. [online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/venture-capital-
schemes-apply-to-use-social-investment-tax-relief [Accessed: 10th August 
2018]. 
Gov.UK. (2018). Government announces major changes to rebuild trust after 
Carillion. [Online] Availlable at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-major-changes-
to-rebuild-trust-after-carillion-25-june-2018. [Accessed 30th June 2018]. 
Grassl, W. (2012). Business models of social enterprise: A design approach to 
hybridity. ACRN Journal of entrepreneurship Perspectives, 1(1), 37-60. 
Gray, D. E. (2016). Doing research in the business world. SAGE. 
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutional entrepreneurship in mature 
fields: The big five accounting firms. Academy of Management journal, 49(1), 
27-48. 
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., &, Lounsbury, M. 
(2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses. The Academy of 
Management Annals, 5, 317-371. 
148 
 
Grix, J. (2010). The foundations of research. Macmillan International Higher 
Education. 
Guardian, (2011). Live Q&A: Social enterprise - a guide to legal structures. 
[Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/social-enterprise-
network/2011/jan/17/liveq-a-legal-structures [Accessed 7th July 2018].  
Guclu, J., Dees, J., G., &, Battle Anderson, B. (2002). The Process of Social 
Entrepreneurship: creating opportunities worthy of serious pursuit, Fuqua of 
Business, Center for the Advancement of Social entrepreneurship 
Guild HE, (2018). The Social Enterprise Mark. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.guildhe.ac.uk/blog/the-social-enterprise-mark/ [Accessed 6th July 
2018]. 
Harding (2006). Social Entrepreneurship Monitor United Kingdom 2006, 
London: GEM UK, Foundation for Entrepreneurial Management 
Harding, R. (2007). Understanding social entrepreneurship, Industry and higher 
Education, February 2007, 73-84. 
Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2017). Institutional entrepreneurship and change in 
fields (pp. 261-280). London: Sage Publications. 
Harper, D. A. (2008). Towards a theory of entrepreneurial teams. Journal of 
business venturing, 23(6), 613-626. 
Harriss, D. J., & Atkinson, G. (2009). International Journal of Sports Medicine–
ethical standards in sport and exercise science research. International Journal 
of Sports Medicine, 30(10), 701-702. 
Henderson, F., Reilly, C., Moyes, D., & Whittam, G. (2018). From charity to 
social enterprise: the marketization of social care. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 24(3), 651-666. 
Health and Wellbeing Partnership. (2018). [Online] Available at: https://hwp-
llp.org.uk/. [Accessed February 2018]. 
Hepburn, A., & Potter, J. (2006). Discourse analytic practice. Qualitative 
Research Practice: Concise Paperback Edition, 168. 
Hsu, G., & Hannan, M. T. (2005). Identities, genres, and organizational forms. 
Organization Science, 16(5), 474-490. 
Hubbard, B. (2005). Investing in leadership volume 1: A grantmaker's 
framework for understanding non-profit leadership development, Washington: 
Grantmakers for Effective Organizations. 
Huybrechts, B., Mertens, S., & Rijpens, J. (2014). Explaining stakeholder 
involvement in social enterprise governance through resources and legitimacy. 
149 
 
Social Enterprise and the Third Sector: Changing European Landscapes in a 
Comparative Perspective. New York: Routledge, 157-175. 
James, D., Kane., D & Ravenscroft, D. (2016) Understanding the capacity and 
need to take on investment in the social sector, summary report. London: 
NCVO. 
Jarvis, R., & Rigby, M. (2012). The provision of human resources and 
employment advice to small and medium-sized enterprises: The role of small 
and medium-sized practices of accountants. International Small Business 
Journal 30(8): 944-956. 
Jensen, E., & Laurie, C. (2016). Doing real research: A practical guide to social 
research. Sage. 
Johnson, P. (2004). Analytic induction. Essential guide to qualitative methods in 
organizational research, 165, 179. 
Johnstone, B. (2018). Discourse analysis (Vol. 3). John Wiley & Sons. 
Joy, I., De Las Casas, L., & Rickey, B. (2011). “Understanding the demand for 
and supply of social finance: research to inform the Big Society Bank”, New 
Philanthropy Capital in association with the National Endowment for Science, 
Technology and the Arts (NESTA), London. 
Kamm, J. B., Shuman, J. C., Seeger, J. A., & Nurick, A. J. (1990). 
Entrepreneurial teams in new venture creation: A research agenda. 
Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 14(4), 7-17. 
Kay, A., & McMullan, L. (2017). Contemporary Challenges Facing Social 
Enterprises and Community Organisations Seeking to Understand Their Social 
Value. Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, 37(1), 59-65. 
Kellerman, B. (1999). Reinventing Leadership: making the Connection between 
Politics and Business, New York: University of New York Press 
Kellerman, B. (2008). Followership, How Followers Are Creating Change and 
Changing Leaders, Boston: Harvard Business school Press. 
Kets de Vries, M. (1977) The Entrepreneurial Personality: A Person at the 
crossroads, Journal of Management Studies, February 1977, 34-57.  
Kets de Vries, M. (1985) The Dark Side of Entrepreneurship, Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 63, Issue 6, p. 160-167. 
Kilby, P. (1971). Hunting the heffalump. In P. Kilby (Ed.), Entrepreneurship and 
economic development, 1-40, New York: Free Press. 
King, N., Cassell, C., & Symon, G. (1994). Qualitative methods in organizational 
research: A practical guide. The Qualitative Research Interview, 17. 
150 
 
Klemelä, J. (2016). Licence to operate: Social Return on Investment as a 
multidimensional discursive means of legitimating organisational action. Social 
Enterprise Journal, 12(3), 387-408. 
Kvale, S. (2008). Doing interviews. Sage. 
Kvale, S., & Brinkman, S. (2009) Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative 
Research Interviewing, Thousand Oakes: Sage 
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories 
Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Langdridge, D., & Hagger-Johnson, G. (2009). Introduction to research methods 
and data analysis in psychology. Pearson Education. 
Lawrence, T. B. (1999). Institutional strategy. Journal of management, 25(2), 
161-187. 
Lawrence, T., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2011). Institutional work: Refocusing 
institutional studies of organization. Journal of management inquiry, 20(1), 52-
58. 
Leadbeater, C. (1997). The rise of the social entrepreneur (No. 25). Demos. 
Lepoutre, J., Justo, R., Terjesen, S., & Bosma, N. (2013). Designing a global 
standardized methodology for measuring social entrepreneurship activity: the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor social entrepreneurship study. Small Business 
Economics, 40(3), 693-714. 
Lincoln, Y.,  &  Guba, E. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry, California: Sage. 
Lloyd, D. (2006). The Social Enterprise LLP – What Is It; And What Is It For?, 
The barrister magazine. 
Lounsbury, M., & Glynn, M. A. (2001). Cultural entrepreneurship: Stories, 
legitimacy, and the acquisition of resources. Strategic management journal, 
22(6‐7), 545-564. 
Low, C. (2006). A framework for the governance of social enterprise sector, 
International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 33, no. 5/6. 
Macmillan, R. (2007). Understanding the idea of ‘grant dependency' in the 
voluntary and community sector voluntary and community sector. People, Place 
& Policy Online, 1(1), 30-38. 
March, J., G. (1991) Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. 
Organization Science, 2(1), 71-87. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2006). Elaborating the “new institutionalism”. The 
Oxford handbook of political institutions, 5, 3-20. 
151 
 
Markus, G. (2001). Building Leadership: Findings From a Longitudinal 
Evaluation of the Kellogg National Fellowship Program. Battle Creek, Michigan: 
W. K. Kellogg Foundation. 
Marsh, D., & Furlong, P. (2002). A skin not a sweater: Ontology and 
epistemology in political science. Theory and methods in political science, 2, 17-
41. 
Martin, R. L., & Osberg, S. (2007). Social entrepreneurship: The case for 
definition (Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 28-39). Stanford, CA: Stanford social innovation 
review. 
McClelland, D. C. (1961). The Achieving Society. Princeton, NJ: D. van 
Nostrand. 
McLellan, E., MacQueen, K. M., & Neidig, J. L. (2003). Beyond the qualitative 
interview: Data preparation and transcription. Field methods, 15(1), 63-84. 
Meredith, G. G., Nelson, R. E., & Neck, P. A. (1982). The practice of 
entrepreneurship (Vol. 30, No. 760). International Labour Organisation. 
Mervis, C. B., & Rosch, E. (1981). Categorization of natural objects. Annual 
review of psychology, 32(1), 89-115. 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook, Los Angeles: Sage. 
Mole, K., North, D., & Baldock, R. (2017). Which SMEs seek external support? 
Business characteristics, management behaviour and external influences in a 
contingency approach. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 35(3), 
476-499. 
Morgan, G. G. (2013). Charitable incorporated organisations. Directory of Social 
Change. 
Morrison Foerster & Trust Law. (2012). Which legal structure is right for my 
social enterprise, A guide to establishing a social enterprise in England and 
Wales. London: Thomson Reuters Fondation 
Mutch, A. (2007). Reflexivity and the institutional entrepreneur: A historical 
exploration. Organization studies, 28(7), 1123-1140. 
Navis, C., & Glynn, M. A. (2011). Legitimate distinctiveness and the 
entrepreneurial identity: Influence on investor judgments of new venture 
plausibility. Academy of Management Review, 36(3), 479-499. 
Neck, H., Brush, C., & Allen, E. (2009). The landscape of social 
entrepreneurship. Business horizons, 52(1), 13-19. 
152 
 
Nicholls, A. (Ed). (2006), Social Entrepreneurship: New Paradigms of 
Sustainable Social Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nicholls, A. (2010). The institutionalization of social investment: The interplay of 
investment logics and investor rationalities. Journal of social entrepreneurship, 
1(1), 70-100. 
Nicholls, J., Lawlor, E., Neitzert, T., & Goodspeed, T. (2012). A guide to Social 
Return on Investment. Liverpool: SROI Network. 
Nickel, P. M., & Eikenberry, A. M. (2016). Knowing and governing: The mapping 
of the nonprofit and voluntary sector as statecraft. VOLUNTAS: International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(1), 392-408. 
Nicolaou, N., Shane, S., Cherkasc, L., & Spector, T.  (2009) Opportunity 
recognition and the tendency to be an entrepreneur: A bivariate genetics 
perspective, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 
110, Issue 2, 108-117. 
Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies. (2016). Office of the 
Regulator of Community Interest Companies: Information and guidance notes 
Chapter 6: The Asset Lock. [online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-the-regulator-of-
community-interest-companies.  [Accessed 23rd March 2018] 
Oppenheim, A. (1996). Questionnaire design, Interviewing and attitude 
measurement, London: Pinter. 
Oswick, C., Fleming, P., & Hanlon, G. (2011). From borrowing to blending: 
Rethinking the processes of organizational theory building. Academy of 
Management Review, 36(2), 318-337. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. (2013a). Embedded in hybrid contexts: How 
individuals in organizations respond to competing institutional logics. In 
Institutional logics in action, part B (pp. 3-35). Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. (2013b). Inside the hybrid organization: Selective 
coupling as a response to competing institutional logics. Academy of 
Management Journal, 56(4), 972-1001. 
Pascale, C. M. (2011). Analytic induction. Cartographies Knowledge: Exploring 
Qualitative Epistemologies. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods. SAGE 
Publications, inc. 
Patton, M. Q. (2002a). Designing qualitative studies. Qualitative research and 
evaluation methods, 3, 230-246. 
153 
 
Patton, M. Q. (2002b). Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, 
California: Sage, CA: Sage. 
Pearce, J., & Kay, A. (2003). Social enterprise in anytown. Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation. 
Queens University & Kingston Social Planning Council. (2011). Kingston Social 




T_FINAL_REPORT.pdf. [Accessed: 8th March 2017]. 
Rae, D. (2007). Entrepreneurship: From Opportunity to Action, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Ratner, C. (2008). Objectivism. The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research 
methods. Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing 
institutional logics. Organization studies, 30(6), 629-652. 
Regulator, C. I. C. (2017). 2017 Annual Report: Regulator of Community 
Interest Companies. 
Ridley‐Duff, R. (2007) "Communitarian perspectives on social enterprise." 
Corporate governance: an international review, 15(2), 382-392. 
Ridley-Duff, R. (2015). The case for fairshares: A new model for social 
enterprise development and the strengthening of the social and solidarity 
economy. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. 
Ridley-Duff, R., & Southcombe, C. (2012). The Social Enterprise Mark: a critical 
review of its conceptual dimensions. Social Enterprise Journal, 8(3), 178-200. 
Ridley-Duff, R., & Bull, M. (2011). Understanding Social Enterprise, London: 
Sage. 
Ridley-Duff., R., & Bull, M. (2015). Understanding Social Enterprise, 2nd Edition, 
London: Sage. 
Ridley-Duff., R., & Bull, M. (2019). Understanding Social Enterprise, 3rd Edition, 
London: Sage. 
Riessman, C. K. (1993). Narrative Analysis. Sage Publications, London. 
Rosch, E., & Lloyd, B. B. (Eds.). (1978). Cognition and categorization. 
Ruebottom, T. (2013). The microstructures of rhetorical strategy in social 
entrepreneurship: Building legitimacy through heroes and villains. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 28(1), 98-116. 
154 
 
School for Social Entrepreneurs (2018). What funding is available for social 
entrepreneurs? [Online] Available at: https://www.the-
sse.org/resources/starting/what-funding-is-available-for-social-
entrepreneurs/#1. [Accessed 9th July 2018]. 
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the 
human condition have failed. Yale University Press. 
Sepulveda, L., Lyon, F., & Vickers, I. (2018). ‘Social enterprise spin-outs’: an 
institutional analysis of their emergence and potential. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 1-13. 
Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. (2000) The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a 
Field of Research, Academy of Management Review, 2000, Vol 25, No 1, 217-
266. 
Shane, S. A. (2003). A general theory of entrepreneurship: The individual-
opportunity nexus. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Shane, S., Nicolaou, N., Cherkas, L., & Spector, T. (2010) Genetics, the Big five 
and the tendency to be self-employed”, Journal of Applied Phycology, Vol 95 
No. 6, 1154-1162. 
Smith, J., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2009). Interpretative Phoneomological 
Analysis: theory, method and research. 
Smith, R., Bell, R., & Watts, H. (2014). Personality trait differences between 
traditional and social entrepreneurs. Social Enterprise Journal, 10(3), 200-221. 
Social Enterprise UK. (2017a). Start you social enterprise, The social enterprise 
guide. [online] Available at: 
https://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=b5514bc0-
5a3b-4c4e-afe1-d8aaec3ebb19. [Accessed 9th August 2018] 
Social Enterprise UK. (2017b). The Future of Business, State of Social 
Enterprise Survey 2017. 
Social Enterprise London, (2001). Introducing Social Enterprise, London: Social 
Enterprise London. 
Social Enterprise Mark Company, (2016). Social Enterprise Mark Assessment 
Criteria[Online] Available at: 
https://www.socialenterprisemark.org.uk/assessment/#criteria. [Accessed 22nd 
April 2018]. 
Social Enterprise Mark Company, (2018). [Online] Available at: 
http://www.socialenterprisemark.org.uk/. [Accessed 22nd April 2018]. 
Social Enterprise U.K. (2012). The Social Value Guide: Implementing the Public 
Services (Social Value) Act. London: Social Enterprise UK. 
155 
 
Spreckley, F. (1981). Social audit. A management tool for co-operative working. 
Beechwood College, Leeds. 
Spreckley, F. (2000). Social audit toolkit. London: Social Enterprise Partnership. 
Spreckley, F.  (2011). Social Enterprise Planning Toolkit. The British Council, 
Manchester. 
Spreckley, F. (2015). Social Enterprise Planning Toolkit. The British Council, 
Manchester. 
Spear, R., Cornforth, C., & Aiken, M. (2007). For love and money: Governance 
and social enterprise. 
Spear, R., Cornforth, C., & Aiken, M. (2009). The governance challenges of 
social enterprises: evidence from a UK empirical study. Annals of public and 
cooperative economics, 80(2), 247-273. 
Steiner, A., & Teasdale, S. (2017). Unlocking the potential of rural social 
enterprise. Journal of Rural Studies. 
Steinerowski, A., Jack, S., & Farmer, J. (2010). Who are the social 
entrepreneurs and what do they actually do? Working Paper. Lancaster 
University Management School. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded 
theory procedures and techniques. Sage Publications, Inc. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1994). Grounded theory methodology. Handbook of 
qualitative research, 17, 273-85. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Procedures and 
techniques for developing grounded theory. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional 
approaches. Academy of Management: The Academy of Management Review, 
20, 571-610.  
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. 
Administrative science quarterly, 50(1), 35-67. 
Sullivan Mort, G., Weerawardena, J., & Carnegie, K. (2003). Social 
entrepreneurship: Towards conceptualisation. International journal of nonprofit 
and voluntary sector marketing, 8(1), 76-88. 
Sunley, P., & Pinch, S. (2012). Financing social enterprise: social bricolage or 
evolutionary entrepreneurialism? Social Enterprise Journal, 8(2), 108-122. 
Symon, G., & Cassell, C. (2012) Qualitative Organizational Research, Core 
Methods and Current Challenges, London: Sage    
156 
 
Teece, D. J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and innovation. Long 
range planning, 43(2-3), 172-194. 
Thomas, D. R. (2006). A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative 
evaluation data. American journal of evaluation, 27(2), 237-246. 
Thompson, J. (2002). The world of the social entrepreneur. International Journal 
of Public Sector Management, 15(5): 412-431. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical 
contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher 
education publishing industry, 1958–1990. American journal of Sociology, 
105(3), 801-843. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. The Sage handbook 
of organizational institutionalism, 840, 99-128. 
Ocasio, W., Thornton, P. H., & Lounsbury, M. (2017). The institutional logics 
perspective. The SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism, 2nd ed. 
thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Timmons, J. A. (1985). New venture creation. Tata McGraw-Hill Education. 
Timmons, J., & Spinelli, S. (2009) New Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship for 
the 21st Century, 8th Edn. New York: McGraw Hill 
Townsend, D., & Hart, T. (2008) Perceived Institutional Ambiguity and the 
Choice of Organisational Form in Social Entrepreneurial Ventures, 
Entrepreneurial Theory and Practice, No. 32, Vol. 4, 685-700.  
Trexler, J. (2008). Social entrepreneurship as algorithm: Is social enterprise 
sustainable?. E: Co Issue, 10(3), 65-85. 
 
 
Van Opstal, W. (2010). Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers. In International 
Encyclopedia of Civil Society (pp. 1326-1327). Springer, New York, NY. 
Vergne, J. P., & Wry, T. (2014). Categorizing categorization research: Review, 
integration, and future directions. Journal of Management Studies, 51(1), 56-94. 
Vurro, C., Dacin, M. T., & Perrini, F. (2010). Institutional antecedents of 
partnering for social change: How institutional logics shape cross-sector social 
partnerships. Journal of Business Ethics, 94(1), 39-53. 
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations (Vol. 3). Sage. 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process 
of sensemaking. Organization science, 16(4), 409-421. 
157 
 
Wrigleys Solicitors. (2014). A Guide to Legal Structures for Social Enterprise. 
[online] Available at: https://www.wrigleys.co.uk/assets/brochure-
downloads/A_Guide_to_Legal_Structures_for_Social_Enterprise_-_14.03.14_-
_with_back_cover.pdf.  [Accessed 9th August 2018] 
Wry, T., Lounsbury, M., & Glynn, M. A. (2011). ‘Collective identity mobilization: 
prototype framing, boundary expansion, and cultural recognition’. Organization 
Science, 22, 449–63. 
Zahra, S. A., Gedajlovic, E., Neubaum, D. O., & Shulman, J. M. (2009). A 
typology of social entrepreneurs: Motives, search processes and ethical 
challenges. Journal of business venturing, 24(5), 519-532. 
Zhao, E. Y., & Lounsbury, M. (2016). An institutional logics approach to social 
entrepreneurship: Market logic, religious diversity, and resource acquisition by 
microfinance organizations. Journal of Business Venturing, 31(6), 643-662. 
Zuckerman, E. W. (1999). ‘The categorical imperative: securities analysts and 









Appendix 1. Interview invitation letter. 
 
Invitation to be interviewed for Doctoral research into social enterprise 
legal structure selection, 
Date  ../../…. 
Dear ………………………… 
This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a study that I am 
conducting as part of my Doctoral degree in the Department of Management at 
Sheffield Hallam University under the supervision of Dr. Rory Ridley-Duff. I 
would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your 
involvement would entail if you decide to take part.  
The selection of appropriate legal structures for Social Enterprises has been the 
subject of much practitioner and Government debate over the past ten years as 
Social Enterprises have sought to protect both their assets and their social 
purpose whilst trading effectively in often highly competitive environments. 
Structure choice may have wide ranging and profound implications for 
investment/funding options and trading opportunities as well as the protection of 
social purpose and/or assets. Both of these factors are important in respect of 
the financial health and business growth of social enterprises alongside the 
generation of social capital and therefore legal structure choice is the focus of 
this research project. 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to seek to more fully understand the 
factors that influence Social entrepreneurs in choosing the structures that they 
adopt for the organisations that they create. 
This study will focus upon the decision choices made by social entrepreneurs 
around the legal structure(s) of their enterprises; the journey that led to this 
selection, the influences that played a part, the decision process(es), the 
support sought or received and the eventual appropriateness of the structure(s) 
selected. 
Therefore, I would like to include yourself and your organisation as one of 
several social entrepreneurs and/or advisers of social entrepreneurs to be 
involved in my study. I believe that because you have and are actively involved 
in the field of social entrepreneurship, you are best suited to speak to the 




Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of 
approximately one hour and thirty minutes in length to take place in a mutually 
agreed upon location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions 
if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time 
without any negative consequences by advising myself as the researcher.  
With your permission, the interview will be recorded to facilitate the collection of 
information, and later transcribed for analysis. Shortly after the interview has 
been completed, I will send you a copy of the transcript to give you an 
opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify any 
points that you wish.  
All the information that you provide is considered completely confidential. Your 
name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study without 
your consent, however, with your permission anonymous quotations may be 
used. Data collected during this study will be stored securely at the University 
and to which only I and my supervisors will have access. There are no known or 
anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.  
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional 
information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please 
contact me on 07864 641541 or by e-mail at j.odor@shu.ac.uk. You can also 
contact my supervisor, Dr. Rory Ridley-Duff on 0114 225 5247 or by e-mail at 
r.ridley-duff@shu.ac.uk. 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics 
clearance through the Research Ethics Committee at Sheffield Hallam 
University. However, the final decision about participation is yours.  
I hope that the results of my research will be of benefit to those social 
entrepreneurs directly involved in the study, other social entrepreneurs or social 
enterprises not directly involved in the study, as well as to the broader 
practitioner and researcher communities.  
I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for 
your assistance in this project.  
 
Sincerely,  
(Signature)       (Signature) 
Jules O’dor                    Dr Rory Ridley-Duff 
Department of Management    Department of 
Management 
Sheffield Hallam University    Sheffield Hallam University 
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Appendix 2. Participant interview questions  
 
Interview Question set for social entrepreneur / social enterprise leaders. 
1. Tell me about the formation of your Social enterprise, from the very 
beginning? 
2. What structure does the organisation have and how was that 
decided? By whom? Has it changed over time and in what ways? Do 
you feel this was, and remains, the most appropriate structure? 
3. In what ways does your organisational structure facilitate the 
participation of stakeholders, if at all? Who would you consider your 
key stakeholders to be and how important is their involvement to you? 
 Are the organisation's assets and Social purpose protected, such 
that they could only be used for their original purpose and that the 
organisation continues to meet its social aims?? If so, how? 
4. Having discussed your enterprise formation journey, on reflection is 
there anything that you might have done differently? 
5. How might you describe the ideal structure for your enterprise? 
6. How would you describe the strengths and drawbacks of the current 
structure? 
 What was the primary driver for you personally or your team as 
Social Entrepreneur(s) in selecting an appropriate legal structure? 
7. What advice did you seek / take in the selection of your legal 
structure and why? How effective did you find it? 
8. Can you say from whom you took advice? Does this relationship 
continue/ if so in what form? 
9. Is there anything that you would like to say about Social Enterprise 





Participant interview question set for social enterprise advisers. 
 
1. Do you or have you in the past, provided advice to social 
entrepreneurs on legal structure? 
2. What form did this advice take? 
3. Did / does this advice relate to new or existing Social Enterprises? 
4. In terms of the organisations that you have worked with, what do you 
see as the key issues raised in terms of legal structure selection by; 
a. New social enterprise formations? 
and/or 
b. Existing Social Enterprises? 
5. Were the issues advised upon resolved as far as the Social 
entrepreneurs were concerned? Were these issues resolved as far as 
you we’re concerned? 
6. If so, how? If not why not? 
7. Do you believe there to be any issues concerning Government policy 
or legislation in respect of the issues that we have discussed so far or 
others that we have not yet touched upon? 
8. Do you provide advice to policy makers and or government on the 
issues of Social Enterprise legal structure selection? What is the 
nature of this advice? Could you talk me through an example or a 
particular instance in regard to this? 
9. Are there any other issues related to Social Enterprise legal structure 




Appendix 3. Anonymised interview field notes. 
 
(transcribed in reverse order). 
Participant 15. 
Background 
Worked at xxxx for eight years as a finance solicitor followed by three years at 
xxxx advising social enterprises and charities on governance, structure, making 
money, funding, property, IP, HR, regulation and compliance etc. Specialist 
team, core charity and social enterprise. NOTE: Law firms also give business 
advice. 
New social enterprises; tend to advise CBS's, Co-op's more than CIC's 
particularly around finance, community shares etc. Often concerning raising 
capital (public hares or bonds) around £ 500,000, £ 1,000,000. 
Should CIC's get CBS benefits in terms of raising public capital - issues around 
share capital. Notes Governance and democratic nature of CBS. 
Seeing increasing number of CIC's, folk still connected with CLG structures; 
issues more investment and ownership. Issues of investment and return for 
SE's.  
"I think people are still nervous about what a CIC actually means for 
them and how if they’re for example going to invest quite a lot of 
money from the outset in that organisation how they’re actually 
going to get that money back out again". 
"So we have seen circumstances where people have set up CICs, 
invested their cash but not realised actually getting that back out 
may be tricky depending on how they’ve actually invested it." 
Entrepreneurial SE's managing risk, investment and need for profit. Need to 
return investment. Need to generate social benefit vs risk and return. The 
enterprise is very much their baby and why would they relinquish that to an 
independent board… fear, running this thing, independent board to oversee 
things…. success of CIC might be the scrutiny from independent board but 
accountable and confident…for the SE. 
"I want to benefit the community but that is, that shouldn’t be at the 
expense of me not being able to control either the risk to me or my 
ability to be able to take the investment that I put into this back out 
again. So I think you are still seeing those two competing interests 
of being able to want to provide a genuine social benefit as well as 
protecting the private reason and rationale as to why somebody 




"the statement that I would quote more often than not is that people 
see their enterprise as their baby and I completely – completely get 
that and so why would they therefore relinquish control of it to a 
genuinely independent board of directors? There’s still this sort of 
feeling of – of fear. Well if I – if I’m running this thing I feel nervous 
about allowing an entirely independent board to oversee my work". 
Funder concerns over governance, due diligence focus on board and its skills, 
professional basis of business action. Drive for growth and the move on from 
grants to debt finance - investment readiness with the aim of sustainability. 
"I think as funding options contract I think you will find funders being 
increasingly concerned about the governance of the organisation in 
which they’re – they’re working. So I can think of a number of – a 
number of charitable foundations that I work whose due diligence 
focus up front will be to focus quite heavily on the governance of an 
organisation, understanding exactly who – what the make-up of that 
board is and also the skills within that board and understanding that 
that is going to drive a more professional basis on which a particular 
social enterprise acts". 
Reputational risk, poor governance reflects badly on the investor…. Usually 
failure is through failure of governance, irregular payments etc. Responsible 
lending or funding, going beyond an return only relationship. 
"that investors are increasingly nervous of is reputational risk of 
investing in organisations where poor governance within that 
organisation actually can then reflect very badly on the investor and 
sort of raise all sorts of reputational queries about why the investor 
has made that investment in the first place.  It’s usually the fact that 
when you think about this from the large problems that have 
occurred with charities and social enterprises over the past ten 
years, it is usually a governance failure that has resulted in the fall 
or failing of that organisation – particularly around where individuals 
have been found to have made irregular payments to themselves 
from their social enterprise out of a governance failing that’s caused 
that." 
Need for grant support; SE not wanting to relinquish control and needing grants, 
not resolved. Charity givers can through legislation cant fund core costs of a 
non-charity social enterprise. Not resolvable. 
Established social enterprises; more sophisticated management, boards etc. 
need for legal advice tends to fairly modest. New trading arms, managing risk, 





Top three issues; 
a. Control and not to relinquishing control and be paid. 
b. Raising funds - grants, asset lock so CBS or CIC. Possible CBS 
and community  share issue 
c. Access to advice that is readily available to give them confidence 
to start up. 
 
Quality and availability of business and legal advice. 
 
"Legal advice has to be given in the context of a commercial issue" 
 
Legal questions almost all ways a commercial context and need to understand 
this and it's about professional relationship between advisers. 
"I think it’s more of a – it’s a relationship thing between professional 
advisors and clients. Now that might be business advisors, it might 
be lawyers, it might be accountants…" 
 
Test of sequencing arguments; 
Need to come for legal advice at the right time; integrated advice "legal 
considerations" during business planning as their business plan might not be 
accommodated legal structure. 
"a number of times we will feel that possible a social entrepreneur 
has come to us a kind of the wrong stage. And that might be 
because they need to develop their business plan further or 
potentially because they’ve taken their business plan so far that 
they – they’ve not counted for a particular legal nuance, which 
means that actually doing their… offering their business plan the 
way it wants to is impossible. So I kind of think that these things 
need to be – need to be kind of going on at the same time. So it’s 
not necessarily the degree of sequencing, it’s as you are 
undertaking your business planning have you considered the legal 
ramifications of that?" 
 
Ideal accountants; lawyer's business adviser's etc. financial and legal concerns 
so all understand the issues.  
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"So I mean the ideal scenario would be – at the appropriate stage 
would be sitting down with a set of accountants and a set of lawyers 
at the same time to almost thrash out what the sort of the main five 
issues on either side of that debate are. And so the lawyers and 
accountants then understand what the – what the particular financial 
concerns are from a legal point of view and the other way around 
what the legal concerns are from an accountant’s point of view.  So 
everyone understands what the issues are and so ideally that would 
be the case rather than being in a situation where you’re talking to 
your lawyers and your lawyers are telling you, that’s an accounting 
issue, you need to go and speak to your accountants and probably 
vice versa and then you are having a series of bi-lateral 
conversations, which don’t quite get at it". 
Sound boards…… before structured advise… cost concerns, but can be 
carefully managed. 
Structures for social enterprise not straightforward… understanding what to do 
in what order almost prevents SE's starting. 
Need advisers to recognise the need for an integrated approach…..advisers to 
see the bigger picture….. 
Issues for Govt policy; firm have fond feelings for CBS, not registered at 
Company's House, lower profile so HMRC view, might be more high profile 
amongst funders etc. 
Quality marks and labels - Co-ops UK community shares badge, good measure 
of quality but badging everything causing organisations to confirm and 
reconfigure  so causes distraction when trying to fit a structure that doesn’t fit. 
"I think this sort of badging everything as either being quality or 
missing, or being outside the box is causing the organisation to then 
make decisions about what they are, what they live and breathe and 
then try and reconfigure what they’re doing to fit within that 
definition, which inevitably takes them away from what they were 
trying to do in the first place." 
CLS perfectly legal form for a social enterprise and capable of delivering social 
purpose, doesn’t have all the external audience but perfectly good vehicle. 
"…. when you think about the legal structures that are out there, when you think 
about what are the definitions of a social enterprise are, any of those – the CLS 
is a perfect – a perfectly decent legal form for a social enterprise. It – it – it is 
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capable of delivering social purpose. The question really is to – what are the 
protections around it that assist the outside world looking in – it doesn’t have but 
it nevertheless is a perfectly adequate vehicle for perhaps the wider definition of 
social enterprise." 
"I think it’s that sort of… it’s that feeling that – that what you are has been taken 
– the definition of what you are has been taken possession of by somebody 
else… doesn’t seem to me to be overly helpful." 
LLP working with a for-profit and community focused businesses, private sector 
expertise alongside community connection, skills etc. to run an asset or service. 
Use of language - lawyers to ensure compliance but making sure 
that the language of SE and that of the legal profession can be an 
issue… needs to aligned through understanding. 
The people in the legal partnership drive the involvement, notion of 
a socially motivated legal practice. Voluntary commitment, boards 
and practice connection allows and understanding of the pressures. 
Stakeholders in the social sector, having ownership. 







"I suppose my story is also quite closely linked to the story of social enterprise, 
because I’ve always been at the sort of front of it all and aware where things 
have been happening, and a lot of the developments and changes that I’ve had 
are also mirrored, I think, in the social enterprise movement." 
Worked as a social worker in the voluntary sector.  
Left-wing politics, suggests that this is still very much part pof the SE sector 
today. 
Got involved with xxxx and from being a small voluntary organisation, set up 
about five major businesses.  Also struggling with legal structures! At this point 
employed xxxxxxxx, who then was at Beechwood College, as a consultant, 
Then became involved in the Community Enterprise movement  but later  went 
into the private sector and set up a very successful managed workspace 





Freer Speckley Defintion. 
http://www.britishcouncil.org.ua/sites/default/files/social_enterprise_plann
ing_toolkit.pdf 
Southcombe:  (independent, business focused, democratic, accountable and 
community based) 
Five principles of Community Enterprise (wiki) 
1. community based, owned and led 
2. engaged in the economic, environmental and social regeneration of a 
defined area or community 
3. independent but seek to work in partnership with other private, voluntary, 
and public sector organisations 
4. self-sufficient or for self-sufficiency, and not for private profit. 
Scotland - DTA Scotland 
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1. are owned and managed by the local community 
2. aim to achieve the sustainable regeneration of a community or address a 
range of economic, social, environmental and cultural issues within a 
community 
3. are independent but seek to work in partnership with other private, public 
and third sector organisations 
4. aim to reduce dependency on grant support by generating income 
through enterprise and the ownership of assets. All trading surpluses are 
principally reinvested in the organisation or the community. 
 
Origins; 






"It became the term for a small group of people and historically, what’s 
happened now is others have looked back and said, ‘Oh yes, we were always 
social enterprises,’ and I think, ‘No, you didn’t, you’d never heard of the term 
until 2000.’  All through the 90s it was a small group of people who were using 
the term social enterprise." 
 
Political viewpoint on SE definition…  
 
"But we’re not saying that all really, we’re saying that we call social enterprise 
now is actually just doing business and it’s the best way of doing business, it’s 
the most socially responsible." 
 
"It’s the high octane way of doing business and it’s the right way to do business, 
so we’re actually not part of a third sector or a different sector, we’re actually 
part of that private sector, but the best way of doing it." 




"xxxx is really good on this and I agree with him 100%.  He said, ‘Social 
enterprise is a grass roots movement, it’s continually changing, and we are not 
in control of that change.’  But people will try and control it, which is one of the 
reasons why I had real difficulties with the Social Enterprise Mark, and with any 
sort of given definition." 
 
"It only matters when people like SUK start to try and position themselves, and 
say, ‘We are the voice of social enterprise in the UK.’  And you say, ‘Well, a) 
you’re not, and b) your definition is undemocratically arrived at and narrow, and 
who the hell are you?" 
 
 
Public sector / private sector thinking…. 
"there is a large movement of people who have drifted from the public sector 
and the charitable sector and they don’t understand that private sector thinking 
and to them it’s still very alien. They don’t realise it and it’s very alien." 
Structure 
Complexity 
"the other thing is that I do think that when you work at social enterprises, it’s 
very rare that you end up with a simple model and quite often two-tier structures 
or multi things." 
Structure as iterative process of evolution and discovery… 
"So I think, as a social entrepreneur, that there would be two routes. One is you 
either strike lucky and you can come across someone like xxxx who really sorts 
you out! ((laughingly)) Or you understand that this is going to be a bit of a 
journey and be prepared to keep changing your structure and your organisation 
to meet as you’re discovering, and that’s how we work anyway.  To say, ‘I’ll set 
up with this, but we might have to wind this company down and replace it 
because, in practice, this may or may not work.’" 
Decision making - a process not a structure…. 
"what the social enterprise sector largely does not understand, which I think in 
Social Enterprise Europe we do, is that decision-making is a process and it’s 
not a structure." 
"And a lot them think structure first, and think that that’s how they deal with 
governance, that they look at a structure.  You don’t, you look at what decisions 
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need to be made and the processes that you need and the people you need for 
different types of decisions, and so you’re looking at a much more flexible 
thing." 
FairShares Model 
"what Fair Shares is to me, it’s not the structure, it’s the principles, and I find it 
so easy at conferences to say, ‘Well, everyone who creates wealth should have 
a fair share, shouldn’t they?’  You can’t answer that, you can’t answer it, and 
then you push home the point." 
 
Relationship to structure 
"but at the moment, the reason why the public sector and the charitable sector 
have structures is exactly the same reason why the private sector has 
structures, but the public sector has to make sure that’s not money but its 
decision-making close to the top, and with charities, the decision-making flows 
to the trustees.  And that’s why imposing charitable and public sector governing 
processes on social enterprises is not good practice." 
Relationship to business planning & business model 
"I think one of the problems is that people get too quickly into the structure, so 
one, sort out your business model first, and then work out the sorts of decisions 
you will need to make that business model work and how you really want to 
work it."  
Supports notion of legal structure being an outcome of Business Planning 
but…  
"It is, except it’s different, in so much that the social entrepreneur will weave in 
the social purpose and their views of democracy into their business models and 
instinctively do that." 
Business driving the structure rather than the structure driving the business… 
"It has to be, and what they don’t realise is that actually you can, there are so 
many things like Golden Votes and things like that, tricks you can use to 
actually reflect what they really want.  And if, at the end of the day, you end up 
with something which is acceptable to the peer group as being a social 
enterprise, great, they are happy to say they’re a social enterprise." 






Relationship to operational practice & divergence 
"there is quite a difference between the formal structure and the internal 
structure, a massive difference, and to be aware of that." 
 
"I think what happens to a third of these social enterprises who have got the 
wrong structure, well, they ignore their legal structure, they operate illegally and 
they operate differently.  And what actually happens and what the constitution 
says are often two different things." 
 
Flexibility & loopholes 
"the other thing is people don’t realise how flexible these structures can be.  A 
lot of business advisors don’t realise how much they can bend and twist these 
structures." 
I don’t know any social enterprise where I’ve spent a long time with, when you 
work out what they really want, where you haven’t had to improvise or be 
imaginative with their legal structure, and that’s built in to good social 
enterprises. 
Governance  
Ownership, Control and Power 
I think anyone like me, who has managed a social enterprise, and been in the 
real thick of it, knows that it’s actually all about power.  It’s all about power and 
managers realise that. Now it’s up to them how they want to manage that, but 
there’s no legal structure that I think I, as a manager, couldn’t manipulate to suit 
the way that I work and manage, and I think most experienced managers know 
that, and so really legal structures, to some extent, reflect that. 
Social Audit….  
"I reckon the reason why it doesn’t happen is because the people who are in 
power in that social enterprise are aware that what they’re doing doesn’t 
necessarily fit with the legal structure and if they start to review it, then that 
change in power will be exposed." 
 
Workarounds - See xxxxx in xxxxl, social enterprise worker controlled 
company owned by the founders, board as a Social Audit Board registered as a 
company limited by guarantee, but with sole purpose of social audit and 
producing a social audit report each year. Enables ownership and control but 
delivers social value in funder friendly manner… 
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See also 'participant 12' on loopholes. 
"what I do is I put on my manager’s hat, and I’d say, ‘When I was managing a 
CIC and it wasn’t working, what would I do?’  Well, it’s dead easy what I would 
do.  I would set up a separate organisation and gradually, I would move all of 




"I don’t think the asset lock works anyway. Any clever person could pull it apart" 
 
Social Audit 
"a good social audit, one of the things it does is that annually it reviews the legal 
structure and it reviews it in the light of people’s experiences annually, and 
that’s a very dynamic thing. That doesn’t happen in social enterprises 
generally."  
"Because it might well be that you want to change the constitution into reality." 
 
Advice and support 
Networks …  
"One is the networking and the ability to set up a self-governing networks is 
really important, because then the discourse happens and you get a common 
view, because you will have people turning up and taking over hospitals and 
saying, ‘We are a social enterprise." 
"I think the big weakness in the UK is the fact that we’ve got a very fragmented 
movement and what we need are local and regional robust networks set up 
using social media, and that will provide a natural protection.  We’ll get the 
balance right that way, because these networks will automatically set that 
balance and make things accessible, but also give people the support they 
need as well, but at the moment, it’s in a vacuum." 
 
"I would tell people those networks do exist and geographical boundaries don’t 




Informal, self-governing networks without constitution and formal meetings. 
(See also Open Space approach). 
"it’s a vibrant network and I think it’s much more alive than the Sheffield one, 
which is having formal meetings and a constitution, and then you’re trying to 
create a structure which someone has to maintain, a secretary and things like 
that." 
Bert Ola Bergstrand - Social Capital Forum  
http://socialcapitalmarkets.net/speaker/bert-ola-bergstrand-community-of-
bergsjon/ 
Social Innovation Seminar, Riga,  3-4, October 2013 
http://socialinnovation.lv/en/bert-ola-bergstrand-social-innovation-swedish-
example/ 
Bad advice - wrong legal structures. 
"xxxx and xxxx, who is director, they did a survey of social enterprises in the 
North East of England and one third of them had the wrong legal structure.  It 
was clearly the wrong legal structure, and which did not fit their business 
models." 
Importance of dependent, impartial support. 
"for the North East, they are fortunate that they have NESEP there, and 
NESEP, I think, understands that and there are the benefits from informal 
linking and empowering, but also it’s important to have, which is something 
which is best paid for by others, not by the people there, really crucial and 
important advice. So NESEP put on a number of courses, not for social 
enterprises, but for advisors of social enterprises, and lawyers, because that’s 
where things were going wrong." 
Who owns structure knowledge …. 
"I think, for me, it’s about ownership and particularly the knowledge of structures 
and articles and who owns it, and of course, there will be professionals who 
want to own it, mystify it, make it inaccessible.  The danger is that if you go 
completely down an open source route you are encouraging people to make 
disastrous decisions, ‘Because I’ve heard that a CICis a good way to do it,’ or 






"….vested interest and I think they are at work. I think that government, 
charities, the private sector, are all seeing social enterprise as a threat, and one 
of the ways in which they can mitigate that threat is to impose their own 
models." For example, charities are very keen to have their type of legal 
structure with the board and the CEO and the beneficiaries disenfranchised.  
That’s the model that they want to impose and it’s no coincidence that the chair 
of xxx is from xxxx Limited. 
See also 'participant 13' on CIC's. 
 
Funders 
"One of the ways that the funders tie us up is that we did a rough estimate, but 
it’s not far off, and that is that social enterprises spent 13 weeks of the year 
entirely, 100% of their resources, 13 weeks dealing with funders, tenders and 
the monitoring that comes with it. Thirteen weeks of the year have to be related 
to that, so it slows everything down, puts everything under their control, allows 
them to exercise external criteria and allows them to manoeuvre things. So I 
think, in that respect, it means that social enterprises are in danger of losing 
their biggest asset, which is their grass roots’ power." 
So a lot of the work is about making social enterprises investment-ready.  I think 
there are two problems with that: a) it’s irrelevant, but again, it’s all about the 
direction in which they want social enterprises to go.  It’s based on a scaling-up 
model which isn’t there and social enterprises don’t actually want to scale-up.  
They actually quite enjoy the fact that enterprises are becoming smaller, they 
prefer that, and what they do want to do is scale-up their impact so that they 
can find like-minded people to do similar, they’d help them. 
……. and actually social investment doesn’t really exist. And what it does do, it 
takes the focus of social enterprises away from where a lot of money is, so in 
things like crowd funding, they’re ignoring that, they’re ignoring Community 
Shares, because they’ve been told, ‘No, it’s social investment and you’ve got to 
look at social investment.  You’ve got to scale-up.'" 
Self Help and SE 
"the answer, of course, social enterprises have got, but they don’t realise it yet, 
and it’s deep in their tradition, and that is to say, ‘Hang on, if there’s a problem, 
what’s been our response always when there’s a problem?  We find our own 
solution, and our own solution is setting up our own banks, we’ve always got 






"First, stick your nose out of it where it’s not welcome! ((laughs)) Show me.  I 
mean we’ve worked in 45 countries, and show me the evidence that any 
development of social enterprise in any of those countries is related to 
government policy or government intervention.  There isn’t any." 
Understanding of the sector by government at all levels 
… the Cabinet Office and they were setting up the Social Enterprise Unit, they 
asked me, from my point of view, ‘What did the social enterprise movement 
want from the Unit?’  And I said, ‘We don’t want money from you because that 
will always have strings, and we don’t want any guidance from you because we 
can guide ourselves.  What we wanted from you,’ and I still think this is the only 
thing they could have done and should have done, is, ‘I want you to turn around 
and look at your own government structures and make sure that every 
government department and every governing officer understands who we are 









Early involvement in the co-operative movement with xxxx ending up 
CEO.  Left to formed a new employee owned business, interested in a new 
model "democratic business"… 
http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Decision_Making_and_Democracy/Democratic
_Company.pdf 
Wrote a masters dissertation on the impact of legal structures at University and 
the theme continued through to PhD research though primarily this concerned 
governance and values. 
Became interested in multi stakeholder models, influenced by xxxx, xxxx and 
xxxx which led on to latest work on Fair Shares model. 
Switch from practitioner to though leader. 
Issues discussed 
Definitions - see also social enterprise mark. 




Ridley-Duff, R., & Southcombe, C. (2012). The Social Enterprise Mark: a critical 
review of its conceptual dimensions. Social Enterprise Journal, 8(3), 178-200. 
 
"But there was a pivotal conversation at the end of 2012 where we retained our 
commitment to distributing dividends to shareholders if the shareholders want 
the dividends distributed. It was because we had an international conversation 
about the definition of social enterprise based on the work I’ve been doing with 
xxxxxxxx in summer schools and paper on the Social Enterprise Mark." 
Social Enterprise London definitions watered down, larger voice of charity 
sector around the CIC.  Definition as result of consultation and ground up 
evolution. 
"I feel quite positive at the moment. I think there were rigidities created by the 
Social Enterprise Mark that the practice community have partially overcome by 
working with the community into a company regulator, and also overcome by 
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reverting back to like CLGs or CLSs; they just bypassed the rigidities of the 
CIC." 
Drivers 
Democratic and multi stakeholder, multi shareholder views. 
Social mission: IT services to social purpose organisations. 
Structure 
FairShares Model; http://www.fairshares.coop/the-case-for-fairshares/ 
Loopholes 
"I got a wake-up call about how people will override the rules when the Social 
Enterprise Mark company walked off with all of the assets of RISE, which was 
the network in the southwest. I think I do want to put this on record actually: 
There was a regional network for social enterprise in the southwest called RISE 
and they were in partnership with Social Enterprise Coalition, at the time, Social 
Enterprise UK later, to create the Social Enterprise Mark. And clearly the people 
behind RISE were much more interested in developing the Social Enterprise 
Mark as a business than continuing to run the regional network. RISE had very 
considerable assets and were certainly solvent. Social Enterprise Mark 
company was most definitely insolvent. But rather than shut down the Social 
Enterprise Mark company and keep the assets in the regional network they shut 
down RISE and transferred the assets to the Social Enterprise Mark company. 
And they did that seemingly without anybody having the power to stop them and 
they organised a meeting to close down the company." 
 
Governance and structures 
Notion of selection based on business  planning and doing business 
"Yes, I subscribe to the view that you should think about your legal model but 
you shouldn’t be too quick to jump to it. It should be decided to support… I think 
it’s a combination of the values you hold and the business, the pragmatic side of 
creating a business." 
 
Ownership and control, having a stake in the  business: 
"I would say part of that debate was that we did not feel like we had an 
investment in our own business. Even though we were a co-op and we 
controlled it and it was democratic, it was, it really was, once you’d left you’d 
gone; you got no real benefit. You certainly had a role in decision making but 
you didn’t feel as though you had an investment." 
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Ownership, control and decision making. 
"Having been an entrepreneur I became very conscious of the way that you can 
be frozen out if you engage with the private sector. I was encountering stories of 
entrepreneurs who when they involve investors suddenly the entrepreneur is 
frozen out of the enterprise they created." 
Notion of "founders share" 
"So, the founders share gave the founder – and it is literally the person who 
signs the organisation into existence – has a continual right to representation in 
the governing body." 
"We then looked at: how could you structure the company so that the founders 
could exercise their power of veto but not of imposition? We came up with the 
idea that a special resolution didn’t just require 75% to change something, as it 
does in UK law, you also needed the consent of the different stakeholders." 
Notion of governance through consent rather than power. 
Similarities in approach to NewCo model developed - xxxxx   and Participant 
11 also Participant 12). See also Stakeholder Model from Geof Cox. 
Entrepreneur wanting control but also wanting to be controlled. 
Asset Lock. 
"So, you still have the notion of an asset lock, but you don’t have it under board 
control; you have it under the stakeholders’ control. So, some of it can be spent 
by the board; some of it can be spent by the users collectively; some of it can 
be spent by the workforce collectively – but they all have to invest it in the social 
objects of the organisation."  
"To me the asset lock enforces philanthropy onto the people who operate under 
it. I’m in favour of an asset lock if the members want the assets to be locked. 
So, it’s this boundary between philanthropy and mutuality that I find very, very 
interesting. What I fought to address in the legal models that make up the 
FairShare’s model is that you should not accidentally transfer assets between 





"The FairShare’s model definitely does, so it has a commitment to triple bottom 
line, to developing cooperative social entrepreneurship, to observing equal 
opportunity norms and observing cooperative values and principles. So, those 
are like very standard objects, and then you add your very specific social 
objects on top of that." 
 
Use of surplus. 
"Under the company and the co-op you can extract. Under the association or 
partnership you can’t. In traditional for-profit, non-profit language there are 
models which lean more towards the for-profit end and more towards the for-
purpose end." 
"So, members capital, cooperative capital: cooperative capital must go to other 
similar organisations or be returned to FairShare’s association or named 
organisations in your constitution, a bit like the CIC. Members capital is returned 
to members in proportion to their capital holdings." 






"Democratic Business Ltd’s rules introduced something that was really 
appealing: it was a division between voting shares and investor shares – they 
had different names for them at different points – but the point was you could 
retain your one-person one-vote principle using holding a voting share, and you 
could have investor shares that reflected either the amount of money you’d put 
in or the amount of money you’d been party to creating in the business. So, as 
you shared out the proceeds you could represent those as investment shares." 
Started a new business FirstContact Software based on these rules. 
Evolution of structures 
"Yes, I think that whenever you start to write documents people can begin to 
think you’re sort of laying down the law. But in every conversation I’ve ever had 
about the FairShares model I’ve emphasised our willingness that the 
entrepreneurs experiment with what is available to them and evolve it, and we’ll 
study what they do and try and work out what works where. So, it is rooted very 
much in an evolutionary mindset that we’re putting something out there that 
people will… This comes from my long work with Cliff, with I think even Morgan, 
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but particularly Cliff and Geoff: any standard model you put out there is the start 
of a conversation and people will want to change it. And it’s up to us to help 
them adapt it so it’s fit for purpose. It’s like virtually every field: you’ve got best 
practice or fit or best fit." 
 
"So, user developed, user influenced, practice influenced, protecting the sort of 




"It’s worth mentioning this: virtually everybody who was involved in the early 
formation of the FairShare’s model and the FairShare’s association was a critic 
of the CIC. So, we felt that the direction the CIC went was fundamentally 
flawed." 
"I can remember going to the launch in London and Steven Stears, he was at 
ETC, he said, “The CIC isn’t about democracy or it’s not about…” And I’ve been 
a founder of Social Enterprise London, it bloody well was. When we pushed for 
the CIC legislation to be introduced and the parties who were arguing for a new 
legal form were certainly thinking of social economy norms at the point that they 
did that." 
"Then by the time we got to legislation they were overruling both Social 
Enterprise Coalition and Co-ops UK, so they both argued for a statutory 
commitment to multi-stakeholder or stakeholder governance. And the 
entrepreneurs who were driving the writing of the legislation and the early model 
rules managed to get that out." 
Response to the CIC 
Yes, so all of the early backers to this were rooted in some critique of the CIC. 
The early critique was the loss; and so Co-ops UK responded initially to that by 
creating a culture CIC, so they restored the democratic elements that were lost 
from the CIC in its original creation by creation a setting of model rules. Morgan 
created its stakeholder model. I created what I call the surplus sharing model. 
Cliff Southcombe created what he called the social wealth model. So, we were 
all finding a legal response to what we saw as the shortcomings of the CIC. 
Advice and support 
Rigid support through Business Link. 
"My one bugbear in the past – and it’s kind of disappeared because the 
Business Link advice service has disappeared – but they were pretty rigid. I felt 
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historically they were quite rigid about what they would and would not recognise 
as a social enterprise. And again they were influenced by that whole 
government thing and what the government wanted, and also I think what the 
voluntary sector wanted. So, they reduced the boundaries where I wouldn’t 
have put them and xxxwouldn’t have put them and xxxx wouldn’t have put 
them." 
Social Investment. 
Social investment industry not fit for purpose. 
"Yes, that’s worth commenting on. I had to write a book chapter around social 
investment. I think crowd funding, crowd lending, crowd investing is a wonderful 
idea whose time has come. I think the social investment industry is not fit for 
purpose, and the research evidence that I’ve seen at conferences tends to 
support that. My own trawl through the literature for writing a book chapter 
showed the incredibly rapid growth of the crowd based models and the very 
slow take-up of the social investment models." 
Crowd funding. 
"I got interviewed by somebody who was researching I think for Big Society 
Capital or a coalition of them, and I said they ought to be doing social 
investment into the platforms that do the crowd stuff, so they can make money 







Working in the co-operative movement, and then in support, CDA and then ran 
the NFWC legal department followed by 20 years as a freelance adviser, mostly 
legal matters and constitutions. 
Issues discussed 
Structure 
Confusion about the options, the pro's and con's of each legal structure. 
Complexity, around ten different legal  structures and variants on a theme… 
Simple structures are best at the start (CLG or CIC) and can always be 
amended or developed later on. 
Complexity and the "ladder of regulation": 
"What I say to people is there’s a ladder of regulation and you’ve got an 
unregulated company, like a company limited by guarantee, and a community 
interest company, which is a bit more regulated, and a charity, which is a lot 
more regulated again, and if you move up that ladder, you can never move 
down, and that makes quite a clear visual image." 
Variety of structures and variants 
"Yeah, and in terms of that, what you could say, the system within which we 
design legal structure is absurd, there are nine or ten different options: we’ve 
got company limited by guarantee, CIC limited by guarantee, CIC limited by 
shares, a charitable company, CIO, Bencom , a cooperative society." 
As an adviser, likes complexity as it provides scope to operate and create 
options for clients. But from a user perspective…. 
"But from the consumer’s point of view, it’s absolutely baffling and a lot of 
people get very anxious about whether they’re picking the right structure or not, 
and equally, a lot of people get anxious when they discover they’ve picked the 
wrong one!" 
 
Clients tend to overthink the issues of structure and are better off starting simple 
and adding complexity later on…. 
Drivers for change of structure. 
"Another obvious ones are if the social enterprise is a registered charity then 
they might want a trading company because they want to get involved in risk, 
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risky trading activities that the charity can’t do. That’s another straightforward 
one." 
Trading Charities, Charity Commission rules financial risk management, 
"The primary reason for setting up a trading subsidiary is to avoid breaking the 
rules, as charities can do, but it also quarantines risk, so if they’ve got an idea 
for a semi-commercial venture that carries an element of risk which could 
impact on the parent charity, sometimes they create a subsidiary so it can go 
bust on its own." 
 
Also the issue of VAT and avoiding making the whole charity in scope for VAT 
at 20% due to trading activity, hence creating a trading subsidiary. 




Loopholes and work around's. 
Funding and Funders. 
"Which is basically you form a community interest company limited by 
guarantee with one voting member, which you can do, which is a social 
entrepreneur. They then recruit a Board of Directors, so when they go to 
funders, say, “Look, we’ve got four directors, they’re unrelated,” and, in fact, 
come the general meeting, there’s only one person with a vote who can appoint 
directors, sack them, replace them. So I don’t particularly like that structure." 
Asset Lock 
"The asset lock in the community interest company, so the asset lock, you’re 
not allowed to dispose of money or assets at less than market value, and if the 
company is wound up, that can’t be distributed amongst members and it has to 
go to another asset lock body. Nearly all the CICs that I deal with have got a 
handful of directors who are on the payroll, so if the business is going down the 
hill, they simply carry on paying themselves until the bank account is empty." 
 
Governance. 
Ownership is a key topic with new-start social enterprises. Who could own the 
enterprise, what voting rights, who might the members be? 
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An unwillingness to share ownership is most common, this manifest around the 
pursuit of funding. 
"an absolute classic is a sole social entrepreneur who’s put something together, 
and I can think of a dozen examples instantly from just the last couple of years, 
they’ve worked hard, they’re talented, they’ve got vision, they’ve put something 
together, and then they’ve gone for funding, and this is one of the big things, 
funders, they go for funding, and the funders say, “You’re the only member of 
this company and we’re not going to touch you. We want to see a minimum of 
three unrelated people in control.” It’s a criteria of a lot of funders. So the social 
entrepreneur comes back and he says, “Does that mean I’ve got to share 
ownership with some other people?” to which I say yes, and they say, “I don’t 
want it.” 
Structure change driven by the relationship of legal structure and 
governing documents to current situation and practice. 
“Look, what’s happened is that your practice has drifted apart from what your 
constitution says, so either change your practice to suit the constitution, or 
change the constitution to suit the practice. We can do either. What do you 
want?” 
Joint ventures and mergers -  
1. Lead body model 
2. New entity model (possibly a SELLP) 
3. The 'Big Merger' model 
Funders looking for cost saving through a reduction in the scale of management 
overhead tend to drive these approaches. 
"And it’s sometimes imposed by funders. Thirty three charities in xxxx all with a 
contract with xxxx County Council, and this is going back a few years, and 
xxxxx County Council said, “Bugger that, we just want one contract. You go and 
sort yourselves out, but come back next year with one entity to sign the 
contract, because we’re not doing 33 again.” 
 
Government Policy 
Simplification agenda perhaps; 
" they ploughed in with community interest companies when we already had 
community benefit societies, and then we already have four forms of charity, 
unincorporated associations, simple trusts, a charitable company and an 
independent society, and then they introduced the CIO. They just keep adding 





"The Charity Commission, you’ve got to be on your toes when you deal with the 
Charity Commission and they’re switched on and they see through subterfuge 
and all sorts of things, but the CIC regulator, as long as you actually know what 
the rules are." 
Advice and support 
Some less informed advisers.  
Bad advice…  
"so I frequently have to amend bad advice, and it may be given with good 
intentions, but poor advice that people have been given." 
 
"people are actually confused about the options and the pros and cons of each, 
so I do a lot of handholding at that stage and explaining in plain English what 
the options are." 
 
"I do get people coming to me who have been advised to register as a charity 
and have realised that they’ve essentially given away their project and they 
didn’t realise they were doing that." 
 
"but there are a number of generalist special enterprise advisors who think they 
know more than they do and give dodgy advice. I’ve had people come to me 
who actually have illegal structures that have been recommended to them by 
people who have quite a standing in the sector." 
 
Complexity, experience and understanding needed to give advice on structures. 
"Yeah, but you’ve got to know the whole range pretty intimately and, frankly, 
unless  you’re a specialist, which I am, you’re not going to. A general social 
enterprise advisor, there’s no way you could have that depth of understanding. 
It’s taken me 40 years!" 
 
Understanding both the legal aspects and the social enterprise aspects…. 
"There are plenty of people out there who are passionate about social 
enterprise and understand the ethos and the values and all that, but don’t know 
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the law. And you’ve got legal firms who know the law but they don’t really get 








Founded xxxx, a small IT projects SE, later an SE adviser (Business Link, Local 





Profit for the entrepreneur. 
Social good coming from enterprise, primacy of this dimension…. 
"I’d already seen it very differently from a lot of people and I’d always seen that 
the social mission would occur as a consequence of successful trading in a 
market, there’s the primacy of the enterprise over the social and I’m quite clear 
about that in what did with xxxx. So, in other words, the more successful we 
were as a business, the more we would deliver our social mission." 
Definitions 
"a business that was as efficient as a private business that actually had some 
good written into it". 
Structure as badge of legitimacy: 
"the biggest minus side was the lack of recognition, so the regular business 
support community would treat us a second-class citizen because we weren’t 
really a proper business and some of the social enterprise community would 
treat us as a second-class citizen because we weren’t a proper social 
enterprise." 
 
"I’m saying, “If you carry on a sole trader, you’re not really a social enterprise 
and there’s nothing stopping you from calling yourself one, you can still access 
my time, you can still access university support. You’ll probably still get a load of 
small grants from UNLTD and various places, but at some point, you’ll need to 
think about it. If you’re serious about being a social enterprise, let’s call it what it 
is and let’s adopt a legal structure that reflects and shows the rest of the world 




Social Enterprise Mark: 
"the Social Enterprise Mark came along and we were basically told, “You’re not 
a social enterprise, you’ll abide by the Mark,” and I think that was quite a 
common experience actually, but suddenly asset locks were massively 
important and we didn’t have one, so there was that lack of recognition." 
Concerns of badge of legitimacy and market place brand in the eyes of 
customers. 
"that’s what worried me about the Social Enterprise Mark. It’s the only time, 
since setting it up, going back to being an entrepreneur, that’s the only time that 
I’ve felt worried for the future, was when we went, “Oh right, we’d better get this 
Mark thing,” and they said, “No, you’re not.” And strategically, I’m thinking that’s 
a nightmare for us now, because if we can’t call ourselves a social enterprise, or 
we become unable to tender for things or not on databases, then it’s the 
beginning of the end and we may as well forget working for charities and we 
may as well just carry on with the SME market." 
 
Most of those advised, "definitely don't want to run a charity; they're a business. 
They're definitely a business"  
Link to UNLTD and NEN spotlight paper on Socially Motivated 
Entrepreneurs and the notion of the BCorp. 
 
Structure 
Pre CIC, options came down to charity or CLG but didn’t like either so looked to 
create a multi-stakeholder shared capital company, dubbed NEWCO. 
No Asset Lock - see comment above re recognition…. 100% income from 
trading so "why would you need that"…. 
Trading is and a viable business model  much more important that structures at 
the start-up phase…… Legal structure as business distraction at this stage. 
CIC an easier way of adopting a social enterprise structure for early years of 
trading. 
Notion of legal structure falling naturaslly out of the business planning 
process. 
Usual conversation with start-up social entrepreneurs about CIC structures the 
conversation is almost always about CIC by shares are rarely by guarantee. 
This largely driven by ownership… 
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"Yeah, so they own 100% at the moment, so it’s like, in essence, how much are 
you willing to give away to another party?” 
The distinction between share and guaranteed CIC, with the share bit being 
driven by the entrepreneurial stance and the control being about how much of 
the business you want to seed, because it’s evolving out of that bunch of 




"NewCo model, and where there were different classes of shareholder. Myself 
as the entrepreneur was the Class A shareholder, there were other charities 
that were partners in the project who were Category B shareholders, and 
employees were Category C shareholders. It would essentially be run by me as 
the managing director but with the Board comprising of one representative of 
each, therefore I could be outvoted. And the dividend was split pro rata between 
all three backers." 
Control linked to swift decision making was key to structure selection.   
"So I could run it with the efficiency of a private company that I was after". 
Entrepreneurial control was very important. "it was very , very key". The aim 
was maximum control within the confines of a Social Enterprise so maintaining 
a minority share but the maximum minority share possible. 
Entrepreneur regards stakeholder structural involvement as supporting 
business discipline, knowing he could be voted out. 
Notions of be a business and make money and then give it away. Keep control. 
The question is do you want to enshrine this in the fibre and make it a legally 
binding element of your business? 
Funding, Investment and Profits 
See above, quote re distribution to multiple stakeholders. 
Growth and practice driven change to distribution model. 
Relationship of structure (particularly asset locked structures) with 
grants, public funding and contracts…. 
Despite the above, accessed funding via KEY FUND, more flexible. 
Advice and support 
Poor, substandard  legal work. 
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SE's giving advice; 
"I got more and more interested in helping other social enterprises start up, as I 
think a lot of social entrepreneurs do, and started becoming a mentor for 
Business Link amongst other people, getting involved in other people’s 
businesses." 
University Social Enterprise adviser. 
Legal structure advice, keep this for latwer and focus first on the business 
planning and the business model. 
"I want to basically say, “Forget legal structure for now, let’s work on this plan.” 
Or, “Forget legal structure for now and let’s just define what products and 
services.” I might say things to them like, “What are your motivations? What do 
you want out of this in ten years’ time?” 
Usual forms…. 
"in a start-up it’s usually between stay as a sole trader or form into a CIC. It’s 
nearly always that." 
Quality and availability of legal advice.  
Concept of local legal flavour, models advisers have most experience with 
etc. Participant favours those who have no corporate agenda and are 
independent. See's legal firms as a sort of sausage factory… 
 
Government Policy 
Anti-interventionist stance sees government intervention as tinkering,  eroding 
diversity and freedom of action. 









Worked in Enterprise support for around 25 years almost all of this time in 
Social Enterprises. Chief Executive of xxxx for the past five years.  
xxxx is a bottom up trade organisation. 
Issues discussed 
Drivers 
Social purpose is supporting member social enterprises through representation 
and promotion. 
Definitions 
Socially motivate entrepreneurs seeking advice from xxxx but not necessarily 
looking to start a Social Enterprise by some definitions. "Trading for Social 
good". 
See UNLTD spotlight paper - How mainstream enterprise support 
organisations are supporting Social Entrepreneurs. 
See also the B-Corp concept: www.b-corporation.uk/b-corps-in-the-uk 
definitions and kite marking issues. 
"When they say that something social is driving them they don’t want to have an 
independent board made of a load of people that… and have no profit out of the 
business, personal profit out of the business. So, does the traditional definition 
of social enterprise still have a place? Particularly when nobody really ever 
understood what it meant anyway. And you then have this continual battle about 
whether a social enterprise is supposed to make any money." 
See also xxxxxxx and Social Enterprise Mark.  
www.socialenterprisemark.org.uk/ 
Structure 
Company Limited by Guarantee with social mission in objects.  
View that a simple CLG structure with strong objects around social mission and 
use of assets should be sufficient for most Social Enterprise other than when 






Changed articles and name (xxxx to xxxx) and looked to open up membership 
to non-enterprise agencies who provided enterprise support. This driven by 
falling numbers of enterprise agencies and need for scale to maintain operation. 
. 
Linkage of operational practice and clarity of governance structures in 
this context, See also Charlie Cattell… 
Board of 14, CEO, 3 co-opted (one year appointment), and 10 elected from 
membership (1/3 retirement by rotation). 
Board understanding of mission (see also participant 6 on SE CEO's as 
directors and source of advice). 
"I actually have a very good relationship with my board, and I think that’s 
because they themselves are chief execs of social enterprises they understand 
the work we’re doing, and because they’re closely aligned to what they’re doing 
on a local level that I’m trying to replicate on a national level they understand 
the job I’m trying to do." 
Previous experience of private sector directors not understanding social context 
and mission. 
"when I was working for the xxxx my board had a lot of the great and the good 
from West Yorkshire on it who ran commercial businesses and couldn’t really 
apply their commercial sensitivities to the running of the social enterprise, if you 
see what I mean, so they couldn’t understand why you would make certain 
decisions based upon social purpose when actually there was a financial 
imperative." 
 
Impact of understanding on decision making. 
"So, when I ran an enterprise agency that’s what I found with my board: it was 
quite difficult sometimes to get my board of local accountants or people running 
local businesses to see, ‘why are we taking on a contract where we hardly 
made any money?’ for example. Why would you do that?" 
Governance process supporting board understanding And relationship with 
CEO - Chair is a two year term proceeded by a two year term as Deputy Chair. 
A two year induction in effect.  
Board - Chair and Deputy Chair as source of advice and support for CEO. 
Vested interest dilemma's in terms of contracts and bidding. Balance between 
members and independents…but fears over balance of commercial viewpoint 




Funding, Investment and Profits 
Profits reinvested into services to support members. 
Advice and support 
xxxx though a mainstream enterprise support network, the members will 
support SE's. 
See UNLTD spotlight paper - How mainstream enterprise support 
organisations are supporting Social Entrepreneurs. 
Social entrepreneurs and and mainstream entrepreneurs share similar business 
support needs. 
xxxx is a mainstream business support network and members don’t all have 
dedicated staff with SE understanding. Referral to specialist SE support / legal 
advice. 
Education - piloted workshops with unlimited and member advice agencies 
designed to help advisers understand Social Enterprises. 
Non-interventionist government - plus austerity - arguments against intervention 
due to growth rates of enterprise. 
"social enterprise will fall into the same difficulties, because the reality is social 
enterprises are harder to start: they take longer, the lead times are longer; they 
often have a volunteer element of running them; there’s usually one very 
enthusiastic driven person who probably very often isn’t a good man-manager, 
isn’t a good fundraiser, isn’t all the things you need." 
Paradox of support: Public policy on business support and social 
exclusion… 
Impact of support on survival rates. 








Director in an NHS spin out under the "Right to Provide" framework now trading 
and delivering a variety of Health related services across the xxxx. Significant 




Social mission and leadership drive.  
Freedom to innovate outside the NHS also a key driver. 
Taking ownership of services. 
Structural drivers for IPS;  involvement and engagement of stakeholders 
alongside accountability for service delivery. 
The Social Mission underpins the enterprise, innovation and trading activities 
that enable it within a legal and governance structure that supports both. 
All trading projects link to Health in one way or another. 
Trading for the flexible sustainability of the Social Mission. 
SELLP as a driver for significant combined Social Impact…. 
Structure 
A Community Benefit Society - form of IPS. 
BenComm driven by a focus on membership and involvement. 
Developing perhaps the first Health and Wellbeing Limited Liability Partnership. 
CHECK THIS… 
SELLP as a model to scale up efficient Social Enterprises to compete for large 
commissioned contracts. Enabling the sector to compete with the large plc's  
who are active in the health commissioning sector. 
LLP enables aggregation of resources and financial strength whilst sharing risk  
and protecting IP plus giving a diversity of delivery capacity and skills. 




Around 1,000 members who pay £ 1 investment, key challenge is active 
engagement in how and what services are run.  
Accountability through structure; 
"Now, if they don’t like the way the management of Social adVentures are 
running these services here we could be voted out by the majority. That kind of 
accountability via the structure of the organisation does not exist in public 
services." 
However, most people just aren't interested - power vs the exercise of power…. 
Also the engagement of staff stakeholders is seen as a key driver of service 
quality. 
Relationship of governance to organisation circumstances and current practice - 
regular governance review. 
"I would say review your governance; it isn’t set in stone. You have to have a 
starting point. You may find that there are pros and cons with that that need to 
be changed; or the organisation grows; or it changes focus. So, governance has 
to come back to it." 
Governance needs changing with changes to operational practice, especially 
moving from contracts to trading, more trading requires different board make-
up, skills and outlook. Public sector checks and balances vs imperatives of 
doing business. 
Good governance is about enabling good decisions. 
Directors CV's little to do with how effective they are as board members. 
Understanding both social mission and context alongside good business 
skills/understanding. Motivation of some directors questioned in terms of 
commitment to the organisation… Directors from the public sector directors risk 
averse… Directors from the third sector and charities very risk averse. 
"Where in reality if you’re going to find anything new, if you’re really going to 
innovate in services some of the things you try will fail. That is a fact. Your aim 
is never to fail, but if you are not actually testing the boundaries of it, if you get it 
right 100% of the time you are not doing anything new. So, that’s just something 
people just have to live with and react to appropriately. And that’s very difficult 
to get out of a board in my experience." 
In balance, private sector directors tend to understand risk management and 
how to push projects forward but not necessarily the landscape, funding etc. 
and the balance of profit vs social impact. 
Attitude is very important not always about skills or experience. 
Difficult to get the right people and the right mix of skills and backgrounds 
197 
 
Structure and governance that promotes enterprise and innovation in support of 
the social mission. 
"No money, no mission". 
Originally Governance not suitable for operational practice and size of 
organisation. Restructured board 12 down to nine and focused upon removing 
barriers to growth and involvement in decision making - board and community. 
LLP model being developed enables member SE's to maintain structure, 
identity and ownership. 
 
Funding, Investment and Profits 
Trading surplus allows flexible investment is services (less profitable or loss 
making services can be supported from surplus elsewhere). 50% trading and 
50% contracts. 
Assets are locked. 
Some Social Investment but borrowing has been commercial as Social 
Investment rates are seen as very high. 
Bank business support really helpful, practical and directly commercially useful. 
Poor experience of social investment: 
"I would ask about the investment readiness of investors"… 
Questioned whether Social Investment can handle large scalable projects as 
they had sought £ 4 million on the back of a strong business plan supported by 
Deliotte's and KPMG. 
Borrowing to speed growth (17,5% own resources, 17,5% from xxxx as a 
deposit then 65% from xxxx) 
Prudent reserves policy to assist in risk management. 
Don’t have to maintain shareholder dividend so can trade on lower margins…. 
LLP as an investable platform through equity shares as asset locked 
organisations can be members and distribute profits without risk to their 
own structure and asset lock. 
 
Advice and support 
Bank business advice really helpful and commercially valuable. 







Currently an assessor for xxxx providing advice and direct support to Social 
Enterprises entering the Big Potential Programme seeking Social Investment 
(Investment Readiness). Charity trustee and director. 
Issues discussed 
Complexity and Confusion. 
Confusion over legal structure based on advice, (xxxx) thought they were a CIC 
and found out that they were actually a registered charity…. 
Complexity of Social Investment Market and the nature of contemporary Social 
Enterprise Funding; from grants and Investment to a range of contracts, grants, 
investment and raising your own finance pus other options such as community 
shares and other crowd funding. 
Note: this complexity alongside structural and legal form complexity,,,,,, 
Confusion and complexity of legal structure's, participant notes there being 
maybe 10 structures, it's all a bit confusing. 
What should we be is the wrong question, as we need to look at what we are 
doing and where we want to get to…. Strong governance more important than 
structure for Social Investment. 
 
Governance. 
Governance and leadership is a big issue for Social Investment, strength of 
board & management team, skills capacity, and financial controls alongside a 
strong viable business plan. Understanding both of social mission and the 
realities of doing business, board skill mix and capacity. Accountants and 
business people who understand the business model, need for a range of 
expertise. Also business people understanding the social business context, 
operating margins etc. balanced with social mission. 
 
Funding, Investment and Profits 
Social Investment issues with boards, management team up and ready boards 
lacking in understanding resulting in blockages. 
199 
 
Social Investment isn't the cheapest. More money than demand. 
Social impact bonds in the delivery of public services. 
Some models preclude directors taking money out which and some don’t so 
making this an important decision point on structure. 
 
Advice and support 
Social Investment market looking to match supply of capital with Social 
Enterprises so providing business support alongside this under the banner of 
investment readiness. 
"I think there was a sense that, ‘well you put the money out there, job done, 
then people will start applying’. Then there was a realisation that actually if 
you’re making a market or you’re trying to increase, you might increase the 
supply of capital and investment, but actually organisations are not in a position 
to take advantage of that." 
 
Poor legal advice, CIC actually a charity; 
"But he still thinks that that’s what he was told they were signing up for. So, 
they’d got some advice from somebody who did it for them and got it wrong. 
You have to adapt from that. We could have got ourselves in a bit of trouble, but 
we haven’t; we’ve got through that." 
Need for Business advice; 
"People can identify need about what needs to happen or what provision; but 
it’s turning that understanding to, ‘what’s the market? Who’s going to pay for 





Participant  7. 
 
Background 
FD and later CEO, 16 years with the organisation. 
Issues discussed 
Drivers 
Key driver was social mission. 
Structures 
A local Authority spin out from the old Local Authority run Careers Services. 
Company Limited by Guarantee with social mission within its objects. No 
legal asset lock and a provision to distribute on winding up. Mention made 
of another local service that went down the shares route and was later sold. 
Another mentioned went down the mutual route. 
No appetite from managers or members for a shares model given social 
mission as driver. 
Looking to create a holding company driven largely by procurement issues (See 
Teckal case law) around local authority involvement in commissioning. TUPE a 
major consideration.  
http://www.wardhadaway.com/knowledge/procurement-in-a-nutshell-teckal-and-
hamburg-exemptions/ 
CEO reflects on the Guarantee vs Shares structures and considers if Shares 
may have been a better route though considers that this was never possible in 
the past and culturally doesn't really fit the organisation This is perhaps a 
reflection on doing social good, but getting no recognition from the user 
community or stakeholders…. 
Considered the charity structure in the past largely driven  by rate relief but 
decided against this following a due diligence exercise, Noted that once done 
this could not be reversed nor can funds be taken out. 
See also Charlie Cattell and the ladder of regulation / tree of complexity. 
Governance. 
Four members with appointment right for four directors each (16). Later 
dispensed with AGM and appointment of directors annually.  
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Some mention of potential BNP councillors involvement so previous CEO 
implemented a change to articles to nomination of directors rather than 
appointment by members directly. 
Primary concern in terms of board make-up has been avoidance of local 
authority control. See also LA spin out consideration (xxxxxxx) 
 
Funding and Profits 
Have adopted a balanced reserves policy over time, tension between building 
reserves and delivering social mission. Profits on one area support less 
profitable services in another part of the business. 
Never needed Social Investment. 
CEO concerned by the potential impact of Social Impact Bonds in terms of 
service delivery funding. Seen as very unclear how this will work. See also 
participant 2 and participant 8 on this aspect. 
http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/services/social-impact-bonds/ 
 
Advice and support 
Local solicitors (xxxx) used to support the legal structure development. 








History in the charity sector with trading charities and giving advice as a SE and 




Some mentions of complexity and lack of definition, "led me to investigate what 
social enterprise was and I'm still trying to find out…..". "As I understand it DTI 
has no definition of social enterprise". I think a reference to legal definition as 
Govt, definitions exist or perhaps practitioner lack of understanding,,,,, 
Boards noted as sometime as being an issue to trading due to risk aversion, 
lack of business understanding, culture of grant support. 
Importance of definitions to funders; So some people are saying well, “No, you 
can’t access this fund because you’re not a social enterprise by our definition.” 
And others don’t care. 
 
Drivers 
Charity trading to replace reduced levels of donations and / or funding from 
other sources (xxxx replaced lost grant funding through trading (donated 
furniture, shop sales) within one year and grew this aspect considerably). 
Trading seen as a route to sustainability. 
Trading led to greater social impact through related activities such as furniture 
restoration training for unemployed young people as well as funding more core 
charitable activities. 
Structures 
Set up as a trading arm of the charity, CLG with social objects. CIC's not around 
at this time though mentioned as possibly an option if available. 
 Asset lock not an issue. Though legal structure required for lease agreements. 
Complexity and confusion noted, CIC's and CIO's mentioned, so many different 
models… Good form safeguarding public money though highlighted issues of 
related governance as a challenge. 
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The combination of of legal structures is confusing and worrying when the board 
are confused by straightforward business issues. 
If there was just one, "one size" fits all legal structure…. encompassing social 
mission and trade…. A simplified form,,,, so that funders, commissioners etc 
can understand what social and charitable businesses are…. 
 
Governance. 
Directors and Trustees - appointment not for skills but for their passion for the 
social mission. Issues of board membership lacking the professional skills and 
experience to run a business. Speed and reluctance to make business 
decisions an big issue. Attitude to investment risk in order to setup a trading 
business. Realisation that in order to trade to continue social mission needs 
business decision making and risk management.  
"It can be really hard when you’re working with people that think the best way to 
fund your charitable organisation is to have a coffee and cake morning at the 
local Church and not get a loan for £20,000 to set up a retail outlet that looks 
professional and will bring in money". 
Need backing of a strong board. Need to recruit more board members with right 
skills or train the existing ones. 
Recognition of the need for people who know both the social business context 
and the social mission as also issues with purely business skills. Classic 
barristers, accountants etc., don’t always have an understanding  of the context 
of social businesses. 
"….what you need is the people that have run social business. So you start 
recruiting CEOs of other social enterprise and charitable businesses with the 
same mind." 
Also other CEO's as mentors and to help educate other board members; 
"I was at the YMCA and that’s where I met him and he was kind of like a 
sounding board for me in the end because he was having the same issues with 
some of his Boards." 
 
"you know, I need – I need a strong management structure before we embark 
on dealing with the legal structure." 
Ownership and control  
"…..a lot of people are put off by the idea that they can set up a social 
enterprise and then be thrown out of it by their Board. And I think that scares a 
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lot of potentially fantastic social entrepreneurs from doing that and setting up 
that structure in a way that would enable them to access funds." 
LINK to participant 4 and similar issues… 
Founders Syndrome…. founders created board of friends who protected them, 
eventually ran reserves down, lacking innovation. 
 
Funding, profits and contracts 
Some commentary on the state and operation of NHS commissioning and how 
problematic this is in terms of management and board capacity. 
"You see one of the biggest things I’ve ever heard that pisses me right off is not-
for-profit. We are for profit; profit is not a dirty word because the more profit we 
can make the more issues we can deal with. So I prefer profit for purpose and I 
think that’s a much better definition of what social enterprise and charitable 
business is about." 
 
Advice and support 
Sought advice from local CVS though funding struggles and closure mentioned 
in relation to local CVS. 
Eroded support for governance, business advice and infrastructure support all 
eroded last few years and post Brexit participant though that this would only get 
worse. 
Keeping up with legislation, legal compliance, structural changes etc. a major 








Decision process for selection of legal structure 
 
Chose CIC as it seemed to fit (Community purpose, accommodated shares, 
investment, didn’t take any advice which was a mistake, seemed new and sexy 
as a structure) 
 
"The CIC structure allowed us to still run it as an entrepreneurial type business 
whereas many of the other structures, charitable structures and what not you 
put on it really don’t lend themselves to running it like a regular business." 
 
CIC as largely a reassurance to public bodies and funder that we were a 'bona 
fide' social enterprise - see also definitions and Social Enterprise Mark 
related issues. 
 
"my overall feeling about all of these structures is they over complicate things 
and really they are put in place because a few bad apples ruin the whole apple 
cart and so it’s about not trusting anyone. So organisations all of a sudden have 
a little label that says, I can trust that; even though it could be the worst run 




Largely entrepreneurial with social purpose. 
 
Tension between entrepreneurial behaviour and public trust.....brought out in 




CIC Governance and board involvement – didn’t work and diverted effort from 
doing business. Issues of understanding and vested interest. Community 
involvement in the board largely non-productive. Stakeholders vs business 
needs. 
 
"I mean that in the best possible way is that here you’ve got people who were 
trying to engage with the community but because of the way the legal structures 
are we are being forced into relationship structures that are not natural and are 
very bureaucratic and create a lot of stress and anxiety for the entrepreneur." 
 
A strong perception of grants in the sector when many plc’s access these in 
cash and kind for a multiplicity of reasons.. those in the sector find it frustrating 
to have to justify their position to the end they appear to have to… 
 
Notion of legal structure as a hindrance rather than a help in terms of 
stakeholder and community engagement as this forces relationship structures 
that aren’t natural ones.  
 





Boards - Board needs to drive the business, doing business first then the social 
capital/impact will follow.  
Community and stakeholder engagement issues. 
 
"We tried to set up Advisory Boards and bring various people onto the actual 
Board of Directors and I think pretty much without fail all of that activity has 
been – with the exception of one person that was on our Board, Roger, who 
was a Councillor, most people that have been engaged either in the Advisory 
Board or who have come on our Board earlier on really just were like big wet 
cloths on the business and were – diverted the business from sustainability 
essentially; trying to direct it in ways that was more like a personal fiefdom." 
 
Interview subject suggests that a limited company by shares is the best 
structure alongside strong mem and arts due to flexibility. 
 
Ownership and Control 
 




Funders and Funding. 
 
Trust of funders and public bodies was a major issue. Link to badge of 
legitimacy..... 
 
Risk as an issue as public bodies try to eradicate this and it simply isn't possible 
to run a business without risks. 
 
Asset lock and investment issues. 
 
"That asset lock – that asset lock for CICs is the main reason you cannot draw 
investment into CICs. I mean I got investment but it was from quasi funding 
places, it wasn’t like – and I got a loan because they were going to back the 
building but nobody was going to back the business because there was no – I 
couldn’t even get the xxxx to invest and basically he told me straight out, the 
Chief Exec, he said, “You’ve got an asset lock, so I’ve got to bet on your 
business and there’s no way I can do that. I mean I need to have something to 




Use of profits 
 
Profit distribution seen as a major issue (large entrepreneurial investment for 
5% above base rate return) within CIC structure…. See also need for advice 
in structure selection…. 
 
"I didn’t really educate myself on exactly how the CIC works. I didn’t – one of 
the big things I didn’t realise was the restrictions on extracting profits. So – and 





"the structure of who decides how much money the entrepreneurs get back 
from the project. Why should it only be 5%? I mean hell I’ve sweated blood in 
shit loads for this and I get 5%? I mean quite honestly it makes me want to say, 
fuck you, basically." 
 
"It’s like I had the CIC regulator in xxxx for six hours…….This is not an 
entrepreneurial style of thing because why wouldn’t it be 50:50. Basically you 
have to be an entrepreneur and be a monk. It’s like actually I’m going to give 
you 99% of everything I have and then it will go to the community; well that’s 
really insane. I mean that’s just totally insane. It’s totally insane to me. Anyway 
that’s what I feel about stakeholder stuff." 
 
" the deal’s not an equitable deal; particularly if you are looking at structures like 
CICs and stuff." 
Structural loopholes and work around's 
"But what people don’t realise is there’s lots of ways to do that. So I could sell 
SHINE tomorrow and the person who buys it doesn’t have to do the same thing 
with it, they can do whatever they want. I think people, a lot of people confuse 
the lock as being in perpetuity for the actual asset. It’s not; it’s for the asset and 
then whatever the CIC realises that asset of. So if I have a building and I sell 











Founded first social enterprise in 2003: , which was xxxx. Sits on the Board of 
xxxx, the xxxx initiated commission led by Lord Lowe, looking at governance 
across charity and social enterprise. Supported around 111 social enterprises of 
one sort or another. 
 




Early stage grant requirement vs Trading income 
Start and growth funding 




Ownership and control 
 
Advice process looking at this as a key issue. 
 
"Control and ownership comes back time and time again and I would say in the 
main the sort of people we’re working with are quite entrepreneurial, or have 




"decision making, who do you want to take decisions? Do you want you? Do 
you want it to be a non-Executive Board? Do you want to involve users or 
beneficiaries, blah, blah, blah – and then we just work through what they see as 
the route that they want to take." 
 
 
Income and profits 
 
"We look at what income generation – so you are seeing it as a mixed model of 
grant and trading. Is your trading likely to be contracts with public sector or is it 
going to be sort of a B to B, B to C model? We look at what people want to do 
with the profits and I push people to extremes. So they all say, “Well it’s not 
really an issue because we’re not making any profits at the moment,” and then 
you say, “But what if…?” We talk about tax, we talk about those implications, we 
look at who owns the asset if you like at the end of the day? So we look at asset 
locks in terms of that and so I just work through that process with them and from 








"CAF Venturesome did a piece of research about some different models there, 
profit generator model; so like One Water sells commercially and Gift Aids all of 
its profits into their own foundation. So for some people they are actually better 
with a commercial organisation and then they set up a charity or a foundation – 
do you see what I mean, or something like that?" 
 
"Because then what they’re doing is maximising the profit, gift-aiding the profit 
so again there’s bigger gain and essentially having – so traditionally people 
would have had a charity with a trading subsidiary….. What we’re often saying 
to people, if you want to be really commercial and you don’t actually want a 
Charity Board making the decisions, you have your trading entity, which you 
control, you and your co-directors or whatever and then you Gift Aid. So you 
have a relationship from that back to a charity of some sort and that’s a stronger 
model for people’s control than these others might be. So it’s – again you just 






"CEOs are often very much more entrepreneurial and manage risk better than 
Boards do. Boards wobble at all sorts of reasons." 
 
Boards, doing good vs doing business 
 
Issues related to Stakeholder engagement in structures - baord memebers 
understanding the "social business" reality. 
 
"……. £200K overdraft at the end of the day with that and then we were also 
doing outcome based funding; so you were essentially just keying your 
information into the LSC or JCP databases, no invoice as such generated – you 
just got a payment every periodically, usually monthly on that. And they put in 
an interim Finance Director who said, “You don’t really know what you’re doing.” 
I said, “Well I think we know what we’re doing, it just takes a little bit of time to 
produce management accounts.” “Oh no, we want this.” Put that in place and 
this was a Charity Finance Director who just didn’t understand what we were 
doing, told the Board we were insolvent and the Board went off it, closed me 
out, brought in a specialist to help us – so this guy turned up. I got back in on 
the Monday and started to defend this – but anyway the bloke came in and said, 
“I’ve come to sort out your issues with the revenue.” And I said, “So what are 
you going to do?” He said, “Well we’ll help you reschedule your payments.” I 
said, “Well we’re up to date.” “But you’re in trouble.” I said, “No, we’re not. We’re 
up to date.” “Oh, okay, right, fine.” So he went and then it was, I said to the 
Board, “So have you been talking to the bank?” “Oh no,” so I went to see the 
bank with one of the Board members and the bank said, “Well what’s the 
problem?” I said, “None.” “Okay.” We had £300,000 of reserves at that point, 






Legal structure as a journey – composites evolve due to available structures 
and circumstances. Not always a good or appropriate fit to the available 
models.  
 




"Yeah, and it’s some of that stuff that kind of lets you, you need to have a 
flexibility that just doesn’t exist in the structures at the moment. Conversion is 
really difficult. So people who started as you should be able – I can’t see why 
there’s any reason why you shouldn’t actually be able to convert a charity to a 
CIC, at least a CIC limited by guarantee, why can’t you? You can’t. You have to 
close one down and start again, transfer the assets, etc. But why can’t you? 
Why can’t you more normally have Unitary Boards? Why do you have to go 
from very full permission from the Charity Commission who really, really don’t 





"you see and big lottery are funny about CICs limited by shares, as are 
Community Foundations, they have particular views." 
 
Dilemma for early stage start-ups needing a mix of grant and other funding. 
 
 
Funding and structure traps 
 
"So we’re working with somebody who started off self-employed, then formed a 
CIC, then Comic Relief desperately wanted to fund them because they were 
doing such wonderful work, got to the point where they were nearly at signing 
and they said, “Oh by the way you are a Charity aren’t you?” So they ended up 
founding a charity and they are working between Scotland and England – so 
they now have the two directors both self-employed, they’ve got two CICs, one 
registered in England and one in Scotland. One charity at the moment 
registered in Scotland but they need another one in England because lottery 
want to fund them and they need that structure – how stupid." 
  
"Sometimes funder driven decisions – I mean the reason I set my first social 
enterprise up as a charity – I set it up as a company limited by guarantee 
because I wasn’t interested in personal gain and the big funder came, Northern 
Rock Foundation came and said, “We want to give you three-quarters of a 
million pounds but we need to be a charity,” so what would you do? 
 
Advice and support structure used." 
 
 
5. Decision making and Control 
6. Income (grants, trading, investment and mix) 




Quality of Advice; 
1. Local Authorities poor 
2. CVS  & CVA poor 
3. Enterprise Advisers poor, often lack knowledge of social enterprises 
4. A Few lawyers offering good advice 
5. Some social enterprise support networks offering good advice 
6. More adviser training needed 
 
"my personal view is they are better to go to a lawyer to say, “I want to set up a 
CIC limited by shares and I want your advice,” than going to them and saying, 
“What should I set up?” because we actually find the advice quite often quite 
poor." 
 
"we unpick structures quite a lot; particularly – so we find Enterprise Agencies 
haven’t a clue. This is fairly generic – there are one or two individuals who know 
what they are talking about but generally Enterprise Agencies don’t understand 
the structures and sort of see the SBDA Voluntary Sector, advice organisations 
again don’t understand the structures and very few lawyers do." 
 
"But they were advised by the Local Authority to be a CIO and I think if they do 
what they really could do with this, a CIO is not the right structure for them now, 
already, and that’s a year on. And you kind of think… … 
They haven’t got a clue have they?" 
 
"Well you know and there’s a sense for me that there’s a clear need for more 









Accountant in charity sector and charity trustee alongside providing advice to 
trustees and supporting boards in decision making. 
 




Structure change driven by the pursuit of funding or the engagement of 
stakeholders. 
Neither of the two cases discussed changed structure due to complexity and 
understanding of the stakeholders. -- complexity and understanding. 
 
Structure and Governance 
Community Shares, Community Benefit Society (xxxx) Stakeholder 
engagement / management, volume of unsophisticated investors (100 at first 
AGM), education and risk management, level of community interest / 
engagement is key, governance issues related to this form of investment and 
governance with voting at one share one vote regardless of value of investment.  
Board of twelve, self-selected based on community interest, strong chair driving 
the project. 
CBS - benefit, not legally regulated, so not expensive to set up in terms of legal 
costs. However, complex in relation to rules, to register as a charity or not? 
Note of persuading the Charity Commissioners and the two forms of Charity 
(membership or foundation). Simple funding reporting contrasted to other forms 
of funders wanting large reports.. 
Board and decision making, attitude to risk (big financial commitments). Skills 
and experience of Directors and big boards. 
 
Refection on structure. 
Perhaps should have formed a CIC but this would have brought legal costs and 
regulation. CIC locked into earning  money or donations, 
 
Complexity as pick and mix from a Sweetie Jar 
 
Noted that many projects start with getting the project off the ground and don’t 
consider the issues and impact on legal structures five years hence. 
LINK to the work of GEOF COX on structures made here. 
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Issues of legal structure related to funding body requirements (Charity or CIC) 
etc. and asset locks. Badge or asset lock for funders… (Notion of definition and 
form of SE as badge of legitimacy). 
 
Drivers - xxxxx social enterprise 
Community ownership, protecting the asset, and financial efficiency. 
 
Funding related to Heritage Building  
Beneficiary engagement -   tenants as shareholders 
Community interest -  financially and emotionally involved. 
 
Asset Lock 
CBS asset lock to protect the Heritage Building. 
 
Funding & Grants 
Heritage Lottery Funding to repair the building. 
Architectural Heritage Fund loan on favourable terms 
Community shares - withdrawals and re-investment, recycling money. 
Complexity -  understanding what funders want and the related legal issues 
such as VAT and TAX. 
 
Other issues discussed 
 









Chair of a Social Enterprise Network (xxxx) and a director of a LA spin out. 
 
Advisors not choosing structures - importance of impartiality 
 
Key issues in structure selection and advise: 
 
 Decision making 
 Control 
 Ownership 
 Income - Grants, Trade, Contracts  
 Governance 
 
Structure as an outcome of a deductive process - See also outcome of business 
planning process. Community HUBS... 
 
For Charities: issues of traditional sources of funding drying up and seeking to 
trade for sustainability. Structure wise; developing trading arms...  TAX 
implications.... Risk aversion.. 
 
Also issues of cultural and political nature as charity mind-sets are challenged 
by business and trading issues.... Also potential funder and funding history 
conflicts in this sense too.... 
 
LA spin outs - lack of LA officer understanding of structures and implications.... 
NHS ... "Right to request".... Lack of business acumen an understanding by 
service managers.... Health Service commissioning a jumbled mess.... Social 
values bill lacking traction..... 
 
Implications for LA board membership and control... and implications from grant 
funders. 
 
Existing SE's: some issues around the move from grants to trading as an issue 
of sustainability. 
 
Funding implications and new sources such as - Crowd funding and 




Lack of Business support for new SE directly and funding for this is patchy. 
 
Government focus on Investment Readiness links support to investment 
through debt finance - BIG POTENTIAL PROG. 
 




Networks for self-help. 
 
Advisor bias driving legal structure (based on knowledge and skills balance 
rather than maleficent motives). 
 
Business support offer shaped by funding and funders.... Outcome related 




Social Impact bonds discussion.... shell companies for this formed as CLG for 
simplicity, though often wrapped up in complex governance. 
 
Government policy - replacing public investment with private but tendering 
arrangements acting against this... 
 
Again, investor led business support. 
 
Political view:  
 
Government not prepared to fund third sector but happy for it to deliver.... North 
South divide on issues... Devolution issues...Sector lack of belief in local or 
national government. 
 
Growth of limited by shares tech SE's DOTFORGE... Legal structure for 
growth... though concerns over ethos and social impact aspects... 
 
Changing structure to follow funding environment........ Conversion 
issues.... 
 
CIC as badge of SE office - legal structure as badge of legitimacy.... and 
operating issues such as rate relief.... Various types of CIC.. 
 
 
Ideal perhaps a Limited Liability partnership with a community interest test. 
 










25 years of experience in a Social Enterprise 
Origins in Government Initiative with the primary driver being social purpose 
Funding via LA projects 
Governance began with an Advisory Group (up to 12 members) 
No Structure at this time but growing - LA spin out??? 
Driver - Advisory group (stakeholders) looking to protect the use of public funds 
as driver for legal structure 
 
Drivers for structure choice : 
 no shareholders 
 profits for social purpose 
 limited liability 
Outcome: CLG with articles protecting use of assets and social purpose 
 
Advisory group dissolved and focus on CLG board. 
Other than CEO, board are unpaid non exec directors. 
This structure stable for many years. 
Future change in structure driven by the sustainability  of delivering social good 
(non-traditional education for children excluded from school) by funder (DfE) - 
board to be retained and expanded (more governance)....  
Board skills and make up more important with new structure 
New structure prescribed with model articles... 
Income via Trading with schools and winning contracts from public bodies.... 
A sense of moving to from Business to Funder and Business to Consumer. 
No legal Asset Lock - protection is solely in the M&A or objects. Appropriate for 
last 20 years.... though assets limited in value. 
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Forced merger by funders in past raised issues of decision making and 
control.... demerged after a year... Issues over understanding of social good 
and balance of board.... 
Board as support to CEO, balance of skills and experience. Small nature (7 
Directors - 2 members, 4 non-execs and 1 CEO) promotes fast decision 
making. Structure though to be a good one... 
Charity structure considered but avoided due to perceived bureaucracy and 
restrictions on possible activities. 
Took legal advice from local law firm. 
Focus on Social Purpose.... 
Expect less control in new structure driven by funders.... but doing social good 
is the primary driver.... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
